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PREFACE
At present in South Africa, personal compensation in
relation to motor vehicle accidents is firmly based on
the delictual principle of 'fault'. This gives rise
to a number of questions: Is this the system best suited
to the realities of the motor vehicle and its
accident-causing potential in modern society? Are the
interests of society best served by a system of
compensation based on fault? Is this the optimum system
for the handling of the vast number of claims arising
out of motor vehicle accidents? Are there alternative
workable schemes which could be introduced? To these
questions the writer addresses herself in this thesis.
By no means will this thesis answer all the intricate
and complex questions involved in the fault vs. no-fault
debate. However, it is hoped that what follows will
contribute to a better understanding of the basic issues
involved and will facilitate further discussion with
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There is no doubt that the motor vehicle is an inescapable and
fundamental feature of modern society. As such, it has exerted
an enormous influence on virtually every facet of communal life.
Although it was invented in the late 19th century, its socio-
economic and cultural impact has been most acutely felt in the
20th century. However, although the motor vehicle has provided
the world with its most popular - and arguably most economic
mode of transport, by its very nature and widespread use it has
also become a source of enormous damage and destruction.
At its introduction, society experienced great difficulty in
coming to terms with this hitherto unheard-of form of transport.
It was initially viewed with suspicion, scornfully labelled a
"horseless carriage" and dismissed as an aberration unlikely to
have any permanent or widespread effect on transportation.
However, as its potential gained more widespread recognition, so
societal attitudes began to change and the motor vehicle,
assisted by mass production, steadily gained greater sway over
the affairs of men. Roads were designed especially to cater to
its requirements, macadamised surfaces appeared, towns were
redesigned and suburbs sprang up around city centres. A new way
of life centered around and dependant upon the motor vehicle
developed. Within a few short decades of its invention, the
motor vehicle had made an indelible impression upon social and
economic life. By the late 20th century, life without it would
be inconceivable.
The law has adapted to, but not kept abreast with, the socio-
economic impact of the motor vehicle. In the realm of motor
accident injury compensation in particular, it has barely
advanced beyond the "horseless carriage" thought pattern.
Instead, the delictual liability patterns operating at the time
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of its introduction are still largely applied today, despite the
fact that the basic grounds of liability then formulated were
designed for situations which hardly compare to modern-day motor
accidents either in frequency or in seriousness in relation to
social and financial consequences.
Law cannot remain static. It must continually adapt to the needs
of the society it serves. Drastic technological advances which
go beyond the scope of existing laws demand drastic revisions of
those laws. However, the phasing out of obsolescent laws and
their replacement with a more suitable and efficient system is
frequently hampered by a resistance to change, which results in
anachronistic laws being distorted in order to apply to
circumstances for which they were never designed. Such a
situation could lead to perceived or real injustices which, if
left unchecked, would result in dissatisfaction and ultimately
disregard of the law.
it is essential that the existing legal system be
examined to ensure that it is performing at optimum
on its own terms and that it adequately reflects the







2. COMPENSATION LIABILITY IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Compensation liability and the extent of legal protection
afforded by a community to the victims of the wrongful acts of
others can be seen as a reflection of the prevailing attitudes of
that community, and will differ at various stages in its history.
Societal attitudes are moulded by a multitude of factors,
including the economic development of that society, its general
standard of education, its moral and political outlook, its class
structure and its level of technological advancement. As
technological developments take place, so societal attitudes are
forced to adapt to these developments, and this alteration in
attitude is generally followed by a parallel alteration in the
law. This sequence of events is illustrated in an examination of
society's reaction to the introduction of the motor vehicle.
The history
attempt to
of compensation liability can be described as an
balance two fundamental conflicting interests:
society's interest in security and society's interest in freedom
of action.
the result
The former interest demands that a person injured as
of the action of another should be compensated for
such injury, regardless of the motive or purpose underlying such
action. The latter interest, on the other hand, rules that an
injured party will only be able to claim compensation if the
person causing such harm had done so intentionally, or with an
undue lack of concern for the injured party. The choice may also
be seen (1) as one between an individualistic political
philosophy, emphasising the personal responsibility of those who
cause accidents, and a more socialistic doctrine which stresses
that society as a whole is under a moral obligation to care for
those in need of help. Advocates of the former philosophy tend
to see compensation as consisting solely of cash payments
(extracted as punishment from the wrongdoer) which the injured
party may spend as he pleases. Conversely, those supporting the
latter view emphasize the responsibility of society to offer
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compensation not only in monetary terms, but also by way of help
and welfare in kind.
Great Britain's progression into industrialisation embodies the
struggle between these two divergent ideologies. A closer look
at this process - and especially the introduction of the motor
vehicle into that and other countries - in its historical context
illustrates the factors influencing the resolution of this
fundamental conflict.
2.2 THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL ERA
Prior to the Industr ial Revolution, Britain was a predominantly
agricultural society. Its social structure consisted basically
of two tiers made up of the land-owning aristocracy on the upper
level, and the landless peasants on the lower level. The vast
manorial estates of the upper classes were worked by the
peasants, who were often the live-in servants of the landowners.
Relations between aristocrat and peasant were usually
character ised by a type of "benevolent" despotism. The lower
classes were in no position to mobilise any forceful social
change as they did not have sufficient wealth, education or
organisat ion to exert any pressure for change.
The idea of the "Chr istian paternalist ethic", a philosophy well-
suited to the rigid class structures of the day, prevailed. This
doctrine emphasized the state's obligation to serve society by
accepting and discharging the responsibility for its general
welfare. Unfortunately it was hampered by both economic and
administrative considerations.
As far as road transportation was concerned, this was the era of
the horse and carriage. A victim of a road accident in this
pre-industrial era was able to receive compensation from the
person who caused the injury, without being required to prove
fault. This approach was, and is, known as strict liability
i.e., liability imposed irrespective of fault.
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2.3 THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (c. l790-c.l840)(2)
ainto
capital were coordinated under a permissive government,
result was the transformation of an agrarian society
During the period known as the 'Industrial Revolution', Britain
underwent a series of industrial, economic and social changes
which radically altered the appearance of the countryside and
altered the structure of the community itself. Labour, land and
and the
mobile industrialized nation.





which was at once industrial, economic and so-
Until this time the structure of society had been
by the distinction between townsman and pea-
emergence of the new towns with their massed
industrial workers profoundly modified this. The rapidly
developing factories required manpower; population was
drained from rural areas to swell the city slums, where the
new proletariat led an exhausting and wretched existence.












completely erased. The new "working class" was "obliged to
accept a new and harsher work discipline in which the employer
acknowledged no paternal obligation towards his faceless, dehuma-
nised 'hands'" (4).
With the advent of this 'new machine age', with its promise of
great technological advancement, the doctrine of "laissez-
faire", (first propounded by Adam Smith in the late 18th
century), gained predominance. This doctrine embodied the
principle of abstention by the state from interference with
individual action - except to provide for the enforcement of a
framework of laws.
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"Many old privileges and monopolies were swept away and
legislative impediments to enterprise were removed. The
State came to play a less active, the individual and the
voluntary association a more active part in affairs. Ideas
of innovation and progress undermined traditional sanctions:
men began to look forward, rather than backward, and their
thoughts as to the nature and purpose of social life were
transformed" (5).
Under the influence of this liberal and individualistic ideology,
strict liability gave way to fault liability. In terms of this
new system, a person who caused harm to others was only legally
obliged to pay compensation to the people he injured if it could
be established that the person who caused the harm was 'at
fault'. "The foundation of liability was not the damage as such
but the evil intention, i.e., the fault". (6). Attention came to
be focused on the 'moral' culpability of the defendant, with the
law of torts being seen as an instrument for exacting retribution
from those who behaved "wrongfully". Without proof of fault, a
victim would have to bear his own losses, according to the pre-
vailing doctrine of the non-interference of the state. Thus:
"During the nineteenth century the 'moral advance' of tort
law vastly accelerated. In response to doctrines of natural
law and laissez-faire, the courts attached increasing
importance to freedom of action and ultimately yielded to
the general dogma of 'no liability without fault'. This
movement coincided with, and was undoubtedly influenced by
the demands of the Industrial Revolution. It was felt to be
in the better interest of an advancing economy to
subordinate the security of individuals, who happened to
become casualties of the new machine age, rather than fetter
enterprise by loading it with the cost of 'inevitable'
accidents" (7).
The sWing towards individualism and "laissez-faire"
6
during the
Industrial Revolution is indicative of 19th century society's
supreme interest in freedom of action. There is no doubt that
the emergence of 'fault' as the basis for liability was
influenced by the appearance of many new machines which could
prove dangerous, but also socially useful. Fault liability
offered economic protection to inventors and innovators by
shielding them from being held liable for all the losses they and
their machines would have been responsible for under a system of
strict liability. The introduction of liability based on fault
was also seen as a ..... morally favoured compromise between
earlier strict liability concepts and the total designation of
the responsibility for harm flowing from socially desirable
activities" (8). This was the prevailing attitude at the time
of the invention of the motor vehicle, and thus the idea of 'no
liability without fault' was applied to this new machine.
2.4 EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (late 19th cen-
tury onwards).
The third quarter of the nineteenth century was an era of reform,
characterized after 1880 by the revival of British socialism, the
rise of trade unionism, the formation of the Labour party and the
growing acceptance of the view that the state should make itself
responsible for the welfare of its poorer citizens. "Increased
social mobility, the redefinition of the relationships between
different social groups, and the growth of class consciousness ...
led to nation-wide movements of social protest, manifested in
various campaigns for social and economic justice" (9). With
social reform on the upswing and the rise of the Welfare State
came the idea that advances in technology should not be produced
at the expense of society: ..... the focus of attention in the
nineteenth century began to swing away from individual rights in
the direction of social duties, and with it the emphasis shifted
to the function which law fulfils in its communal existence"
(10).
The technological revolution had given rise to inventions which ,
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though providing a technological benefit to society, also had an
accident-causing potential which could no longer be ignored.
Whereas previously fault could be clearly attributed to the
wrongdoer, the introduction and increased use of inventions
possessing the ability to wreak except i on a l damage, against wh i c h
'reasonable care' was not always a sufficient precaution,
heralded a movement back towards strict liability.
The motor vehicle, however, was not included in this category of
'inherently dangerous inventions', and, at least in Britain,
fault liability continued to apply to this mode of transportation
(11). Advances in motor vehicle technology (making greater
speeds possible) and increases in the number of vehicles on the
road, especially with the advent of the 20th century (12), led
to problems being experienced in the application of the fault
princip le to automobile accidents. These problems were primarily
financial. Although many victims were unaware of their legal
right to claim compensation, and others lost what claims they
might have had through the defence of contributory negligence (a
complete defence in those days), the problem of the financial
incapacity of defendants to meet the claims made against them
became increasing ly widespread, notwithstanding the rule of 'no
liability without fault'.
Whereas inability to meet quantum of compensation is a problem
which could be faced by a defendant in any delictual case, the
distinguishing factor here was the immense number and extensive
quantum of the claims ar ising out of a single isolated activity.
Various governments in Europe and the Commonwealth became aware
that as far as motor accidents were concerned, the delictual
action as between individuals was not only failing hopelessly to
compensate innocent victims, but was also causing a great deal of
economic hardship, if not outright bankruptcy, to an increasing
number of drivers. Faced with this generally unsatisfactory
situation it became clear that a whole new class of activity had
been created which would have to be dealt with on its own terms.
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The response of some countries, especially the Scandinavian
countries, was to impose strict liability on automobile owners or
drivers. For example, strict liability statutes were introduced
in Denmark in 1903, in Sweden in 1906, in Norway in 1912, and in
Finland in 1925 (13).
"Many countries of the world have of course long imposed
strict liability on owners or drivers of motor vehicles,
mostly originally in the infancy of motoring in the interest
primarily of pedestrians, who were considered unfairly
exposed to this new extrahazardous menace without
participating in its benefits. Typical is the German
legislation of 1907 which in effect brought the automobile
into line with railways, mines, electricity and gas
undertakings and, later, of aircraft. The French courts, in
a celebrated sleight-of-hand, accomplished the same results
by stripping CC art 1384, dealing with responsibility for
things, of any fault requirement and then subsuming motor
cars to this article instead of continuing to classify
driving as an activity subject to the fault rule of art
1382" (14).
Britain and the Commonwealth, however, responded by introducing a
new type of insurance, formulated to deal exclusively with motor
vehicles. Here the prime motivation was still the protection of
drivers from financial ruin.
With the addition of insurance as a supplement to the law of tort
in relation to motor vehicles, the individualist philosophy
underlying fault l iability was seriously undermined. The burden
of compensating accident victims now fell on all premium paying
motorists, and the idea of retribution extracted from the
individual motorist for his wrongful intent fell away. At the
same time, the argument for deterrence by way of individual
punishment was irreparably weakened.
Although the concept of insurance was introduced to protect
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drivers and to ensure the fin ancial liability of the fault system
apropos motor vehicles, i t also encompassed the idea of the
social distribution of losses. This feature was in keeping with
the continuing 20th century backlash against the rampant
indi v i dualism of the 1 9 th centu r y .
of society being one of security,
With the predominant in teres t
an increasingly collectivist
philosophy was developing.
As noted above, the "individualist" precepts contained in the
idea of fault liability were shaken by the introduction of
insurance. These soon came to be shaken even further by the
realization that the common law alone was not sufficient to deal
with the ever-burgeoning number of accidents. Throughout the
Western World, statutes promulgating compulsory motor vehicle
insurance began to be introduced.
By this stage, flaws in the fault liability insurance system vis-
a-vis motor accident compensation, such as the enormous cost of
the system, the difficulties inherent in determining fault, and
the vast number of victims left uncompensated because they fell
outside the limited boundaries of those eligible for compensation
under such a scheme, were growing ever more evident. Even before
World War Two there was a growing realisation of the need to look
beyond fault to a more equitable and socially just system of




automobile owners as early as
liability
1916 in
Denmark, 1925 in Finland, 1926 in Norway (with a private bond as
an alternative) and 1929 in Sweden (15). In 1928 New Zealand
passed the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act - the
first of its kind in the Commonwealth. Although liability
depended on proof of fault, even at this stage it was suggested
that there should be "cover against risk, no matter how the
accident happened" (16). The Hon. F.J. Rolleston, the Attorney-
General to whom the suggestion was made replied: "that is a goal
to which I should very much like to attain, and I hope it will
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eventually be possible to extend this scheme to that extent"
(17). The issue of no-fault motor vehicle insurance was to
continue to be an important subject of debate in New Zealand.
Britain, too, had to confront the issue, and in 1930 compulsory
motor vehicl e insurance was intro du ce d (18). In 1934 a private
member's bill, which purported to introduce liability for
motorists without proof of fault was introduced into the House of
Lords (19). However, although the bill was approved in the House
of Lords, this was not the case in the House of Commons, and the
issue was shelved. On the other side of the Atlantic, the
Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences
published a report by the Committee to Study Compensation for
Automobile Accidents in 1932. The report recommended the
adoption of a system of compensation which would not necessarily
require accident victims to establish fault on the part of
drivers in order to obtain compensation. This recommendation
came as a result of the committee's extensive study of the social
effects of road accidents and the extent to which losses were met
by the existing system of negligence-based liability.
In South Africa, a great increase in traffic was experienced
after World War One, with a consequent rise in the number of
persons killed and injured in road accidents. Here, too, many
drivers were unable to meet the claims made against them, giving
rise to an undesirable social situation. Consequently, in 1939,
South Africa became the last country in the Western World to
introduce compulsory motor vehicle insurance, with the introduc-
tion of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Bill. Originally, the Bill
envisaged providing protection only to the victim, by the guaran-
teeing of compensation. The insurance company was then to
recover the compensation paid out from the motorist. However, a
Select Committee amended the Bill, and the Motor Vehicle
Insurance Act 29 of 1942 was passed.
Four years later, in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, the
first no-fault road accident scheme was enacted. Although this
momentous move, and its ensuing success, did not spark off a
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rush of "no-fault law" enactments, it can be regarded as a major
catalyst to a growing train of thought.
During the early 1960s various European countries such as
S~ i t z e r l a n d , Austri a and Czechoslovakia a dopted systems of abso-
lute liability, coupled with compulsory insurance (20). A decade
later, many American states initiated new motor vehicle insurance
schemes through a wide variety of plans, which incorporated the
idea of "no-fault" liab~lity in varying degrees. In 1972, New
Zealand introduced the most radical reform to date of accident
compensation law: the first fully comprehensive no-fault scheme
for personal injury by accident. The 1972 Accident Compensation
Act extended no-fault coverage far beyond the confines of motor
vehicle accident compensation. Following this, two Australian
provinces, Tasmania and Victoria, also adopted road accident
compensation without fault, and an Australian Committee of
Inquiry suggested an even more comprehensive scheme than that of
New Zealand, aimed at bringing both accident and sickness
compensation under one national scheme. No fault insuran~e is
now offered in every Canadian province, and the Pearson Commis-
sion in Britain has also proposed a national scheme of no-fault
motor vehicle insurance.
Interest in a system of no-fault motor vehicle insurance for
South Africa has been generated over a number of years, both by
academics and by members of the legal profession. Various Commi-
ssions of Inquiry, including the 1981 Grosskopf Commission of
Inquiry, have examined the issue. Until now, however, it seems
as if there has been an unwillingness to abandon the old Roman-
Dutch delictual principles entrenched in the South African sys-
tem. Perhaps, as one American writer has suggested;
"Long immersion in the legislative mill tends to condition
veteran legislatures to thinking in terms of conflicting
special interests inside the state capital rather than the
broad public outside it" (21).
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Today, no-one can deny that the motor vehicle plays a fundamental
role in society. It is both technologically beneficial and a
source of widespread damage and destruction. It is the duty of a
responsible government to attempt to balance the societal
benefits of this mode of transportation with the welfare
requirements of that society. In order to do so, careful
consideration must be given, by that government, to the arguments
both for and against the various motor vehicle insurance schemes
available to it, so that it may properly determine which scheme
best meets the current needs of the community.
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3. TYP ES OF INSURANCE SCHE MES
3.1 I FTli.ODUCTIO N
The i ntr o d u c t i o n of compulsory insurance for motor vehicles has
gone some way towards resolving the conflict between the inte-
rests of driver and victim, but differences in the types of
insurance schemes which could be applied greatly affect the
nature of the balance of interests finally ach ieved. Before
moving on to a consideration of the various merits and demerits
of the alternative fault-based and non-fault based compensation
systems, it is useful to briefly compare the general characteris-
tics of the three main types of insurance which could be applied
to motor vehicles today.
3.2 THIRD PARTY FAULT LIABILITY INSURANCE
Third party fault liability insurance was once the main form of
insurance applied to motor vehicles, but as already noted, the
last few decades have seen a move away from this type of
insurance in many parts of the Western World.
While most insurance contracts concern the provision of indemni-
fication for loss or damage caused to the person or property of
the premium payer - (as is the case with life, fire, theft and
various forms of accident and illness insurance) - third party
insurance constitutes a notable exception to this general rule.
In fact, under this type of insurance scheme, the insured is the
one person who is unable to receive compensation under his insur-
ance policy. Instead, the purchaser of the policy provides for
the indemnification of the person he negligently injures. Conse-
quently, the system is referred to specifically as "third party"
insurance: the insured being the first party, the insurance
company the second party and the victim the third party. Under
third party insurance, the insurance company assumes responsibi-
lity for compensating the victim for the personal loss or damage
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he has suffered as a result of the policyholder's neg ligence.
Third party liability insurance usually pledges itself to full
compensation of the victim: even intangible losst such as pain
and sufferin g , ffi 3 y be compensate d .
Third party fau lt liability insurance is essentially an e xtension
of the delictual liability system. Although fault law's precept
of individual accountability must of necessity be sacrificed
under a system of insurance (unless the insurance company is
allowed a right of recourse against the insured wrongdoer) third
party liability insurance still incorporates the old "laissez-
faire" idea of 'no liability without fault'. It is imperative
claimed must have been due to the negligence of
that the insured be proven to be at fault t the damages
the insured.
as fault cannot be proved in all cases t and conse-
Third party
compensation t
insurance is thus selective in the provision of
quently the loss lies where it falls for at least some victims.
Adversary proceedings are a standard facet of this type of insur-
ance. A person seeking compensation must either proceed to
court t where as the plaintiff he will have to discharge the
burden of proof that the defendant was 'at f au Lt t , or
alternatively negotiate a settlement with the defendant insurance
company. In any event t a detailed investigation into the deter-
mination of fault is unavoidable t often necessitating the ser-
vices of lawyers t insurance investigators t and assessors. In
addition t the fault principle also applies to the plaintiff t and
his damages will be reduced to the extent that he is found
negligent. This type of insurance scheme tends to utilise a
once-and-for-all l u mp sum settlement t and compensation proceed-
the victim's medical condi-ings may therefore be delayed until
tion has "settled down" sufficiently
assessment of his damages.
3.3 STRICT LIABILITY INSURANCE
for a medical and judicial
The concept of strict liability in our law today is usually
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extrahazardous
linked with the control of things or operations of an
nature which require skilled supervision because
of their potential to cause serious damage. Many countries
originally applied strict liability insurance to the motor
vehicle, because of its enormous accident-causing potential.
Strict liability insurance, or 'risk' liability insurance as it
is also called, was introduced as a supplement to fault liability
(22). Liability flows from a specified "risky" activity rather
than from the defendant's behaviour - the defendant is held
liable irrespective of wrongful intent or negligence (23).
Strict liability insurance is a type of third party liability
insurance: it is taken out by the insured for the benefit of the
victim of his "risky activity" (in this case the driving of a
motor vehicle). Although strict liability compels one who has
caused an injury to compensate the victim of his act, whether
such injury was caused through fault or not, an insured defendant
must still be found and proven to have been 'strictly' liable,
i.e., a causal link between the defendant's activity and the harm
suffered must be established by the ordinary rules of procedure.
Consequently, as with fault liability insurance, strict liability
insurance does not cover ' pure' accidents (such as, for example,
where the motorist causing the accident had a heart attack), or
accidents where on ly the motorist is involved (24) (for example,
where a motorist crashes into a wall).
Under strict liability insurance,a plaintiff will still require
legal assistance in order to bring a claim. Although the need to
prove fault is removed, other defences do exist to a claim under
this type of insurance, and a claimant therefore falls prey to
the delays inherent in an adversarial contest. If the plaintiff
chooses not to take legal action, he will still have to bargain
with the defendant insurance company in order to attempt to reach
an acceptable settlement.
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3.4 FIRST PARTY NO FAULT INSURANCE
First party no-fault insurance can be described as the standard
type of insurance i n oDe r a t i o n today. It forms the basis f o r,
inter alia, life, ac cident, theft and fire insurance. The last
few decades have also seen the rise of the use of first party no-
fault insurance for motor vehicles in some areas of the Western
World.
This type of insurance is known as "first party" because under
this system a policyholder is insured against injury to himself
and looks to his own insurer for compensation. In motor accident
cases, the motorist, his passengers and pedestrians injured by
his car are all covered by his insurance policy. The underlying
rationale is to provide compensation to the policyholder upon his
involvement in an accident, without reference to the issue of
fault. The criterion for compensation is not fault, but the fact
that a person has suffered a loss (25).
Because of the "first party" nature of this type of insurance, an
insured receives compensation directly from his own insurance
company, and the services of "middlemen" such as insurance
experts and lawyers are usually not needed. Adversaria1 proceed-
ings are kept to a minimum, and therefore administration costs
are kept low. The emphasis is on the speedy reimbursement of
those injured in motor accidents, and on the use of as great a
percentage of the premium as possible for the compensation of
victims..
A claimant is compensated on an assessment of his injuries, and
often a fixed schedule -of benefits is provided. Compensation for
non-economic loss in minor cases is often limited, and even
be removed altogether. The extent of coverage under first party
no-fault motor vehicle insurance may be optional to a certain
degree, with a specified basic minimum being enforced. Often
the standard policy requires an insured to meet a certain part of
the loss himself, for example the first two weeks or so of lost
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wages.
It should also be mentioned that no apportionment takes place
under no-fault insurance: people are protected against their own
negligence as well as that of other people.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. "Whether strict liability may be classified as delictual
liability is a question of terminology; but it would not
appear inconsistent to u s to recognise that in the law of
delict, risk as a g r o u n d f or liabilit y may exist alongside
the traditional one o f f a ult". Hosten, Edwards, Nathan and
Bosman Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory
1977 p.497. However, strict liability has been criticised
as "not an alternative to negligence at all. Indeed, strict
liability is merely a negative notion in itself" Atiyah
op cit. p.168.
2. Atiyah op cit. p.264 comments on the anomalous situation
which arises where "the mo r e 'strict' tort liability is, the
nearer liability insurance approaches first party insurance,
until it eventually reaches the point where it is evidently
nothing more than first party insurance purchased by one
person for the benefit of others".
3. Ibid pp.169-170. "If it were recognised that the only
rational justification for 'strict liability' was that
motorists are good risk bearers via insurance, and not that
they ought to be held liable for accidents they have caused,
it would be appreciated that there is no logical reason for
giving a remedy to the victim of a non-fault caused accident
where another motorist is involved, but none where no other
motorist is involved".
4. In most cases, compensation will only be refused where the
driver wilfully caused the accident, or was driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs.
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4. AN EXAMINATION OF THE FAULT SYSTEM
4.1 INTRO DUCTION
Much debate has arisen in recent years as to the effectiveness of
the "fault"-based liability formula in motor accident
compensation systems. The debators generally fall into one of
two camps: those who criticize the fault system and cite first
party no-fault compensation as a superior alternative, and those
who ardently defend the concept of a fault-based system, deny the
viability of "no-fault" as a suitable substitute, and who confine
themselves to reform within the fault system itself.
Underlying the application of fault as a basis for liability is
th~ rationale that an individual ought to be held personally
liable for his actions, but only where there is moral culpability
on his part. No-fault compensation, on the other hand, seeks to
remove this perceived injustice to the victim by focussing on the
plight of the injured individual, rather than on the wrongful
conduct of the actor. The reasoning of those who uphold and
defend the fault principle is that if compensation were awarded
irrespective of culpability, standards of morality would be
seriously undermined, and the incentive to exercise care on the
part , of the driver would be diminished, if not totally
eliminated. The fault criterion, they assert, is objective, fair
and just. On the other hand, proponents of the no-fault
insurance system argue that fault liability insurance fails to
protect the interests of those injured in road accidents. In
addition, they attribute many of the deficiences of the fault
system as a whole - such as high administration costs and delay
in payments - directly to the imposition of the fault criterion.
No-fault insurance, they insist, would present a more equitable
and efficient solution to the problem of modern-day accident
compensation.
This chapter addresses itself to an examination
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of the
traditional arguments put forward for and against the fault
system as a whole.·
4.2 AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE FAULT SYSTEM
4.2.1 OBJECTIVITY
The fault liability system, it is argued, is essentially an
objective system. It is this characteristic of "objectivity"
which lends the system a certain aura of solidity and fairness.
As noted earlier, liability under the fault system is dependant
upon a finding of 'fault' on the part of the person against whom
judgment is sought. In endeavouring to ascertain whether or not
a person was 'at fault', the law measures his conduct against
that of the hypothetical 'reasonable man'. Thus in order to
prove fault, it must be shown that the defendant deviated from
the course of action which the reasonable man would have
undertaken under the same circumstances, i.e., that he failed to
take the degree of care which a reasonable man would have taken.
Liability is thus established on a case-by-case basis. This
method of judging liability has been sharply critized:
"What is negligence? It is the failure to do what the
reasonable man does. These words give the appearance of
being a statement of primary fact. We first assume that the
reasonable man exists, then we assume that he actually
behaves in a certain way; then we measure the defendant's
behaviour against his. But this hides the element of judg-
ment, it hides the fact that the judge decides not merely
how the defendant behaved but, whether he ought not to have
behaved differently. In deciding that question the judge is
not merely comparing the defendant's behaviour against the
behaviour of the reasonable man - in the absence of common
practice, there is no such man and no such behaviour in fact.
The standard of behaviour against which the defendant's
conduct is thus measured is a standard decided on, and
inevitably decided on, by the judge himself" (1).
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Having pointed out this flaw in the practical application of the
reasonable man concept, with some of its implications, Atiyah
further elucidates on the difficulties of gauging what a
reasonable man's conduct would be:
"The courts have never agreed that they are precluded from
finding negligence even in the face of unanimous and long
standing practice... If it were alleged that a driver was
negligent in driving across a road junction without
stopping, it would not advance his case much to prove that
he had observed the crossing in question and ascertained
that 90% of the drivers did the same" (2).
It would appear from the above that what is judged to be the
supposed conduct of l the 'reasonable man' is not necessarily a
reflection of common driving practice, and that consequently the
reasonable man is not everyman. One might assess the reasonable
man to be that fictitious person who carries out what the
presiding officer considers to be reasonable behaviour. It
follows that what might be judged 'reasonable' conduct by one
judge may be appraised differently by another - resulting in a
certain discrepancy in the reasonable man criterion. There is
also great difficulty in establishing precedent, because each
case is unique. In addition, the split-second judgments demanded
of drivers make it difficult to judge what the reasonable man
would do under the circumstances, because tort law theory
ostensib ly acknow ledges that even the reasonable man may
occasionally make mistakes.
The application of the reasonable man criterion may result in a
plaintiff experiencing:
••• great difficulty in proving that the driver
failed to take reasonable care. If, for example, the
accident was caused by the negligence of some other road-
user, whether motorist or pedestrian, and the driver had
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done all that a reasonable driver cou ld have done, he may
not be liable; or if the accident was caused by some defect
in the car whic h no reasonable man could have foreseen or
preve n t e d , the driv e r will escape li a b i l it y" (3).
The trend today however, would seem to be towards sympathising
with the plight of the injured victim. In the full knowledge
that fault must be proved to compensate such victim, the courts
are tempted to stretch the definition of negligence to include
more and more conduct which in reality merely amounts to the
ordinary driving practices normally considered incidental to the
risks of motoring.
It has been stated that:
"Traffic would probably be paralysed if drivers and police
did not take a congenial laissez-faire approach to tra~fic
regulations, and view ' them more as advisory than binding.
It is probably just such flexibility and adaptability of the
driver that allow him sometimes to stray innocently over the
hazard threshold into a collison, but which in most
circumstances keep him safe and optimize the pursuit of his
objectives. We call this skilful driving as long as nothing
happens. However, those same manoeuvres would be branded
irresponsible and reckless if some unexpected occurence were
to cause a mishap" (4).
It is a widely held view that a large percentage of road
accidents can be attributed to what can be described as "driver
error
However
"Driver 'error' is not always avoidable. Inferences as to
culpability made from a driver's failure in any particular
situation must be drawn very carefully, inasmuch as many
errors are not avoidable by the average drivers even by the
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exercise of reasonab le care. A number of limitations on the
average driver's abilities to perform his task ens ure that a
number of unavoidable crashes will result which will be
later ascribed a s d ri ve r e r r o r .
Most drivers are often 'guilty' of driver error. A certain
magnitude of driver error is representative of the behaviour
of the general average of drivers, and must be considered as
normal, even though such behaviour departs from 'standard',
, correct' , or ' ideal ' behaviour" (5).
It is also true to say that ordinary drivers may have certain
qualities which the courts, in their attempt to keep the standard
of fault 'objective', do not take into consideration in their
judgments. A defendant may be inexperienced, or have bad
judgment, or be young or old, or handicapped in some way. By the
same token, it is no defence that a driver was unaware of the
potential harm of his conduct, or that he was not conscious of
committing any fault. It is therefore not necessary to a finding
of negligence that the driver's conduct was morally blameworthy
in any way. It would seem that the essential objectivity of the
reasonable man concept is, of necessity, lost in its application,
becoming subject to the sympathies of the presiding officer.
This perhaps unavoidable fact is further exacerbated by the lack
of set standards for reasonableness and unreasonableness. This
lack of clearly defined outlines makes the "reasonableness"
criterion one which is very difficult, if not impossible, for the
man in the street to comp ly with. When viewed in this light, the
aura of solidity and fairness tends to crumble to reveal what
must be described as a very vague criterion to apply when judging
real traffic accidents involving real human beings.
4.2.2 DETERRENCE
Exponents of fault liability believe that the imposition of the
fault requirement, with its emphasis on personal liability, acts
as a deterrent to negligent driving. Although the aim of
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d e t e r r i n g drivers from the sort of driving which is likely to
lead to accidents is of course a good one, "To say that the goal
of the law is deterrence (if that is true) is not the same as
s a y i n g that it actually does deter" (6). "Unfortunately, t he
claim of a significant deterrent effect for the present
automobile liability insurance system has so far proven
unsusceptible to substantiation by empirical evidence" (7). On
the contrary, there would seem to be some evidence that countries
which utilise the no-fault system for motor accident compensation
have not experienced an increase in irresponsible driving:
"More than 10 years of motoring and accident experience in
about two dozen states indicate that the highway fatality
and injury rates in no-fault states exhibit no significant
difference from those in traditional states" (8).
In spite of this, it is argued that in the event of the fault
criterion being removed, drivers would no longer be deterred from
negligent driving, incentives to exercise care would vanish, and
the result would be increasingly unsafe driving habits and a
probable rise in the number of accidents (9).
The validity of the view that personal liability deters motorists
from d~iving negligently is, however, somewhat questionable.
Firstly, since the act of negligence is often in reality an error
of judgment, and as such not subject to conscious or moral
decision, it is debatable whether a person can be deterred from
acting negligently. Secondly, if a driver is not deterred from
driving negligently by the fact that in doing so he may injure
himself or his family, lose his driver's license or incur
criminal penalties, it is unlikely that he will be deterred by
the risk of incurring liability for harm caused to someone else.
This view is particularly apposite when one considers that even
in the event that a driver is found to be legally liable, the
damages will not be met out of his own po~ket, but out of the
funds of his insurance company.
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The supporters of fault liability claim that even fear for one's
own safety is reduced by the knowledge that the accident costs
will be paid for (10). This really does not seem plausible. A
driver may recklessly disregard safety for a number of reasons
but surely not because he or his family would be compensated
should an accident occur. There are further weaknesses in the
argument that the fault liability system actually does det~r
negligent driving. One of these is that:
"A motorist cannot reach even the threshold of thinking
about the legal inconveniences of his carelessness until his
mind admits that he is driving carelessly and that he may
have an accident. But motorists are notoriously optimistic
about not becoming accident statistics themselves,
notoriously qUick to blame the other fellow when an accident
occurs, and notoriously generous in appraising the quality
of their own driving. Thus we are fighting an uphill battle
against human nature if we try to base a campaign for safe
driving on the fear of what will happen with insurance
claims" (11).
In considering the psychological outlook of the driver, it is
probably true to say that the average driver is probably fairly
confident of his driving prowess, and that very few drivers climb
behind the wheel with the expectation that they will shortly be
involved in a collision (unless they have the specific intent of
bringing this about). Consequently it would be true to say that
the legal liabilities of a collision are unlikely to be uppermost
in the mind of the average driver, and that the fear of incurring
those liabilities would therefore be unlikely to have a reforming
effect on his driving.
On the other hand, the average driver, even when totally
oblivious of the law of delict regarding motor accidents,
probably drives with a certain amount of prudence and caution.
However, it is not only "speed fiends" and "exhibionist" drivers
who get involved in collisions. Instead,
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a road network filled with cars driven only by the
most skilled, reasonable and prudent drivers will still
generate accidents. Furthermore, if it is assumed that this
hypothetical r oad network includes a representative share of
high-speed roads, intersections, curves and turns, and hills
and bumps, it can be confidently predicted that the system
will generate a certain percentage of serious injuries and
of deaths without a single reckless or careless driver being
on the road" (12).
In other words, accidents are an inevitable by-product of the
presence of motor vehicles on the road. This is especially true
considering the driving conditions of today, with the high speeds
and quick reflexes that motoring demands (13). Even 'good'
drivers make mistakes, and it is only chance which determines
whether an error will result in an accident or not. Along with
this idea goes the view that the role of the driver is vastly
over-emphasized, since it is merely one of the many components of
a traffic accident. In this light the ethical correctness of
awarding compensation to a victim on the basis of whether someone
else can be proven to have been negligent or not seems doubtful.
The proponents of fault liability still assert that negligence is
a clear-cut issue, and cite the number of cases where the courts
have indeed
However, this
found the defendant guilty of negligent driving.
view does not take into account the possibility
that more and more conduct is being labelled 'negligent' simply
because the accident occurred - whereas realistically such
conduct could be regarded as standard driving practice. This
labelling may well be motivated by the fact that a finding of
fault is necessary in order to compensate a victim, but the use
of a harsh criterion for compensation does not justify the
distortion of the negligence concept.
Proponents of . the fault system claim further that an advantage of
the fault system is that a negligent driver undergoes social
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However:
and that such community disapproval restrains dangerous
This social censure is supposed to imbue the defendant
censure,
driving.
with a sense of moral guilt.
"Whatever offences are created and whatever penalties are
made applicable, t he fact remains that the sense of moral
guilt is generally absent. Few intend to kill or to cause
harm: comparatively few are guilty of truly reckless or
negligent driving. Infinitely the vast majority have only a
split-second lapse of care or a momentary error of
judgment"(l4) •
The absence of moral guilt has the effect that:
"Punishment on these terms, does not deter dangerous
driving. The driver whose conduct has been subject to a
super-critical standard and found wanting tends to think of
himself not as a properly chastised, but only as someone
victimised or unlucky" (15).
If a closer look is taken at the so-called "punishment" meted out
to negligent drivers (i.e., the payment of damages to the
victims) it is evident that even under fault liability insurance
it is not the 'guilty' driver, but his insurance company who pays
up. Thus, in purely economic terms, it cannot be an effective
deterrent.
To counter this, fault adherents often suggest that motorists
should be prevented from insuring against the whole of their
liability. The negligent defendant, they argue, should be ob-
liged to pay a certain amount - perhaps a set percentage - of the
damages out of his own pocket.
However, any measure which would increase the danger of victims
not receiving a percentage of compensation due to lack of funds
on the defendant's part would be a regressive rather than a
progressive step. An alternative solution proposed by proponents
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of the fault system is to allow the victim to claim the whole
amount from the defendant insurance company, thus ensuring
compensation, while at the same time, allowing the insurance
company to recover the compensation paid from the negligent
party.
However:
this scheme also has grave disadvantages, not least
being that neither insurer nor insured would have any
interest in enforcing the payment, even the insurer would
find it simpler to raise the level of his premiums
generally, than try to extract indemnities from individual
motorists. In any event, if sums are to be extracted from
the motorists as a quasi-fine after the victim is paid, this
appears a more appropriate task for the criminal law, with
its required procedural safeguards for an accused" (16).
It should be noted that while there is a consensus of opinion as
to the lack of deterrent value of the fault criterion among
critics of the system, it is recognised that the law of
contributory negligence ~ have a deterrent effect. However, it
is not the person "at fault" who suffers, but the claimant, who
loses a percentage of his compensation even if he was only
slightly 'at fault'. This may cause him considerable hardship if
he was severely injured. This effect has been criticised on the
grounds that:
the degree of sanction bears no relationship to the
degree of negligence displayed. The grossly negligent who
has suffered a cut finger loses ten dollars of potential
recovery. The barely negligent claimant who is paralysed
for life may lose hundreds of thousands. The arbitrariness
of the sanction violates all principles of scientific
correction" (17).
The punishment aspect of deterrence can perhaps best be summed up
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by the following statement:
"Looked at as a deterrent system, tort can be regarded as
lagging far behind the law of crime. In criminal law we
have learnt the necessity of individualising punishment and
even, in many cases, of refraining from punishment
altogether; but tort still imposes an arbitrary, mechanical
forfeiture" (18).
4.2.3 MORALITY/ETHICS
The fault concept is upheld on the moral wground that to make a
negligent driver compensate the victim of his 'faulty' conduct
accords with the principles of basic justice. Basing liability
on fault is credited with encouraging a sense of individual
responsibility otherwise lacking in modern society, and it is
feared that should the fault criterion be removed, this would
result in a decline in the standards of morality. In respect of
the ethical merits of fault law it has been said that:
"The concept of liability on the grounds of negligence is to
be defended on the ground that it is morally superior to a
rule of absolute liability, and the basis of all liability
is not mere logic but pure morality" (19).
The principle that justice and morality demand that an injured
person should not have to bear the loss caused by another's
negligence, and that the defaulter should be made to pay
compensation to such injured person, should be closely examined.
GlanvilleWilliams (20) cites two alternative theories in
connection with this principle. Firstly, there is the theory of
ethical retribution which emphasizes the punitive aspect of the
payment of compensation. The idea is that the defaulter should
be made to suffer. This view has been endorsed by writers such as
Salmond, who believed that:
the ultimate purpose of the law in imposing liability
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on those who harmed others was to punish the wrongdoer, not
to compensate the victim. In his view compensation was not
the object or even a sufficient justification for imposing
legal liability. It was no more than the instrument by
which the law fulfilled its purpose of penal coercion. The
basis of the fault principle therefore was that the
wrongdoer should pay" (21).
Along with this line of argument goes the idea that fault has "a
distinctive function to perform in the handling of indignation"
(22). In other words, fault law gives a victim the satisfaction
of extracting compensation for his damages from the "guilty"
party, and thus getting his revenge.
here is the beneficial aspect of the payment of
Secondly ,
emphas ized
there is the theory of ethical compensation. What is
compensation: the reimbursement of the victim. Justice is seen
to be done if the victim receives compensation for the harm he
has suffered, and this compensation does not necessarily have to
be provided by the wrongdoer himself.
Today, ethical retribution has been rejected by many because of
its vindictive nature, (23) and has been rendered virtually
inoperat ive by the institution of insurance. It is not the
'guilty' defendant who pays the bill, but his insurance company.
The pla intiff is compensated out of funds collected from all
premium paying automobile owners, the vast major ity of which have
no connection whatsoever with the particular accident in
question .
One can accept the justness of the principle that a person in-
jured by the negligence of another should not have to bear this
loss himself. However, the ethical compensation theory does not
subscribe to the idea of payment without proof of fault, as it is
based on the principle of the innocent being compensated for harm
done by the guilty (24). The question arises: can it be held to
be morally "wrong" to compensate a person injured in an accident
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which was not ostensibly caused by another's fault1 To reply in
the affirmative would be to condemn accident, life and fire
insurance and other loss distribution devices as immoral.
Another aspect of the morality issue concerns the fact that the
personal blameworthiness of the defendant plays no part in the
determination of liability. Liability flows from an act of
negligence~ which in all probability results from a momentary
error. Morally, a person can only be condemned if he knowingly
trangresses the rules. However, as far as fault law is
concerned,
negligence is not a state of mind, but conduct which
falls below the standard regarded as normal or desirable in
a given community. The subjective notion of personal
'fault' has long been discarded in favour of the stricter,
impersonal standard of how a reasonable man would have acted
in the circumstances. In this manner, while retaining a
verbal link with the moral criterion of fault, the admoni-
tory function of the principle has been largely overshadowed
for the sake of compensating accident victims, regardless of
the "wrong-doer's" subjective "blameworthiness"" (25).
Thus, even if a defendant is found technically to have been "at
fault" this does not necessarily imply that his actions should be
described as morally "wrong". In other words:
the law of tort does not perfectly reflect morality.
Good motive is not necessarily a defence in tort, and bad
motive does not necessarily make a tort" (26).
On the other hand, it is possible to question the morality of a
system which deprives an injured victim of compensation. The
view has been put forward that society has a moral duty to
protect the public from the harms associated with modern methods
of transportation:
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"If one believes that society should protect th~ individual.
helping him develop his personality and reach his potentia-
lities. if one believes that society constitutes a brother-
hood of men. then a fortiori one should organise society to
protect people against hazards and especially road hazards.
which constitute a large social problem and are caused by a
special. identifiable category of things. To refuse to
protect man against the motor vehicle. one of the greatest
killers in industrialised societies. would amount to
abandoning him to the daily possibility of tragedy and tc
following a purely egotist and fatalistic philosophy" (27).
4.2.4 FULL COMPENSATION AND INDIVIDUAL ATTENTION
It is argued that only under the fault system does a victim
receive full compensation for his loss. Supporters of this
system claim that every aspect of a plaintiff's damages is
covered under fault liability law. and that in addition. fault
liability insurance provides the unique feature of compensation
tailored to the individual characteristics and specific
deprivations of each individual case.
fault l iability, so the argument goes.
totally recover all his losses.
Only under a system of
will a victim be able to
It must be acknowledged that compensation schemes under the fault
system usually provide for an extensive range of benefits, inclu-
ding the compensation of non-economic loss such as pain and
suffering. By contrast, compensation awards for non-economic
loss in no fault schemes tend to be limited. and in some cases
completely dispensed with (usually in respect of minor injuries).
Payments under the fault system can be very high usually in
isolated cases which make the headlines. However, only those
fortunate few who are able to prove fault on the part of another
driver are eligible for any compensation at all. It is possible
to argue that the fault system is able to make such handsom~
payouts because of the small percentage of motor victims to whom
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compensation is available, and that for each victim adequately
compensated, many others are left either under-compensated or
uncompensated (28). One must also take into account the fact
that by far the majority of claims conclude in a settlement with
the defendant insurance company. The high percentage of settle-
ments is largely due to the delays, uncertainty and expense
involved in proving one's case in court, and the fact that the
courts often apportion liability in any event. Insurance
companies are able to capitalize on this risk and thus strike a
bargain with the plaintiff at a figure below "full" compensation.
The fault system's dedication to full compensation has . been
criticized as wasteful, especially in relation to minor claims.
This is especially so when those minor losses are compensated by
a source other than motor vehicle accident compensation, with the
result
that:
that some victims are doubly compensated. It is argued
huge sums can be saved by eliminating entitlement to
benefits for the first few days, and these savings can be
used to provide benefits to those who now receive none.
no doubt that the 100 perThere is
applied in tort law today, is one of
cent principle, as
the principal factors
leading to over-compensation for minor injuries,
compensation for more serious cases" (29).
and under-
Providing full compensation for lost wages can also deprive an
accident victim of the incentive to return to work.
As far as the claims of "individually-tailored compensation" are
concerned: each case admittedly receives individual attention
under the fault liability insurance system. No-fault schemes, on
the other hand, often employ schedules for the purpose of alloca-
ting compensation to victims. These schedules prescribe set sums
of compensation according to the nature and type of the loss or
impairment of bodily function, without taking the individual
characteristics of the victim into account. However, it can be
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argued that,far from being an advantage over scheduled awards, it
is precisely this feature of 'individual attention' which approp-
riates an inordinate percentage of the premium price. The
'attentio n ' is most often directed at t h e qu a n t u m of liabili t y,
and contributory negligence, rather than towards an examination
of the particular needs of the victim. Care is taken in asses-
sing the nature of a victims injuries, but this feature is not
•unique to the fault system. Although schedules of compensation
tariffs are often provided under no-fault schemes (and these seem
to work fairly well), there are also no-fault schemes, such as
those of Michigan and New Jersey in the USA, which provide for
medical and rehabilitation services that are unlimited in time as
well as costs. Earnings-related compensation under the New
Zealand no-fault scheme is individually tailored, as it is calcu-
lated at 80 per cent of an injured individual's loss of earning
capacity. Rehabi litation programme. designed in accordance with
a victim's specific needs are also offered.
It is a moot p~int whether no-fault s6hemes sacrifice individual
attention to more efficient and speedy compensation, and whether
victims eligible for compensation under the fault system really
do receive true individual attention in every case. · The view has
been put forward that:
"The present [fault] system is individualistic mainly in
theory, in practice it is categorical and mechanical, as any
system must be if it is to handle masses of cases in an
efficient manner" (30).
The ultimate proposition of no-fault advocates is that the best
compensation system is one which benefits the largest number of
individuals, and which concentrates on compensating the most
seriously injured victims. No-fault insurance schemes do not
provide compensation for all victims, but they do provide relief
for many more victims than fault liability insurance schemes.
No-fault schemes also tend to focus attention on the more
seriously injured victims, although this may be at the expense of
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providing full compensation fo r minor claims.
4.2~5 FAULT IS KNOWN AND UND ERSTOOD
Some supporters of the fault criterion contend that because the
fault system has been in use for so l o n g , the workings of the
system are well known and accepted by the general public, who
have not demonstrated dissatisfaction with the system. This may
be true to a certain extent, but it nevertheless does not exclude
the possibility that this "acceptance" is in fact due not only to
a lack of public awareness regarding alternative forms of compen-
sation, but also to a lack of understanding as to how the fault
liability system operates. It can be argued that the majority of
the population, lacking as it does any sort of legal education,
is largely unaware of its rights in connection with third party
motor vehicle insurance. People do not campaign against a system
of which they have only limited knowledge, and silence cannot be
assumed to indicate satisfaction.
In relation to motor accident compensation in Britain,
been stated that:
it has
"There has been an upsurge of interest in some academic
circles in recent years, and also to a limited extent among
the professions directly concerned ••• But we found no
widespread appreciation of what might be involved and
certainly a fairly general lack o f concern among the public,
except for those who had suffered injury and discovered from
personal experience some of the defects of the system" (31).
Again, the general public has no choice as to the compensation
systems imposed upon it. That choice is made at a much higher
level - in most cases by the government acting in consultation
with certain legal advisory bodies. However, a survey taken in
America revealed that:
the general public prefers insurance which offers the
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certainty of payment of actual lo ss suffered as opposed to
the uhcertainty of recovery .of .a c t u a l loss suffered plus
pain and suffering, dependent on whether or not fault can be
proved" (3 2 ).
One can also argue that public dissatisfaction with the law in
relation to motor accident compensation is reflected in the
fragmentary but significant demands for change voiced in articles
and correspondence columns of the daily press, professional jour-
nals etc., although there is admittedly no cohesive and
articulate public demand for change.
In conclusion, even if one accepts the fact that the general
public is familar with the fault ' s y s t e m , this does not necesarily
constitute a valid argument for maintaining the system. The
point at issue must remain the overall effectiveness of the
system, as opposed to the public's knowledge of the inner
workings of that system. An inadequate system cannot be redeemed
merely on the grounds of public familiarity with it.
4.3 AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE FAULT SYSTEM
This section examines the various criticisms levelled against
the fault system, and attempts to illustrate the no-fault
solution to these problems.
4.3.1 UNCOMPENSATED VICTIMS
A major criticism levelled against the fault liability insurance
system is that only a small percentage of motoi accident victims
are reimbursed for their losses, (33) while the majority is left
uncompensated. The reason for this discrepancy is that" the
main focus of the law of delict is on the conduct of the
defendant, rather than on the needs of the plaintiff, with the
aim of compensation being subordinated to the fault requirement"
(34). The fault system is deliberately selective with regard to





of another motorist in order to recover damages. If such
cannot be proved, the loss is not shifted but lies where it
Setti n g aside for the moment cases where a victim cannot recover
because of his own 'faulty' conduct, there are also many instan-
ces in which even a blameless victim will go uncompensated. ,
Examples of these include: where a victim cannot prove fault on
the part of another, due to lack of eVidence; where the driver
who caused the injury was not at fault (for example, where he
suffered a heart attack whilst driving); where the accident was
due to mechanical failure, such as brake failure; where the
injured party took evasive action and there was no "contact" with
the unknown negligent vehicle (35). The fault system also re-
quires that there be both a wrongdoer and a victim for compensa-
tion to be available, and thus certain single-car accident
victims are barred from compensation, whether they were 'at
fault' or not (36).
Proponents of no-fault believe that the time has come to insti-
tute a change in objective from the indemnification of drivers to
the compensation of victims. A first-party no-fault insurance
scheme would eliminate the fault-finding requirement altogether.
A victim's qualification for compensation would merely be the
existence of his injuries, and thus the problem of uncompensated
victims would be greatly alleviated.
Opponents of no-fault, on the other hand, contend that compensa-
tion on a no-fault basis would be unjust, in that it would amount
. to 'rewarding' the 'guilty' motorist. In addition, they argue
that the fact that the wrongdoer is not made to pay compensation
to the victim (as the victim would c laim from his own insurer)
would foster an irresponsible attitude on the part of drivers.
As regards the alleged injustice of such a system, it has been
noted earlier that there is a fine line between those whom the
courts choose to label "guilty', and those considered "innocent".
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One might also question the "justice" of punishing a motorist and
his or her ~ family financially for years, for what was possibly a
momentary lapse of judgment. In answer to the allegation that no-
fault in s u r a nce "rewards" t h e guilty it should b e n o t e d that
these victi ms · can hardly b e regarded as being " r e wa r d e d " .
Compensation would be provided for people who would have been
denied relief under the fault system, but this would not necessa-
rily constitute a 100 per cent reimbursement, and would hardly
be likely to constitute an incentive to get injured. It should
also be noted that even no-fault schemes exclude certain catego-
ries of drivers from receiving compensation. Such exclusions
usually include motorists who deliberately and intentionally
cause an accident, and motorists who indulge in wilful
misconduct, such as driving under th~ influence of alcohol or
drugs. As regards the desirability of "making the wrongdoer
pay", it suffices to reiterate that under both fault liability
insurance and no-fault insurance, it is the insurance company who
pays and not the individual motorist.
Another objection often voiced against the institution of no-
fault motor accident compensation is that as far as uncompensated
victims are concerned, there are a wide variety of accidents to
which a person might fall prey, and it is therefore unjust to
single out and especially favour the victims of automobile
accidents with no-fault compensation while victims of other
accidents must struggle to prove negligence.
"As to the victims, it would involve singling out from the
universe of the needy those persons who happen to be in auto
accidents. The needy man who falls while crossing the
street, to say nothing of the n e e d y man who suffers from
disabling disease, would not be a beneficiary or concern of
the fund" (37).
It has been suggested that the law should rather "address itself
directly to the problem of poverty " (38), and that universal
compensation should be insisted upon. This is without doubt a
41
most laudable aim, but one questions the logic of shunning a more
modest type of reform pending the institution of a general
national health insurance plan.
Professors Keeton and O'Connell address
objection by observing:
themselves to this
"Why do we isolate automobile accidents for special
consideration? The person injured in an automobile accident
is, after all, only one of many kinds of victim of mischance
and hazard. Why not include in our concern all of these
victims among others, the victims of the power
lawnmower, cancer and the fall at home? This question has
been asked rhetorically so often that it has come to be
termed the "bathtub" argument. This is the one which (asks)
Why not compensate the man who steps and falls in his
bathtub at home? A fall in the bathtub is an isolated
event. It is not a social problem. It is not a product of
a fast moving society which leaves thousands of victims
without means of support or sustenance. The automobile
accident victim, on the other hand is a very marked social
problem, both because of his number and because of the
sources of his injury" (39).
In spite of this, some proponents of the fault system deny that
the number of injuries and deaths caused every year by motor
vehicles amounts to a distinct social problem worthy of being
singled out in this manner (40). Here the statistics speak for
themselves:
Amer i c a 1982 ( 41 )
New Zealand 1983 (42)
43,945 road accident deaths;
1,269,000 seriously injured motor
accident victims
644 road accident deaths;
16,200 injured victims
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Sout h Africa 1984 (42) 9,621 road accident deaths;
27,795 seriously injured motor
accident victims
Proponents of the fault s ystem argue that it is not the function
of the fault system to perform a social welfare service. This is
not a criticism of the no-fault system per se, but the exposition
of a certain philosophy which denies that the law can be an
instrument of social advancement in addition to being the
upholder of the status quo.
4.3.2 OVER AND UNDER-COMPENSATION
It is alleged that in addition to leaving large numbers of motor
vehicle accident victims uncompensa ted, the fault liability
system often misal10cates compensation in those instances where
it does choose to provide indemnification. Victims with minor
injuries are paid soon after rendering their claims, and are
often over-compensated for their loss. On the other hand, those
with more serious injuries must often endure long delays, and
when they finally do receive payment they are under-compensated.
"Studies have shown that the least injured (those with less
than $500 in medical expense and wage loss) end up
recover~ng on the average four and a half times their actual
loss. By contrast, a US government study found that those
with direct damages of more than $25,000 recover an average
of just five cents on the dollar - ironic, because it means
that the most seriously injured, who receive the greatest
pain, end up getting no compensation for their 'pain and
suffering'" (43).
In Britain, the Pearson Commission discovered that:
minor claims, especially those for non-pecuniary loss,
are relatively over-compensated, whilst in cases of serious
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and lasting disability, plaintiffs often fail to achieve
that restitution of their financial position which is the
objective of damages in tort" (44).
This inequitable distribution of funds would appear to be
directly linked to the process of litigati~n endorsed by the
fault system. In settling a minor claim, insurance companies
bear in mind the potential cost of litigating such a claim:
usually it would cost more to defend the claim than to pay it
out. They are therefore prepared to pay in excess of the true
value of the claim in order to avoid the waste of time and money
involved in litigation. However, with a more serious claim, the
large amount of money at issue makes it worth the insurer's while
to litigate. Furthermore, whereas the insurance company has the
funds available to litigate, victims suffering severe injuries
are often in dire economic circumstances, due to lost income and
the added financial burden of medical treatment. Such victims
are often willing to settle for less than what they might receive
in court simply in order to avoid further delay. An insurance
company is thus able to use the uncertainties of litigation to
persuade accident victims to accept a low settlement. In such a
negotiated settlement, the plaintiff is pitted against the
strength of the defendant insurance company, which has little
incentive to be 'generous'. In fact, the motorist who suffers
serious injuries is locked in a no-win situation as:
even if the claimant prevails in court, the expenses
of litigation must be paid. Since the recovery is generally
limited to damages for the actual injury, a plaintiff must
deduct these expenses from a sum computed only on the basis
of the injury" (45).
It would appear that major claims are never fully compensated.
Not only is the fault liability insurance system biased in favour
of minor claims, but overseas studies have shown that affluent
claimants are likely to be better compensated than poor ones. It
is reported that: "families with under $5,000 income emerged
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with just 38 cents for each dol lar of loss while those with
incomes of over $10,000 got 61 c e n t s " (46). This could be
explained by the fact that the financial impact of such injuries
would pr o b a bl y be more acute l y f e lt by poorer families who would
be tempted to agree to large discounts in the hope of prompt
payments. Rich families are in a far better bargaining position,
as they have the funds to hold out for a court decision. (They
will also be able to afford better attorneys, and have the
ability to bring more pressure to bear on the insurance company
involved than a poor family).
No-fault proponents claim that such disparity in awards, which is
not related in any way to the merits of a case, would not occur
under a first-party no-fault insurance system. As far as minor
claims are concerned, many no-fault schemes enforce a basic
minimum of two or three weeks during which a victim must shoulder
the loss himself. This is done mainly in order to avoid
duplication of benefits to the victim, as this period is often
compensated for by employers. It is also done to avoid
fraudulent claims and to reduce costs. Insurance companies would
no longer be influenced by the threat of litigation in such
cases, as the right to sue in tort would be abolished, even under
a dual or 'threshold' no-fault system. Regarding major claims:
as victims would now be claiming from their own insurance
companies, there would be an incentive for such companies to
adequately compensate their clients. The discrepancy in payments
as between rich and poor families would also be eliminated, due
to the fixed schedules often employed by no-fault schemes . Also,
because no-fault schemes usually stipulate a 'floor' of
compensation, ruling out certain minor claims (especially for
pain and suffering), and because of the general administrative
savings under such a system, more money would be available to
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4.3.3 DELAY
Fault liability insurance has been criticised on the grounds that
it offers c omp e n s a t i o n too late. I t a f f o r d s the victim no
interim relief while he is in hospital or receiving treatment,
with the result that he must struggle to pay his bills
including his medical bills - himself, and at the same time
support his family if he is a breadwinner.
"The length of time from injury to settlement is very
important to injury victims. During that time there is
likely to be hesitation to obtain the fullest desirable
medical treatment, for fear of the burden of paying for it.
If the victim is a wage earner, the family may well go on
reduced rations, and even bec~me a "relief case" while
awaiting the settlement" (47).
If a victim decided to go to court, he may have to wait years
until he receives compensation (48). Although only a small
percentage of motor accident cases go to court, it has been said
that exposure to the court mechanism may be the inherent
cause of most of the delay" (49). The delays under the fault
system are, according to its antagonists, bound up with the
determination of fault. , It takes time to assess statements and
discover whether or not fault can be established. The question
of apportionment must be considered, necessitating an analysis of
the degree of fault on the part of each party. Consultations
with the motorists involved may prove difficult, particularly if
one or both parties are confined to hospital for any length of
time. Cases where a party suffers from amnesia are not uncommon.
Witnesses have to be summoned and their evidence examined, along
with 'in loco' inspections of the site of the accident and an
examination of the position of the vehicles, skid marks, etc.,
appearing on police and other plans. A certain amount of legal
wrangling and negotiation ensues, with each party attesting to
his own innocence and the fault of the other party.
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Even if a plaintiff does not go to court, as is often the case,
an investigation into the question of fault still has to be
carried out. Although many accident victims are tempted to reach
a settlement with the wrongdoer's insurance company in order to
receive compensation more speedily, there is little incentive on
the part
timeously.
of an insurance company to provide compensation
It has been suggested that:
there is a built-in motivation for delay in that
insurance companies of any size operating in this field have
the advantage of retaining in their hands for investment
purposes large sums of money in relation to claims commenced
but not yet finalised. It is not suggested that reputable
insurance companies take undue advantage of this factor and
the considerations involved do not all speak in favour ' o f
delay, but nevertheless this element on the whole is
unfavourable to speedy settlement claims" (50).
To give an idea of the time periods involved, D.H. Botha (51)
refers to a study in Britain which revealed that only 42 per cent
of seriously injured victims received any compensation, and 25
per cent of these had their damages reduced by contributory
fault. Of these 42 per cent, only 2 per cent received
compensation in the first year after the accident, 20 per cent
received compensation during the second year, 6 per cent in the
third year and 3 per cent in the fourth year. He adds that our
practitioners will know whether these figures reflect the
situation in South Africa. Defenders of the fault system concede
that there is an inordinately large time gap between the accident
claim and the compensation received, but argue that this factor
could be improved without having to resort to a change to no-
fault. However, reformers such as Atiyah feel that: "No doubt
there is room for improvement in present procedures, but it seems
unlikely that much can be done to reduce the time taken to try
personal injury cases, or even to settle them. The problems are
inherent in the system" (52).
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Under a first party no-fault system, so the argument goes, a
determination of fault and all its concomitant delays can be
avoided . An accident victim claims from his own insurance
company, which assesses his loss simply on the injuries he has
sustained and his economic loss. Proponents of no-fault agree
that this direct form of compensat ion is much more
efficient, benefits flowing from the fund to the victim without
eference to the injurer or his responsibility for the accident"
1). It is claimed that the absence of adversary proceedings
i greatly speed up the payment process, as would the fact
~any no-fault plans contain prompt payment clauses (54).
lauses stipulate that where the insurance is not paid out
~ertain time period (usually 30 days), interest will be
this provides an incentive to insurance companies to
e victim as soon as possible. These features have
~ Department of Transportation to state that "Faster
of benefits is definitely recognised as one of the
.d t a g e s of all forms of no-fault auto insurance" (55).
4.3.4 LUMP SUMS AND REHABILITATION
An investigation into the issue of fault not only involves a
certain amount of delay, but is also by its very nature
surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. The amount of
compensation a victim may receive depends on how well he is ab le
to discharge the burden of proof that the other motorist was at
fault. Many external factors, such as the availability~ of
witnesses, are involved, and thus the outcome of the 'adversarial
contest' is not always predictable. This combination of delay
and uncertainty often has an adverse effect on the rehabilitation
of the victim, and 'litigation neurosis' has become a well-known
ailment.
Even where a decision has been made in favour of the victim ,
there may be further delay before he receives any compensation.
This is due to the fact that the fault liability system utilises
lump sums as a standard method of compensation. These lump sums
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not only cover the damages that have already occurred, but also
seek to make a once-and-for-all settlement in respect of all
future damages. Consequently, a claimant must wait until his
condition has stabilised sufficiently for the quantum of the lump
sum to be determined in regard to possible future treatment
requirements (56).
Another disadvantage in the use of lump sums is that these
predictions as to the future medical and rehabilitative needs of
the victim lead by their very nature to a great deal of
imprecision. This is aggravated by the fact that amounts so
determined cannot usually be re-evaluated. It has been
established that where, for example, brain injury has occurred,
it is possible that epilepsy or some other disorder may occur
years after the accident (57). If compensation is based on the
expectation that some disorder will occur in the future, such
compensation may prove either to be a legitimate necessity, or an
inappropriate windfall. If one takes the opposite stance, one
risks the event of a claimant being grossly un~er-compensated.
To take the middle route and offer compensation that falls
somewhere between the two extremes is really no solution at all.
Difficulties also arise in calculating the extent of the loss of
future earnings especially in the light of modern-day inflation
rates.
Another disadvantage of lump sum compensation is that there is no
guarantee that the money will be used for the purpose for which
it was intended, i.e., the payment of the costs of rehabilitation
and the supplementing in whole or in part of future wages.
Atiyah comments:
the recipients may be inexperienced in the handling of
large sums of money, and ••• may invest it in reckless and
hopeless enterprises. They are, of course 'entitled' to do
this if they wish, but since the money is largely found by
society, and since society will have to bear the burden - or
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some of the burden - of maintaining these people if
should be reduced to poverty again, society has some
to say how the compensation should be paid" (58).
they
right
As far as the question of rehabilitation is concerned, there can
be no doubt that the delays involved in determining fault and in
computing a victim's present and future compensation needs have a
negative effect.
"Because many rehabilitation techniques must be started
promptly after an injury has been sustained, delays often
greatly hinder medical recovery. Yet, for the seriously
injured victim, no money may be available for rehabilitation
until many months after the accident. Further, when
compensation does come, it does so in a single settlement,
so that future rehabilitation costs have only been estimated
and the money may not be sufficient or available when
needed" (59).
Time is usually of the essence in rehabilitation programs, and it
is to the victim's advantage that he embarks on such a program as
soon as possible. However, uncertainty as to his future economic
prospects may deter him from entering into such a program
timeously, and this delay could in turn permanently affect the
extent of his rehabilitation. One may even go so far as to argue
that: "The action in delict discourages rehabilitation; the
claimant who appears in court with a useless cut-off ugly bared
stump of an arm is likely to fare better than one who has already
equipped himself with a functional artificial limb" (60).
All these factors have the result that people suffering bodily
injury in motor accidents are placed in a highly unsatisfactory
position in relation to their social and physical rehabilitation.
In addition, it must be borne in mind that certain victims are
excluded altogether from receiving compensation for their
injuries or rehabilitation aid under the fault liability system.
Although this may be in keeping with the principle of 'no
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liability without fault', the" .0. cost to society of leaving
motoring victims without rehabilitation and unable to earn a
living is also substantial" (61).
Under a first party no-fault system, it is claimed, there would
be no need for any delay or uncertainty as a determination of
fault is not a necessary prerequisite to compensation. Delays
caused by the computing of a once-and-for-all settlement would
also be avoided by the institution of periodic payments.
Proponents of no-fault argue that the prompt payment requirements
which form an inherent part of no-fault schemes facilitate
rehabilitation, and that the fact that payments are made
periodically ensures
i . e • ,
victim.
payments suited
that more accurate compensation 1s made,
to the present medical condition of the
The awarding of periodic payments for wage loss, so the argument
goes, discourages overspending, and substitutes one source of
monthly income with another, thus causing as little dislocation
to the claimant as possible. The Minogue Report suggests that
"To encourage rehabilitation, payments should not be reduced on a
dollar for dollar basis as the accident victim recovers earning
capacity, but a formula should be used which would permit a net
benefit to be derived from a return to gainful employment" (62).
Of course, the awarding of lump sums possesses the great
advantages of speed, convenience and finality. These advantages
were considered by the Pearson Commission before it concluded
that: the uncertainties implicit in weighing the future
and expressing the result in a once-and-for-all payment outweigh
the convenience of such a quick and final settlement" (63). On
the other hand, no-fault co~pensation'systems do not necessarily
award periodic payments in every case - there is a place for lump
sum awards in certain select circumstances (64). Some writers
feel that a claimant should be given the right to plead his case
for receiving a lump sum (65), while others feel that in cases of
serious and lasting injury periodic payments should be mandatory
(66) •
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Consequently, it is argued that a no-fault scheme has the
advantage that a victim does not have to worry about the outcome
of an investigation into fault, but is able to begin
rehabilitation procedures without delay. He does not have to
impress a court with the pathos of his situation, and can
therefore concentrate on regaining his health, secure in the
knowledge that his bills are being paid. He is also given an
incentive to return to work due to the fact that payments for
wage loss are not compensated on a 100 per cent compensation
basis.
4.3.5 ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM: THE COST
Another criticism levelled at the system of fault liability
insurance is that it is economically inefficient. It is asserted
that an excessively large percentage of premium income is
expended in administrative costs, leaving limited sums available
for the compensation of victims. These high administration costs
are attributed to the procedures involved in the determination of
fault.
"The charge is that in the fault system too much time, money
and effort are devoted to an investigation of blame in an
environment where that investigation contributes nothing to
the avoidance of injury, and that those resources could and
should be channelled to curing and compensating the injured"
(67).
The cost-efficiency of an automobile insurance system is
reflected in the percentage of the premium fee collected from
policyholders which returns to claimants as benefits. One
American study (68), demonstrated that only 14,5 cents out of
each premium dollar goes towards the compensation of a traffic
victim's actual out-of-pocket expenses. The other 85,5 cents is
distributed as follows: 33 cents to insurance companies and
agents for administrative costs, advertising, profit, etc.; 23
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cents to claim's investigators and lawyers (with the impact of
legal fees falling most heavily where injuries are most serious);
8 cents to du plicat e recovery, (i.e., wher e an award is made for
damages which have already been compensated b y some other source)
and 21,5 cents to pain and suffering. In Britain, the Pearson
Commission described the operating costs of the fault system as
"absurdly high", and estimated that 45p out of every insurance
pound went towards such costs. Of this, only 40 per cent went
towards the handling of claims by insurers and general
administration. The rest was expended on broker's commissions,
claimant's legal fees and profit (69).
Opponents of fault liability insurance argue that the system is
inherently inefficient and expensive to operate because of the
complex procedures which the investigation of claims demands.
Such investigations generally entail legal costs as well as the
services of an adjuster. These costs are not necessarily linked
to the court process, as only a small percentage of claimants
proceed to court. The settlement process itself involves a
detailed investigation into the causal factors of the accident.
Time and money is spent in obtaining evidence from witnesses and
taking statements, as well as in assessing the nature of the
injuries reflected in the medical reports and in computing the
quantum involved. Damages for pain and suffering - a particular
feature of the fault system - are notoriously difficult to
compute. Because of the adversary relationship between the
parties, these legal costs are often duplicated as each party
seeks legal advice in negotiating his claim.
The criticism of the high costs involved in maintaining the fault
system is further strengthened by the fact that many motor
accident victims are either under-compensated or not compensated
at all. It was this factor which caused the State of New York
Insurance Department to remark:
in our judgment the profligacy of the operating costs of
the fault insurance system and its wantonness in mismatching
limited resources with serious human needs would be enough
to bring the whole system down, someday, even if there were
nothing else wrong with it" (70).
In this regard it has also been argued that the extent of the
administration costs of the fault system render it inefficient in
relation to other compensation systems, which provide for more
extensive cover on a far lower adminstrative budget, like for
example, Workmen's Compensation Schemes.
Proponents of no-fau lt insurance contend that a no-fault scheme
would be economical ly more efficient and would also afford
compensation on a broader basis. In dispensing with the fault-
finding requirement, a larger proportion of the administration
costs would be directed towards compensation, as expensive
"middlemen" such as lawyers and insurance adjusters would no
longer be needed. The economic advantages to the policyholder
are recorded in the 1985 US Department of Transportation report:
"According to the 1983 results, a no-fault system is 16,2%
more efficient than a traditional system, with respect to
returning money paid as premiums to victims in the form of
benefits or damages (71).
Under a system of first-party no-fault insurance, victims are
compensated solely on an assessment of their injuries. Most no-
fault schemes presently in operation do not provide compensation
for minor non-material loss. Loss of this nature apparently
accounts for the majority of claims, and is usually over-
compensated, due to the 'nuisance' value of such claims. Fleming
describes these losses as ones which" in a literal sense at
least, money can never repair and the award is a windfall, so to
speak, for the victim" (72).
Defenders of the fault system argue that under a system of no-
fault insurance there will be many more successful claimants, and
therefore extra funds will be needed to meet these costs, making
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no-fault a more expensive system. They question how these extra
funds will be raised, and usually conclude that an extra burden
will be imposed either on the taxpayer or on the premium
purchaser. However, most of the advocates of no-fault aver that
the amount of capital saved by eliminat ing the investigation into
fault plus the funds created by the abolition of "nuisance"
claims for minor non-material loss plus the administrative saving
brought about by the utilisation of 'first-party' compensation
will set off this extra expense. Others believe that a no-fault
insurance system will cost more, but insist that the benefits to
society will far outweigh the additional costs. They contend
that society's goal should be the compensation of injured
victims, rather than the maintenance of low premiums. However, a
study conducted for the American Insurance Association offers
evidence that premiums can actually be reduced under no-fault
schemes. Between 1972 and 1975 the change in liability insurance
costs, adjusted for inflation, was up by 29.4% in Washington (a
"fault" state), while in Michigan (a "no-fault" state) it was
down by 16.1%" (73) .
4.3.6 COURT CONGESTION
The fault system has been criticised on the grounds that although
only a small p~rcentage of all motor accident cases reach the
courts, those that do form a large portion of the total number of
cases on the court calendar. It is alleged that because the
courts are "clogged" with motor accident litigation, they are
prevented from spending enough time on more important matters,
and the result is a deleterious effect on the administration of
justice generally. Itis also alleged that the delays inherent
in third party 'fault' liability compensation are exacerbated by
delays resulting from overloaded courts. Professors Keeton and
O'Connel l point out that:
"Most disputed cases - by far the greater percentage
involve injuries that are not severe, and in these small
cases it often happens that more is spent in fighting a
claim than it would be worth if valid. Added to this, of
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course, is a fortune in tax dollars used to maintain the
courts whose time is consumed by these cases" (74).
On the other hand,
process:
it is cl aimed that, with regard to the court
"Ma ny of the defects of the existing law and the attacks on
the existing system governing compensation are not peculiar
to cases where negligence must be proved but are general
features of litigation itself whatever the basis might be of
liability" (75).
While it is true that many reforms could be carried out within
the framework of the present system, it can also be argued that
there are defects which are inherent in the system. With regard
to the issue of delay, a certain amount of blame could be held
to lie with the litigation process per se. However, the no-fault
insurance system does not aim to speed up the court process, but
rather to abolish litigation concerning 'fault' in relation to
motor accident compensation, to a greater or lesser degree,
depending on the type of scheme implemented. It is therefore
striving, in this way, to eliminate delay altogether, at least
for some cases.
New Jersey Chief J ustice Joseph Weintraub has been recorded as
estimating that auto accident cases amount to 51 per cent of
noncriminal cases, and take up 80 per cent of all the civil
court trial time (76). C.L. Gaylord comments that a review of
any of the US Supreme court reports reveals a large amount of
motor accident cases, and that:
"In most of these the court has had to decide arguable
issues of fault. When one considers potential
investigations and preparations, the trials in the lower
courts, the appellate preparation and the work of the
supreme courts, the total judicial and lawyer time devoted
to haggling over whose fault the incident was in just these
56




it is argued that not only could






A "pure" no-fault system, i.e., one in which the fault liability
action is completely abolished, would, so the argument goes,
eliminate the problem of clogged courts. However, even a
"threshold" no-fault system, (i.e., one in which the fault
liability action is banned below a certain level of loss), would
relieve a certain amount of the court's burden. Of course, the
higher the threshold the smaller the amount of motor accident
litigation. An example of the effectiveness of a threshold no-
fault scheme in reducing clogged courts is demonstrated by the
Massachusetts experience. Here:
"Between 1970 (the last year of "fault" auto insurance) and
1975, when no-fault had been in effect for three years,
motor vehicle cases in the state's district-courts plum-
metted from nearly 34,000 to just over 4,000. Their propor-
tion of all court cases dropped from about 35 to about 6
percent at the district court level, and from 66 percent to
25 percent at the superior court (appellate) level" (78).
4.3.7 EVIDENCE
Another issue connected with the fault criterion is the question
of evidence. Under the third party liability insurance system,
an injured person must discharge the legal burden of proof that
the motorist who injured him was at fault in order to be
compensated.
In practice, numerous difficulties are encountered in respect of
this requirement. Motor vehicle accidents are by their very
nature sudden, unexpected events occurring over a very brief
period of time - usually only a few seconds. While a number of
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people may witness the actual impact, the probabilities are that
few, if any, will be able to accurately and specifically relate
the vital events leading up to the coll ision.
Added to this is the fact that these cases are often heard
months, or sometimes even years, after the accident. Witnesses
may have difficulty in remembering the specific details of the
collision, or may recall them incorrectly. A witness'
recollection of the event may be consciously or unconsciously
coloured by sympathy for one of the motorists concerned. One
also cannot overlook the possibility that a witness may lie. In
addition, the motorists involved are obviously interested parties
and are unlikely to present an unbiased view. Even if they are
convinced that they are being completely honest, there is a
natural tendency to reconstruct events in one's own favour. Dean
Prosser has described the process of fact finding to determine
negligence as:
"A cumbersome, time-consuming, expensive, and almost
ridiculously inaccurate one" (79).
One disillusioned British writer has estimated that:
"The chances of a court's making a finding of the relevant
fac ts concerning a road accident, which accurately
correspond with what happened, mu s t surely rate at no more
than SO per cent" (80).
Criticism of the eVidential aspect of a motor accident claim is
largely directed a t the difficulties of proving fault. A victim
may, through no fault of his own) be unable to provide sufficient
proof to satisfy the court) and therefore go uncompensated.
There may have been no witnesses to the accident, and therefore
insubstantial' proo f as regards the details of the collision.
This is especially so where there are no witnesses in a loss of
support action. In such cases, the insurance company concerned
may either lead the evidence of the surviving motorist, who will
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simply give his version, or, where the evidence on the part of
the plaintiff is so lacking that it cannot be held to satisfy the
onus of proof, the insurance company may elect not to call any
witnesses at all. In both events, the court may find it very
difficult to determine who was actually at fault. There are also
cases where victims suffer from amnesia, or from brain damage, or
where, for some reason, victims" .•• by virtue of their inju-
ries, have difficulty in identifying and enlisting the co-
operation of any inde pendent witnesses" (81). Evidential diffi-
culties also arise where a person is injured by an unidentified,
or 'hit-and-run' driver. Fault on someone's part must still be
established, and thus if:
there are no witnesses of the accident and the physical
facts (such as the position of the vehicles etc) do not
themselves amount to evidence of negligence, the plaintiff
will fail. In practice, this simple lack of evidence is a
very common problem" (82).
A successful trial under the third party fault liability system
would thus appear to depend on such peripheral factors as the
number of people present to witness the accident, and their
ability to accurately describe the details of the incident in
court. Those injured in an accident occurring in a deserted area
or at night would seem to be unjustifiably prejudiced.
It would appear from the above that, setting aside for a moment
the number of victims whose claim founders on the fault
criterion, even in situations where one driver was at fault,
there is still no guarantee that fault will be established and
compensation paid out.
The uncertainty and capriciousness of the evidence requirement
has been severely criticised by opponents of the fault liability
system, along with the expense involved in assembling the
evidence in order to determine fault. Every action, whether
successful or unsuccessful, is costly in terms of time and money
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to the parties involved, the witnesses and the state. It is
argued that by dispensing with the intricacies of the evidence
requirement as it applies under tort law, and by basing
compensation simply on an assessment of the victim's injuries,
the no-fault system offers a cheaper, quicker, more efficient,
and - in the end result - more accurate system of compensation.
4.3.8 TEMPTATION TO DISHONESTY
It is claimed that the fault liability insurance system
encourages dishonesty and overreaching by both claimants and
insurers" (83). Because liability under the fault system depends
upon someone being found to be at fault before compensation is
paid, and because compensation is paid in proportion to the
extent of fault so proven, a powerful incentive is provided for
each party to attempt to put the blame on the other party, even
if this necessitates resorting to fabrication. In addition,
people may exaggerate their losses in the hope of achieving an
increased award. "The prevailing practice of settling claims for
minor injuries at extraordlnarily high multiples of out-of-pocket
loss has an impact in turn on the way a claimant is likely to
describe his injuries" (84). Claims for non-economic loss, i.e.,
pain and suffering, especially in relation to minor injuries, by




well as the majority of laymen, are
infamous "whiplash" injury and the
upon which the victim of such an injury
sits. Although a whiplash may be a serious injury and cause
great discomfort, this type of injury can be easily feigned
in hopes of a lucrative settlement with an insurance
company" (85).
Insurance companies, in their turn, may delay payment in order to
pressurise claimants into accepting a less favourable settlement.
The situation Is concisely summed up by Professors Keeton and
0'Connel1:
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"To the toll of physical injury is added a toll of
psychological and moral injury resulting from pressures for
exaggeration to improve one's case or defense, and even for
outright invention - or perjury - to fill any gaps and cure
any weaknesses. The inducements strike at the integrity of
driver and victim alike, all too often corrupting both and
leaving the latter twice a victim - physically injured and
morally debased" (86).
Although there will always be those who set out to defraud an
insurance company, no-fault proponents believe that a system of
no-fault insurance would help t o diminish the routine
exaggeration of claims. For example, claims for pain and
suffering are often disallowed under no-fault insurance if the
injuries are minor. Schedules which allocate a set quantum to
specific injuries are a feature of many no-fault plans, and these
also help to guard against the exaggeration of claims. It is
argued that because there is no need to apportion blame under a
no-fault system of insurance, and because claims are made against
one's own insurance company, the entire claims procedure may be
undertaken in a more forthright and direct manner.
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5. THE ALLOCATION OF THE COMPENSATION COSTS OF MOTORING
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The motor vehicle has proved to be an enormous benefit to
society, and has p layed a crucial role in the advancement of
standards of living to the levels enjoyed today. However, its
introduction has also given rise to serious social problems,
including an increased toll of death and serious injuries to all
road-users. It was realised early on in its development that the
cost to society of compensating the victims of motor accidents
had to be apportioned in some way. Two main mechanisms have
evolved for this purpose: loss shifting and loss dist~ibution.
The question of how the burden of these motoring costs should be
distributed in relation to the whole community remains an impor-
tant topic of debate, especially in relation to the issue of
fault liability insurance vs. no-fault insurance.
5.2. LOSS SHIFTING
The concept of loss shifting has been described as : a
segment of tort law which arose as an outgrowth of the industrial
revolut ion, and the increasing complexity of society, which
~
multiplied sources of risk and loss as between its citizens" (1).
Originally, the cost of compensating the victims of motoring
fell on the individual motori st, who was held personally liable
for his wrongful conduct. In this regard, the idea encompassed
by the term 'loss shifting' was that the loss suffered by a
person as the result of the negligent conduct of another should
be shifted from the victim to the wrongdoer. Thus, 'loss
shifting' upheld the moral principle that an innocent injured
individual should not have to suffer loss because of the wrongful
act of another, and also provided for the financial punishment of
the negligent party. Such punishment, it was thought, would in
its turn have a deterrent effect on negligent behaviour.
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6. THE LEGAL PROFESSION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In considering the possibility of the introduction of a no-fault
system of motor vehicle insurance, a clearer perspective may be
gained by examining the attitude to reform exhibited by an
institution which at the moment plays a major role in relation to
motor vehicle accident claims: the legal profession. Under the
third party fault liability insurance system, an investigation
into and a determination of the legal issue of the delictual
liability of the parties involved in a motor accident is an
essential prerequisite to the awarding of compensation.
Consequently, the legal profession is intrinsically involved in
the third party system - not just in the litigation process, but
also in negotiations with insurance companies.
In investigating the attitude of the legal profession towards the
introduction of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, it may be
useful to survey the situation in the U.S.A. and in New Zealand,
where this issue has been of immediate relevance to the legal
profession.
6.2 THE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION
During the 1960s there was a revival of interest in the concept
of no-fault motor vehicle insurance in the United States. A
multiplicity of no-fault plans were vaunted, the most notable of
which was probably the Basic Protection Plan advocated by
Professors Keeton and 0'Conne1l (1). There was a growing
awareness of the deficiencies of the fault system, and of the
existence of viable alternatives. In relation to the attitudes
of the legal profession, it was noted at the t ime that:
"The bar, although it might be expected to play the role of
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the experienced conservative and thus to supply a sharp
challenge to t h e reform, has been bluntly hostile when not
apathetic. At most an occasional spokesman has sallied
forth in th e j o u r n a l s to stigmat i s e the plans as socia listic
d e par tu res f r om the Am e r i can way 0 f I i f e" (2).
However, when it became evident in the late 1960s that the
implementation of no-fault plans were being seriously considered
by State legislatures, the American bar became far more militant
in its denunciation o f no-fault motor vehicle insurance. There is
no doubt that they were, and still are, able to exercise
tremendous influence:
"With such powerful arguments of fairnes~, economy and
clearing of court congestion on its side, the fact that no-
fault auto insurance has been adopted in only a handful of
states is a tribute to the heels-dug-in opposition and the
political clout of the Organised Bar in general, and the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) iri particular"
( 3 ) •
One of the reasons given for the attitude exhibited by the legal
profession, and especially by the American bar was that:
perhaps a third of the legal fees of the United
States bar comes from litigation over automobile accidents.
The simple fact is the American bar has no interest in
getting rid of the source of so much of its income' (4).
Despite lawyer opposition to no-fault insurance, on January 1,
1971 Massachusetts became the first State to put a no-fault
automobile insurance plan into effect. However, this enactment
was only achieved after four years of bitter debate over the
concept of no-fault, which had begun in 1967 when the
Massachusetts legislature nearly enacted the Keeton-O'Connell
Basic Protection Plan (5). Philip M. Stern describes how:
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"Even in that first legislative battle, the h and of the ATLA
was present, although disguised in a highly deceptive
manner. Soon after the Massachusetts House had passed a no-
f au l t bill, a spate o f full-page anti-no-fa u lt newspaper ads
appeared around the State, ostensibly paid for by the
Teamster's Unl6n. It was later revealed, though, that the
ads were paid for not by the Teamsters but by the State's
trial lawyers " (6).
He goes on to relate methods used by lawyers in other States to
prevent reform:
"The Texas trial bar dunned each of its members $10 a month
for a political fund supporting no-fault opponents. The El
Paso Trial Lawyers newsletter proudly reported that the fund
was "responsible" for the nomination of six of the eight
candidates it had backed for the State Senate" (7).
It is asserted in those States where no-fault bills have been
passed, trial lawyers have attempted to make such legislation
"costly and unworkable". This applies especially to the no-
lawsuit no-fault States, in which the right to a tort action is
curtailed by a threshold, thus limiting the involvement of the
legal profession. The trial lawyers' aim in these States has
been to boost a claimant's medical bills over the medical expense
threshold, thus entitling such claimant to a tort action:
"Senator Frank Moss of Utah charged that New York State
lawyers actually circulated a letter that encourages
accident victims to seek larger medical expenses" so as to
push them over the $500 cutoff mark. The senator said that
the letter also offered a carrot to doctors to go along with
the higher charges: attorneys offered, without charge, to
collect the doctor's fees from the insurance company. In
Miami, a doctor indicted for conspiring with a lawyer to
defraud an insurance company was the proud owner of a boat
he named Whiplash" (8).
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In recent years, the battle has shifted to the federal level.
Proponents of no-fault have sought to bring about the enactment
of a bill prescribing federal minimum no-fault standards for all
States. Needless to say, the ATLA have strongly opposed such a
bill. In addition, Robert W. Meserve, the President of the
American Bar Association (ABA), also opposed such a bill, and
instead urged Congress to await the results of State experiments
with a variety of plans (9). Two years later, in 1975, James D.
Fellers, the then President of ABA, also opposed the imposition
of national no-fault standards, urging instead that the States be
permitted to develop their own reform plans (10). The situation
today is that:
proposals to reform the industry by establishing a
nationwide system of "no-fault" coverage (to pay accident
victims promptly regardless of fault) have been defeated
every time they have come before Congress. Principal
opponents of reform are trial lawyers (who make $2 billion
per year on accident cases) .•• " (11).
This obvious economic interest has led to a certain amount of
public cynicism regarding lawyer opposition to the institution of
no-fault plans. Organisations such as the ATLA have been
denounced as having:
..• obviously most to lose from the demise of tort
litigation. Although their concern is transparently with
their own bread-and-butter, in public debate they have
donned the mantle of championing the man-in-the street as
one who is once more being gouged by the voracious insurance
industry". (12).
This focus on lawyer's negative reactions to no-fault, headed by
the organised plaintiff's bar, should not be allowed to negate
the fact that there are many lawyers in the U.S.A. who support
the idea of no-fault, in spite of their economic interest in
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maintaining the status quo. In fact the first president and
cofounder of the ATLA has stated that:
"[I am] convinced the No Fault is the only way out of the
wasteful, irrelevant, burdensome and exasperating procedure
now employed •.• [I] feel it is probable that when the dust
has all cleared, No Fault will be conceded by all to be
substantially speedier, less wasteful and more fair than our
present system" (13).
6.3 THE ATTITUDE OF THE NEW ZEALAND LEGAL PROFESSION
With the introduction of the Accident Compensation Act in New
Zealand in 1972, the delictual action for 'personal injury by
accident' was effectively abolished. With this abolition, the
services of the legal profession were severely curtailed.
However, lawyer opposition to no-fault was for some reason not
nearly as widespread as it would appear to have been in the
United States. Although the legal profession opposed the use of





instead that a judicial-type assessment of
and although the introduction of the bill was




"The legal profession was divided at the design stage of the
system and to its great credit, the organised profession did
not oppose the change. While there is still some occasional
nostalgia for tort liability and some criticism of
particular features, the legal profession has come to live
with the new system" (14).




G. Ison in his expose of 'The Politics of Reform
Injury Compensation' (15) cites several reasons





the legal profession is opposed to the awarding of
payments - an essential feature of most no-fault plans.
periodic
"Once medical attention has been provided for, the most
significant financial consequence of disablement is usually
a loss of earnings. What anyone needs as compensation for
loss of income is obviously the provision of income. For
lawyers, however, compensation by way of lump sum, . rather
than periodic payments, has two advantages. It provides an
immediate fund from which a substantial fee can be paid, and
it provides a capital figure with which the fee can be
compared and by reference to which may seem reasonable"
(16).
Secondly, Ison feels that there is a conflict of interests
between a section of the legal profession and the general public
in relation to the issue of damages for pain and suffering.
"If there is a public will that compensation should be paid
for pain and suffering, and for loss of amenities of life,
this item of compensation could be calculated most
efficiently through the establishment of tables indicating
dollar amounts for various losses of faculty. For the legal
profession, however, retaining the concept of general
damages for pain and suffering, and for loss of amenities of
life, assures that compensation cannot be measured in any
precise or automatic way. The assessment requires an
intuitive judgment, and the uncertainty and mysticism
involved in this create a demand for advocacy" (17).
There may also be a conflict in respect of the forum to be used.
"The litigation bar has an interest in having as many issues
as possible determined by courts of general jurisdiction.
It is here that the lawyer is perceived as the natural
advocate. Administrative processes and administrative
tribunals might be able to function without generating the
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same recognised and broad-scale need for legal services
(18).
Lastly. Ison argues that:
the theoretical retention of the fault principle might
seem to portray the legal profession as engaged in the
pursuit of virtue. and some of this image may linger however
much it is demonstrated that tort liability in practice is
not the social implementation of a moral precept" (19).
Although the reasons cited above may seem unduly harsh. it should
be mentioned that arguments for the retention of delictual
liability by lawyers are not necessarily motivated by self-
interest. The law may be regarded as essentially a conservative
profession.
"Lawyers. by definition, look to the past - prior cases.
past customs and practices. and other precedents. Looking
to the future without the baggage of the past is difficult
for any lawyer. and law reform suffers, therefore. from a
perspective t h a t is, in a sense, inconsistent with its goal~
(20).
Ison concludes by saying that"
"It has been argued above and elsewhere that the retention
of tort liabi lity for personal injury claims is not in the
public interest. But in the long run it may not even be in
the interests of the legal profession. To attempt the
preservation of a system that is so utterly indefensible
must surely be a negative influence on public confidence in
the profession. and a negative influence on the public
perception of the profession as willing and able to play a
positive role in the evolution of an alternative system"
(21).
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6. THE LEGAL PROFESSION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In considering the possibility of the introduction of a no-fault
system of motor vehicle insurance, a clearer perspective may be
gained by examining the attitude to reform exhibited by an
institution which at the moment plays a major role in relation to
motor vehicle accident claims: the legal profession. Under the
third party fault liability in~urance system, an investigation
into and a determination of the legal issue of the delictual
liability of the parties involved in a motor accident is an
essential prerequisite to the awarding of compensation.
Consequently, the legal profession is intrinsically involved in
the third party system - not just in the litigation process, but
also in negotiations with insurance companies.
In investigating the attitude of the legal profession towards the
introduction of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, it may be
useful to survey the situation in the U.S.A. and in New Zealand,
where this issue has been of immediate relevance to the legal
profession.
6.2 THE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION
During the 1960s there was a revival of interest in the concept
of no-fault motor vehicle insurance in the United States. A
multiplicity of no-fault plans were vaunted, the most notable of
which was probably the Basic Protection Plan advocated by
Professors Keeton and O'Connell (1). There was a growing
awareness of the deficiencies of the fault system, and of the
existence of viable alternatives. In relation to the attitudes
of the legal profession, it was noted at the time that:
"The bar, although it might be expected to play the role of
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the experienced conservative and thus to supply a sharp
challenge to t h e reform, has been bluntly hostile when not
apathetic. At most an occasional spokesman has sallied
forth in th e jou r n a l s to stigmat i se the plans as socialistic
de par tu res fro ID the Amer i can way 0 f I i f e" (2).
However, when it became evident in the late 1960s . that the
implementation 6f no-fault plans were being seriously considered
by State legislatures, the American bar became far more militant
in its denunciation of no-fault motor vehicle insurance. There is
no doubt that they were, and still are, able to exercise
tremendous influence:
"With such powerful arguments of fairness, economy and
clearing of court congestion on its side, the fact that no-
fault auto insurance has been adopted in only a handful of
states is a tribute to the heels-dug-in opposition and the
political clout of the Organised Bar in general, and the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) iri particular"
( 3 ) •
One of the reasons given for the attitude exhibited by the legal
profession, and especially by the American bar was that:
perhaps a third of the legal fees of the United
States bar comes from litigation over automobile accidents.
The simple fact is the American bar has no interest in
getting rid of the source of so much of its income' (4).
Despite lawyer opposition to no-fault insurance, on January 1,
1971 Massachusetts became the first State to put a no-fault
automobile insurance plan into effect. However, this enactment
was only achieved after four years of bitter debate over the
concept of no-fault, which had begun in 1967 when the
Massachusetts legislature nearly enacted the Keeton-O'Connell
Basic Protection Plan (5). Philip M. Stern describes how:
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"Even in that first legislative battles the h and of the ATLA
was presents although disguised in a highly deceptive
manner. Soon after the Massachusetts House had passed a no-
fa ul t bills a spate o f full-page anti-no-fault newspaper ads
appeared around the States ostensibly paid for by the
Teamster's Union. It was later revealed s thoughs that the
ads were paid for not by the Teamsters but by the State's
trial lawyers" (6).
He goes on to relate methods used by lawyers in oth~r States to
prevent reform:
"The Texas trial bar dunned each of its members $10 a month
for a political fund supporting no-fault opponents. The El
Paso Trial Lawyers newsletter proudly reported that the fund
was "responsible" for the nomination of six of the eight
candidates it had backed for the State Senate" (7).
It is asserted in those States where no-fault bills have been
passed s trial lawyers have attempted to make such legislation
"costly and unworkable". This applies especially to the no-
lawsuit no-fault States, in which the right to a tort action is
curtailed by a threshold, thus limiting the involvement of the
legal profession. The trial lawyers' aim in these States has
been to boost a claimant's medical bills over the medical expense
thresholds thus entitling such claimant to a tort action:
"Senator Frank Moss of Utah charged that New York State
lawyers actually circulated a letter that encourages
accident victims to seek larger medical expenses so as to
push them over the $500 cutoff mark. The senator said that
the letter also offered a carrot to doctors to go along with
the higher charges: attorneys offered, without charge, to
collect the doctor's fees from the insurance company. In
Miami, a doctor indicted for conspiring with a lawyer to
defraud an insurance company was the proud owner of a boat
he named Whiplash" (8).
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In recent years, the battle has shifted to the federal level.
Proponents of no-fault have sought to bring about the enactment
of a bill prescribing federal minimum no-fault standards for all
States. Needless to say, the ATLA have strongly opposed such a
bill. In addition, Robert W. Meserve, the President of the
American Bar Association (ABA), also opposed such a bill, and
instead urged Congress to await the results of State experiments
with a variety of plans (9). Two years later, in 1975, James D.
Fellers, the then President of ABA, also opposed the imposition
of national no-fault standards, urging instead that the States be
permitted to develop their own reform plans (10). The situation
today is that:
proposals to reform the industry by establishing a
nationwide system of "no-fault" coverage (to pay accident
victims promptly regardless of fault) have been defeated
every time they have come before Congress. Principal
opponents of reform are trial lawyers (who make $2 billion
per year on accident cases) ..• " ( 11).
This obvious economic interest has l e d to a certain amount of
public cynicism regarding lawyer opposition to the institution of
no-fault plans. Organisations such as the ATLA have been
denounced as having:
•.• obviously most to lose from the demise of tort
litigation. Although their concern is transparently with
their own bread-and-butter, in public debate they have
donned the mantle of championing the man-in-the street as
one who is once more being gouged by the voracious insurance
industry" . (12).
This focus on lawyer's negative reactions to no-fault, headed by
the organised plaintiff's bar, should not be allowed to negate
the fact that there are many lawyers in the U.S.A. who support
the idea of no-fault, in spite of their economic interest in
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maintaining the status quo. In fact the first president and
cofounder of the ATLA has stated that:
"[I am] convinced the No Fault is the only way out of the
wasteful. irrelevant, burdensome and exasperating procedure
now employed ••• [I] feel it is probable that when the dust
has all cleared, No Fault will be conceded by all to be
substantially speedier, less wasteful and more fair than our
present system" (13).
6.3 THE ATTITUDE OF THE NEW ZEALAND LEGAL PROFESSION
With the introduction of the Accident Compensation Act in New
Zealand in 1972, the delictual action for 'personal injury by
accident' was effectively abolished. With this abolition, the
services of the legal profession were severely curtailed.
However, lawyer opposition to no-fault was for some reason not
nearly as widespread as it would appear to have been in the
United States. Although the legal profession opposed the use of
fixed schedules for the compensation of non-economic loss,
suggesting instead that a judicial-type assessment of loss be
retained, and although the introduction of the bill was viewed
with mixed feelings, there was no all-out antagonism to its
enactment.
" Th e legal profession was divided at the design stage of the
system and to its great credit, the organised profession did
not oppose the change. While there is still some occasional
nostalgia for tort liability and some ~riticism of
particular features. the legal profession has come to live
with the new system" (14).
6.4 POSSIBLE REASONS FOR LAWYER OPPOSITION TO REFORM
Terence G. Ison in his expose of 'The Politics of Reform In
Personal Injury Compensation' (15) cites several reasons for
lawyer opposition to reform. The primary reason given is that
85
the legal profession is opposed to the awarding of
payments - an essential feature of most no-fault plans.
periodic
"Once medical attention has been provided for, the most
significant financial consequence of disablement is usually
a loss of earnings. What anyone needs as compensation for
loss of income is obviously the provision of income. For
lawyers, however, compensation by way of lump sum, . rather
than periodic payments, has two advantages. It provides an
immediate fund from which a substantial fee can be paid, and
it provides a capital figure with which the fee can be
compared and by reference to which may seem reasonable"
(16) •
Secondly, Ison feels that there is a conflict of interests
between a section of the legal profession and the general public
in relation to the issue of damages for pain and suffering.
"If there is a public will that compensation should be paid
for pain and suffering, and for loss of amenities of life,
this item of compensation could be calculated most
efficiently through the establishment of tables indicating
dollar amounts for various losses of faculty. For the legal
profession, however, retaining the concept of general
damages for pain and suffering, a nd for loss of amenities of
life, assures that compensation cannot be measured in any
precise or automatic way. The assessment requires an
intuitive judgment, and the uncertainty and mysticism
involved in this create a demand for advocacy" (17).
There may also be a conflict in respect of the forum to be used.
"The litigation bar has an interest in having as many issues
as possible determined by courts of general jurisdiction.
It is here that the lawyer is perceived as the natural
advocate. Administrative processes and administrative
tribunals might be able to function without generating the
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same recognised and broad-scale need for l~gal
(18).
Lastly, Ison argues that:
services
the theoretical retention of the fault principle might
seem to portray the legal profession as engaged in the
pursuit of virtue, and some of this image may linger however
much it is demonstrated that tort liability in practice is
not the social implementation of a moral precept" (19).
Although the reasons cited above may seem unduly harsh, it should
be mentioned that arguments for t he retention of delictual
liability by lawyers are not necessarily motivated by self-
interest. The law may be regarded as essentially a conservative
profession.
"Lawyers, by definition, look to the past - prior cases,
past customs and practices, and other precedents. Looking
to the future without the baggage of the past is difficult
for any lawyer, and law reform suffers, therefore, from a
perspective that is, in a sense, inconsistent with its goal"
(20) •
Ison concludes by saying that"
"It has been argued above and elsewhere that the retention
of tort liability for personal injury claims is not in the
public interest. But in the long run it may not even be in
the interests of the legal pro fession. To attempt the
preservation of a system that is so utterly indefensible
must surely be a negative influence on public confidence in
the profession, and a negative influence on the public
perception of the profession as willing and able to play a
positive role in the evolution of an alternative system"
(21) •
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7. THE OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE: A CONSIDERATION OF THE NO-FAULT
SCHEMES PRESENTLY IN OPERATION IN AMERICA AND NEW ZEALAND
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact which the
introduction of no-fault motor vehicle insurance has had on
various overseas systems which have adopted it. These systems
all incorporate the idea that a person injured in a road accident
should he able to claim for at least some of his damages without
having to satisfy the fault requirement. The intention is to
concentrate on the 24 American "no-fault", States, and on
Accident Compensation Coverage in New Zealand, as no-fault
automobile insurance has been in operation in these countries for
over a decade, and therefore enough time has elapsed in order to
realistically assess the value of this reform.
However, these are not the only countries which have implemented
a no-fault system of motor accident insurance. All the Canadian
States operate either compulsory or optional no-fault schemes,
and two Australian States, Tasmania and Victoria, have also
adopted no-fault motor vehicle insurance plans. In Israel, the
Compensation for Victims of Road Accidents Law was passed in
1975, and was effective from September 25, 1976. In 1975, Sweden
became the only European country to enact a compulsory no-fault
scheme for motor vehicle injuries. The enactment, known as the
Traffic Damage Act, does not abolish the tort action at all.
Instead this scheme offers awards at the same level as tort
compensation actions, even in relation to non-economic loss such
as pain and suffering, loss of expectation of life and loss of
amenities. Consequently the incentive to claim in tort is
usually eliminated. In Britain, the 1978 Report of the Pearson
Commission recommended that a limited type of compensation be
introduced for motor vehicle victims. The Commission recommended
a system where no-fault benefits would cover pecuniary loss and
limited pain and suffering, with the tort action being retained
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for compensation beyond the "threshold" of the new scheme, and
for property damage. A government-administered scheme financed
by a levy on petrol was recommended.
The United States and New Zealand schemes, however, enjoy a
further distinction for the purpose of this study in that the
'add-on' and 'no-lawsuit no-fault' schemes of the United States,
and the 'pure no-fault' scheme of New Zealand can be viewed as
three consecutive steps on the road to complete no-fault reform.
7.2 USA: THE NO-FAULT EXPERIENCE (1)
7.2.1 BACKGROUND
As noted earlier, the interest in no-fault motor vehicle
insurance which was generated in America during the 1920s
resulted in an investigation into the whole question of
compensation for motor vehicle accidents being conducted by the
University of Columbia in 1928. When the committee submitted its
report in 1932, its general recommendation was that the fault
issue be abolished and that a type of insurance scheme similar to
workmen's compensation be established for motor vehicles. This
idea formed the backbone of the compensation scheme proposed by
the report (2). Although no immediate efforts were made to put
such a scheme into action in America, the Columbia Plan served
the function of pointing the way towards a practical no-fault
system. In fact, the effects of this early plan were far-
reaching; in that many of its features have consequently been
incorporated into many modern no-fault schemes.
Since that time there have been many proponents of no-fault
reform, among the most prolific being Professors Keeton and
O'Connell. In the early sixties they devised the so-called
'Basic Protection Plan' (3), which once again drew attention to
the possible potential of a system of no-fault insurance for
motor vehicles. As its title implies, this plan aimed at
providing a certain basic level of compensation to automobile
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v i c t i ms regardless of the issue of fault. It recommended that
compensation be speedy, with the tort remedy being reserved only
f o r those with serious in juries. Injuries were to be compensated
by periodic payments , al t h o u g h lump-su m p a y me n t s were to b e
retained for certain i njuries. The plan also recommended that
optional extra coverag e should be made available to the public,
enabling them to make an individual choice regarding the amount
of cover they desired.
These and other recommendations involved dramatic changes to the
eXisting fault system, and further heightened the fault vs no-
fault debate. The Keeton-O'Connell plan was said to have "made
no-fault automobile insurance a topic of international concern
(4), and in many ways, it helped to further the cause for reform.
It is a plan which has had an effect, in one way or another, on
all the American States which have adopted no-fault laws.
In 1968, the 90th American Congress authorised "the Secretary of
Transportation to conduct a comprehensive study and investigation
of the existing fault system for motor accident losses " (5). The
results of this study by the Department of Transportation, which
were published in 1911, highlighted the inadequacies of the fault
system. It was concluded that:
the existing system ill serves the accident victim,
the insuring public and society. It is inefficient, overly
costly, incomplete and slow. It a llocates benefits poorly,
discourages rehabilitation and ove rburdens the courts and
the legal system. Both on the record of its performance and
on the logic of its operation, it does little if anything to
minimise cash losses" (6).
These findings led one writer to comment:
"The tragic and wasteful defects of the present tort
liability system, researched and empirically documented in




implementation of a new system




The Department of Transportation's Final Report contained certain
guidelines for a recommended new system of compensation for auto
accident victims. During the 1970s twenty-four States adopted
some form of no-fault compensation scheme for motor vehicles.
All of these schemes incorporated some) if not all) of these
recommended features. In 1977 a follow-up report was published
by the US ' Department of Transportation) entitled: "State No-fault
Automobile Insurance Experience 1971-1977". This report examined
the changes that had occurred during this crucial time of reform.
In 1983) the Secretary of Transportation was asked to update the
1977 report) in order to detail the full impact of no-fault
insurance. Thus in May 1985 the Department of Transportation
presented its report entitled "Compensating Auto Accident Victims
- a Follow-up Report on No-fault Auto Insurance Experiences".
7.3 REFORM IN AMERICA
Until 1971, American personal injury automobile insurance was
dominated by traditional "fault" liability auto insurance,
consisting primarily of bodily injury liability insurance (BI).
BI insurance provided indemnification to the policyholder up to
the policy limit for claims made against him by accident victims.
However) compensation could only be claimed where it could be
proved that the accident was due to the policyholder's "faulty"
or negligent conduct. In addition) BI insurance provided no
compensation for single car accidents, thus eliminating the
victims of approximately two-fifths of injury accidents from the
compensation process (8).
Then) on January 1) 1971, the Massachusetts no-fault bill came
into effect. It was the first US jurisdiction) other than Puerto
Rico, to implement a no-fault plan. This move was followed by a
wave of no-fault reform, until today in 1985 there are 24 50-
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called "no-fault" States. These States all statutorily endorse
the payment of compensation to accident victims without regard to
the issue of fault (9).
These 24 States define no-fault insurance in different terms, but
they do have certain elements in common. All no-fault States
require insurance companies to offer personal injury protection
(PIP) insurance to all motorists, although the purchasing of PIP
insurance is not compulsory in 6 of these States (10). Being a
first-party insurance scheme, PIP provides benefits to the
policyholder, the passengers in his car, and to any pedestrians
he may injure (11). These benefits usually consist of a sum
covering medical and rehabilitation expenses, lost wages, the
cost of replacement services (for performance of tasks which the
victim would have carried out except for his/her injuries) and,
in the case of fatal accidents, funeral expenses and survivors'
loss. The extent of benefits under the various no-fault plans
differ greatly. For example, Michigan and New Jersey provide for
unlimited medical and rehabilitation expenses, while South
Carolina only provides a maximum of $1,000 for medical expenses.
No-fault States are in agreement that PIP benefits are to be paid
promptly and many States provide penalties for late payment of
claims. Specific time limits for payment are set out in the
statutes.
Although there are 24 American States which can be described as
having instituted no-fault automobile insurance, these States may
be further divided into what are known as "no-lawsuit" no-fault
or "mixed" schemes, and "add-on" no-fault schemes.




are many variations of "no-lawsuit" no-fault schemes ,
all endorse the concept of a "threshold" or limit
the tort action is eliminated. A "threshold"





victim must have sustained, or the level of medical expense such
a victim must have incurred as a result of the accident,
must be reached before a tort action is allowed.
that
This
restriction is considered a "trade-off", in return for which
assured no-fault benefits (usually of a fairly substantial
nature), are provided. PIP insurance is a "substitute" for no-
fault liability insurance here. 16 jurisdictions fall into the
category of a "no-lawsuit" no-fault State.
October 1, 1984:
They are, as of
1- Colorado 9 • Massachusetts
2. Connecticut 10. Michigan
3 • District of Columbia 11- Minnesota
4. Florida 12. New Jersey
5. Georgia 13. New York
6. Hawaii 14. North Dakota
7 • Kansas 15. Puerto Rico
8. Kentucky 16. Utah (12 )
It is within these jurisdictions that no-fault reform has taken
the greatest steps.
The threshold system operates as follows:
"The victim i s allowed to maintain a lawsuit (1) for any
economic loss not compensated by PIP benefits and (2) for
non-economic l o s s if the injury suffered or cost of
treatment equa ls or exceeds the applicable statutory measure
generally referred to as the threshold. If the threshold is
"met", the victim can have both no-fault benefits (PIP
benefits) and a lawsuit. If the threshold is not met, the
victim can have only no-fault benefits. A lawsuit gives the
victim the opportunity to recover compensation for excess
economic loss (economic loss not compensated by PIP) and, if
the threshold is met, compensation for pain and suffering
and other non-economic loss" (13).
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Thus, there are in fact two lawsuit thresholds in each scheme:
one relating to economic loss, and one relating to non-economic
loss (14). Th~ system is at its most effective when the savings
enabled by the disallowment of minor tort claims for economic and
non-economic loss are "balanced" by the extent of no-fault
benefits available. The higher the threshold, the greater the
'lawsuit' saving effected. However, even low threshold no-
lawsuit systems may be "balanced', and even achieve very high
savings on lawsuits. This is because the vast majority of claims
involve minor injuries, and consequently the bulk of cases under
such plans would probably fall within the amount of the
compulsory 'no-fault' section of the compensation threshold,
resulting in a substantial saving on claims . The
overcompensating of "nuisance claims", an inherent weakness in
the fault system, no longer applies here, the tort action being
reserved for the relatively few cases involving serious injury.
7 .4. 1 TYPES OF THRESHOLDS AVAILABLE
As mentioned above, a no-lawsuit no-fault statute usually has
more than one type of threshold, and the meeting of anyone of
these thresholds is sufficient to allow the claimant to bring a
lawsuit in tort. Although all 16 no-lawsuit no-fault statutes
incorporate different threshold levels, these thresholds may be
described as falling into three general categories.
7.4.1.1 The 'Medical Expense' Threshold
A common type of threshold is the "medical expense" or "dollars
of loss" threshold. If the medical bills of ~ claimant are found
to equal or exceed the statutory minimum, a lawsuit is allowed.
Medical expense thresholds are incorporated into 13 of the 16 no-
laws~it jurisdic.tions - only in Florida, New York and Michigan
are they omitted.
One of the problems of using a medical expense threshold is that
most statutes do not provide for the automatic adjustment of the
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dollar values according to the rate of inflation. Only those of
Hawaii and the District of Columbia prescribed methods for
adjusting dollar values in this way. However, that is not to say
that the thresholds in the ot her 14 States are not occasionally
reviewed and adjusted. Colorado has recently raised its medical
expense threshold from $500 to $2,500 with effect from January 1,
1985 (15).
Another problem is that of constitutionality. In Dimond vs Dis-
trict of Columbia (16), the medical expense threshold of $5,000
was held to be unconstitutional, on the ground that it violated
the "equal protection rights embodied in the due process clause".
The amount of $5,000 was held to be an arbitrary and irrational
classification for the justification of being able to bring a
tort lawsuit. However, the court did not hold any portion of the
statute's verbal threshold to be unconstitutional.
7.4.1.2 The 'Days of Disability' Threshold
This type of threshold stipulates a certain number of days for
which the victim must have been disabled before he is allowed to
bring a lawsuit in tort. The 'days of disability' threshold is
used the least frequently - it has only been incorporated into
four statutes. The number of days stipulated varies. The
Georgia Statute provides that a person must have had more than 10
days of disability before he is allowed a tort claim, while
Minnesota and North Dakota require 60 days or more of disability.
The New York Statute prescribes that a victim must have incurred
as many as 90 days of disability or inability to perform his
~sual pre-accident daily activities during the 180 days following
the accident.
7.4.1.3 The 'Verbal' Threshold
This type of threshold involves the allowing of a tort action in
certain stipulated circumstances, including for example, where
the victim was fatally injured, or where the victim suffered a
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"permanent" injury and/or a "serious" disability. Other verbal
standards also exist) such as dismemberment) permanent loss of
use of a body organ or member) significant limitation of use of a
bodily function or system) permanent disfigurement or scarring) a
fractured bone (some statutes specify that it must be a "weight-
bearing" bone» and permanent loss of sight or hearing. All no-
lawsuit no-fault statutes except Puerto Rico contain verbal
thresholds, but only three have exclusively verbal
Michigan) Florida and the District of Columbia.
7.5 "ADD-ON" NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
thresholds:
"Add-on" no-fault plans offer more modest reforms than no-
lawsuit" plans: here no-fault benefits merely supplement the
fault system. The right to sue in tort is not curtailed in any
way. Consequently, the extent of no-fault benefits provided by
the average add-on no-fault state is much less than the extent of
such benefits provided by the average no-lawsuit state. There
are eight add-on no-fault states) four of which enforce the
compulsory purchase of PIP insurance, and four of which merely
stipulate that insurance companies must offer PIP insurance to
all their policyholders.
The four compulsory add-on States are:
Maryland and Pennsylvania.
Delaware) Oregon)
The four non-compulsory add-on States
South Carolina and Washington.
are: Arkansas, Texas)
The varying attitudes towards no-fault insurance are demonstrated
by the percentage of motorists in these latter four states who
actually take out PIP insurance voluntarily. In Arkansas 28)1
per cent of all vehicles are covered by PIP insurance) while in
South Carolina the number is as high as 73,9 per cent; 59)2 per
cent of Texas drivers and 66)2 per cent of Washington motorists
carry PIP insurance.
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It should be mentioned that there are four other States in which
insurers are obligated by statute to offer PIP insurance in
prescribed minimum benefit packages to all policyholders. Each
of these four additional States is listed as an add-on State in
the 1983 Summary of Selected State Laws published by the American
Insurance Association, although they are not classified as such
in the 1985 Department of Transportat ion Report. They are, with
the prescribed amount of PIP insurance coverage: New Hampshire
($1,000), Wisconsin ($1,000), South Dakota ($5,720) and Virginia
($7,200).
7.6 THE COST FACTOR: THE ISSUE OF "BALANCE"
Probably one of the most important issues
reform, and indeed in relation to any
accident insurance, is the issue of cost.
in relation to no-fault
system of automobile
This is a factor which
concerns the motorist, the insurance company and the State
legislature alike. The cost efficiency of a no-fault statute
depends on whether or not it is in "balance". "Balance" refers
to the equilibrium that should exist between the savings which
arise as a result of restrictions imposed on the tort system and
the amount of no-fault benefits offered under a no-fault statute.
In a no-lawsuit no-fault state, balance is achieved when the
savings from restrictions on lawsuits are greater than or equal
to the cost of first party benefits. In an add-on no-fault state
balance is achieved when the amount of third party compensation
available is less than the average amount offered in the
traditional 'fault' insurance States, to the extent that no-fault
benefits are paid for out of these savings. Both types of no-
fault statutes implement the idea of a "trade-off" to provide for
no-fault benefits without r~sorting to a large increase in
premium. Measures introduced in various state which can have a
"balancing" effect include:
a deductible, which reduces payout from the insurance
system; statutory authorization to an applicable insurer to
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require an auto accident victim to submit to a physical
examination by an independent physician, which discourages
frivolous litigation; a maximum fee schedule for physicians,
which reduces the amount of PIP payments for medical
benefits;" (17).
A table summarising data from 51 States (Puerto Rico is omitted)
in the 1985 Department of Transportation Report (18),
demonstrates that between 1976 and 1983 the average auto
insurance premium increased almost twice as much in the average
no-fault State as in the average traditional fault liability
state (91 per cent vs 50 per cent). However, in no-fault States
which were found to be in balance, the average rate of increase
was almost the same (54 per cent vs 50 per cent), while in the
no-fault States which were found to be not in balance the average
rate of increase was found to be extremely high (126 per cent vs
50 per cent.
Another chart in the Department of Transportation's Report (19)
based on information supplied by the Alliance of American
Insurers, arranges no-fault States according to their threshold -
a factor which emerges as an important feature in determining
whether or not a system is in balance. The chart reveals that
all three States which have an exclusively verbal threshold
(Florida, Michigan and New York) and three out of the four States
which utilise high-dollar thresholds, i.e., dollar thresholds of
$1,000 or more, (namely, Minnesota, Kentucky and North Dakota)
are in balance. In fact, these States actua lly had lower auto
insurance costs in 1982 than they would have had if no-fault laws
had not been enacted. However, only three out of the eight
States which have a low-dollar threshold (below $1,000), namely
Kansas, Utah and Massachusetts, and only one State (Oregon), out
of the three no-threshold States charted are in balance. (It
should, however, be borne in mind that this increase in cost is
counter-balanced to a certain degree by the fact that in 1983
alone, almost twice as many injured accident victims received





160 per cent as many victims received auto
in add-on no-fault States as in traditional
The charted figures reinforce the idea that the type of threshold
utilised in a State will have an enormous bearing on whether or
not that State will be in balance as far as cost-efficiency is
concerned. However, it should be noted that:
there are factors other than lawsuit thresholds which
have an effect on balance: e.g., difference in the
behavioural characteristics of the people of the various
States which lead to fewer or more lawsuits, less (or more)
fraud, and less (or more) adverse cost impact ••• It is
clear that what it takes to achieve balance in one State may
not achieve balance in another State, because the States
differ with respect to litigiousness of the population,
medical costs, wage rates, and other still unknown factors"
(21).
These "other factors" lead to the situation where Oregon, an add-
on State, provides over $20,000 in no-fault benefits yet is still
in balance, while Connecticut, a no-lawsuit no-fault State
(albeit with a low-dollar threshold) offers a maximum of $5,000
in PIP benefits but is still not in balance.
However, it must also be acknowledged that States with an
exclusively verbal threshold appear to enjoy particular success.
In Florida, for example, the effect of changing from a dollar
threshold to an exclusively verbal threshold has been remarkable.
No-fault auto insurance was introduced in Florida on January 1,
1972, with a medical expense threshold of $1,000. During 1972, a
great reduction in costs was experienced, but in subsequent years
costs escalated rapidly. When the cause of this was investigated
by the Florida Insurance Department, it was discovered that
first-party benefits were overutilised by people who wanted to
pierce the $1,000 threshold in order to obtain the right to sue
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in tort for intangible loss. In fact:
"In a review of Florida BI liability claims files, reviewers
concluded that the threshold was not overcome properly in
23% of the cases and was questionable in another 21% of the
cases" (22).
There was a consensus among insurers that the increase in
insurance costs in Florida was due not only to the effect of
inflation on the relatively low dollar threshold, but also to
intentional efforts on the part of some claimants to deliberately
overcome the threshold by various means, including fraud.
Sometimes these fraudulent claimants were aided in their
inflation of claims by lawyers and doctors. Taking note of these
abuses, the Florida legislature amended its no-fault statute so
that an exclusively verbal threshold would operate from October
excess litigiousness,
1 , 1976. Since then, there have been no further complaints of
and in fact PIP insurance costs actually
decreased in Florida between 1977 and 1980.
The experience of States with high-dollar thresholds is better,
from a cost point of view, than that of States with low-dollar or
no thresholds, but it is still not as good as that of States with
an exclusively verbal threshold. The District of Columbia, which
had the highest dollar-threshold ($5,000) enjoyed the most
success among the "mixed" schemes, but this State changed to an
exclusively verbal threshold by court order in 1984.
In light of the above, it is surprising that more no-fault States
have not adopted an exclusively verbal threshold, with its
obvious cost advantages.
7.7 IMPLEMENTATION OF A "PURE" NO-FAULT SYSTEM
At the moment there are no American States which eliminate all
tort lawsuits for automobile accident injury in return for no-
fault benefits. However, it has been concluded that:
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"The elimination of all law suits would (certainly in
theory and substantially in practice) save those amounts
[i.e., benefits based on proof of fault] along with the
costs of services necessary to prosecute and defend those
lawsuit claims. Depending on the size of such savings, and
they would certainly be large, insurance premiums could be
held stable or even lowered even if PIP benefits were
increased to high levels and even if pain and suffering
benefits were made available on a no-fault basis" (23).
7.8 OTHER EFFECTS OF NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
The implementation of no-fault insurance in the United States has
not only affected the actual financial compensation of victims,
but has also had an impact on other areas connected with the
compensation process. Two areas . which have benefited enormously
from the introduction of no-fault insurance are the
rehabilitation of accident victims and t~e congestion of courts.
7.8.1 REHABILITATION
The importance of the need for rehabilitation cannot be
overemphasized:
"Rehabilitation can turn maimed and severely injured
v ictims back to productive and healthy lives. The capacity
of an auto insurance system to encourage, to practice and to
pay for this powerful tool shou ld be one of the important
criteria of the effectiveness of a State auto insurance
system" (24).
No-fault insurance is better able to assist the rehabilitation of
victims, due to its role of making a significant amount of money
available to the victim immediately after the accident. This
factor has an enormously beneficial effect, as rehabilitation
programmes should be embarked upon as soon as possible in order
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to be most effective. The assurance of no-fault aid also lifts a
great burden from the victims mind, and consequently he is able
to channel all his efforts into his re-entry into society, rather
than into preparing for an adversarial contest or bargaining with
an insurance company. As one doctor and psychiatrist observed:
it should be appreciated by all concerned that the
adversary nature of a tort or compensation action subsequent
to injury heightens the patient's sense of grievance,
entitlement to redress, and revenge - which tends to foster
his aggressive drives and to shift his attention away from
goals of rehabilitation and eventual regained independence"
(25) .
He also added that:
it should be recognised that the delays so frequently
encountered in settling personal injury litigation tend to
keep the patient trapped for months, even years, in a limbo
of indecision and idleness in which dependency needs are
fostered. During this time it frequently becomes so
pointless to try to work toward rehabilitation that,
practically, the patient remains an invalid until legal
elements emanating from his injury are resolved" (25).
No-fault schemes also provide more money for rehabilitation than
traditional schemes, as guaranteed no-fault aid is available in
conjunction with a tort lawsuit (although in a no-lawsuit no-
fault state the threshold would have to be met first). Initial
large outlays for rehabilitation expenses can of course reap
great benefits in the long run, as people who have been unable to
support themselves and thus have been wholly dependant on
insurance benefits are often, after rehabilitation treatment,
able to support themselves again at least to some extent.
A Report compiled
Michigan reveals the
by The Insurance Bureau of the State
value of rehabilitation t o insurers:
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of
recent estimates have shown that for every dollar
spent on rehabilitation, $9 are returned through increased
productivity and that for every rehabilitated spinal cord
injury, $60,000 in future medical and nursing home costs are
saved. However, a successful rehabilitation is generally
possible only if an individual gets appropriate treatment as
soon after the accident as possible. Placing a ceiling on
PIP payments will serve to introduce uncertainty for the
injured individuals on whether or not he or she can afford
rehabilitation treatments. This uncertainty inevitably
causes delay and markedly reduces the possibility of
successful rehabilitation" (26).
When no-fault motor vehicle insurance was first introduced in the
early 1970s, occupational therapy and rehabilitation were not
utilised enough, either by insurers or victims. However, the
importance of rehabilitation is being increasingly realised both
by insurance companies and by society, and statistics indicate
that the percentage of victims using vocational rehabilitation is
growing rapidly.
7.8.2 COURT CONGESTION
No-lawsuit no-fault auto insurance by its very nature relieves
the court's burden of motor vehicle accident cases by prohibiting
lawsuits for minor cases which do not reach the required
threshold. The no-lawsuit States which have investigated the
impact the introduction of no-lawsuit no-fault has had on the
court calendar reported that the change has been significant.
In Minnesota, for example, a report compiled by the State
Insurance Department on the basis of records maintained by the
Hennepin County District Court over the period 1977-1980 noted
that although the number of complaints filed over that period had
risen by 14 per cent, the number of complaints filed in 1980 was
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still over one-third less than the number of complaints filed in
1974 - the year before n~-fault legislation was adopted (27).
When the State of Michigan's no-fault statute went into effect in
1973, it also experienced a decline in the number of court cases
filed in its circuit courts. According to a report made by the
Michigan Insurance Bureau in 1978, the number of lawsuits filed
between July 1975 and June 1977 actua lly showed a decline of
approximately 31,3 per cent (28).
When Florida's no-lawsuit no-fault law was first adopted in 1972,
it had a $1,000 medical expense thresho ld which ultimately proved
to be too low. However, the number of lawsuits filed still
declined quite significantly. After Florida changed to an
exclusively verbal threshold in 1976, litigation declined even
more dramatically.
Insurance reported:
In December 1981, Florida's Commissioner of
"Florida no-fault has dramatically reduced litigation
resulting from traffic accidents. With the adoption ,o f a
verbal threshold in 1976, the percentage of automobile
negligence suits to total cases decreased 58.3 percent in
Dade County and 39.3 percent in Duval County circuit courts
over the four-year period ending in 1980" (29).
Litigation connected with motor vehicle accidents also dropped
substantially in Massachusetts and New Jersey following their
introduction of no-fault insurance. Even the Oregon add-on no-
fault statute is credited with bringing about a decline in
automobile claims. An "independent survey for the first 36
months revealed a 33 .4 percent decline in the frequency of auto
bodily injury claims" (30).
All these statistics demonstrate the undeniable success no-fault
insurance has had in curbing the number of motor vehicle injury
court cases. This success can be attributed not only to the
lawsuit thresholds employed by the no-lawsuit no-fault States,
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but also to the payment of first-party economic loss benefits to
all victims in add-on no-fault States, which have had the effect
of making a tort claim unnecessary.
7.9 CONCLUSIONS OF THE 1985 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
The investigation by the Department of Transportation into the
performance of the various no-fault systems in the United States
pr~vides possibly the most concrete basis for comparison between
no-fault and traditional fault systems available to date.
Bearing in mind that its conclusions are based on over a decade's
experience in 24 no-fault jurisdiction$, it goes some way towards
providing definitive answers to many of the criticisms levelled
at the no-fault system.
The general conclusions of the Department of Transportation's
Report were as follows:
"I. Significantly more motor vehicle accident victims
receive auto insurance compensation in no-fault States
than in other States.
2. In general, accident victims in no-fault States have
access to a greater amount of money from auto insur-
ance than victims in traditional Sta tes.
3. Although no-fault States, on average, have higher in-
surance premiums then traditional States, this seems
to be due to the inclusion in the average of no-fault
States with laws that are out of balance.
4. "Balance" in no-fault systems seems to be closely
linked to the presence of an exclusively verbal or
high medical-expense dollar threshold.
5. Compensation payments under no-fault insurance are




No-fault insurance systems pay a greater




7. State auto insurance laws which provide high no-
fault benefits would appear to better facilitate the
rehabilitation of seriously injured motor vehicle
accident victims than traditional laws, although the
lack of good data on rehabilitation experience under
traditional laws precludes a good quantitative esti-
mate of the difference.
8. No-fault has led to reductions in the number of law-
suits and, thus, to significant savings in court and
other public legal costs paid by the taxpayer.
9. Typical auto insurance benefits in both




10. The percentage by which other cost of payments to
accident victims in no-fault States exceeds the cost
of such payments in traditional auto insurance States
has increased from 1976 to 1983.





THE NO-FAULT EXPERIENCE (32)
It has already been noted how, on the introduction of compulsory
motor vehicle insurance in New Zealand in 1928, the then
Attorney-General expressed the hope that eventually a motor
insurance scheme not dependent on proof of fault might be
introduced. A great deal of interest in this idea was generated
in 1932, when the Columbia Report was published, resulting in a
bill being drafted along the lines suggested by the Report in
1937. However, this bill was never introduced. Nevertheless,
the idea of no-fault motor vehicle insurance continued to receive
attention, despite great opposition.
In 1962 a "Committee on Absolute Liability" was appointed under
the chairmanship of Sir Richard Wild. His aim was to investigate
the desirability of introducing abso lute liability for death and
bodily injury arising out of the use of
Report of this Committee, issued in 1963,
motor vehicles. The
indicated an openness
to the no-fault concept, but also expressed the opinion that
there was no public demand for such an absolute liability scheme.
In addition, the Committee considered it unacceptable to single
out motor accident victims for special privileges. It was
recommended that the matter be investigated by another Committee
(33).
In 1966, the New Zealand government set up a Royal Commission
under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Woodhouse, Judge of the
Supreme Court (34). The Commission was instructed to investigate
the compensation law relating to injury or death arising out of
accidents (including diseases) suffered by persons in employment~
However, in its report, issued in 1967, the Commission made
recommendations pertaining to the compensation of all accidents,
whether they occurred at work or on the road or elsewhere. The
report, entitled Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand,
stated:
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"We have made recommendations which recognise the
inevitability of two fundamental principles -
First, no satisfactory system of injury insurance can be
organised except on a basis of community responsibility:
Second, wisdom, logic and justice all require that every
citizen who is injured must be included, and equal losses
must be given equal treatment. There must be comprehensive
entitlement.
Morever, always accepting the obv ious need to produce some-
thing which the country can afford, it seemed necessary to
lay down three further rules which, taken together with the
two fundamental matters, would provide the framework for the
new system. There must be complete rehabilitation. There
must be real compensation - income-related benefits for
income losses, payment throughout the whole period of inca-
pacity, recognition of permanent bodily impairment as a loss
in itself. And there must be administrative efficiency"
(35).
The report concluded that the tort system was capricious in
operation, as well as cumbersome and inefficient. Only a very
small number of injured persons received full compensation, and
most received nothing. It was held that the fault system as
related to motor vehicle accidents was unable to cope with the
present needs of society.
The Woodhouse Commission recommended the creation of a new
independent authority to administer the scheme) and that in order
to reduce administration costs, private insurance companies
should be excluded from the scheme.
Following the publication of the Woodhouse Report, two further
committees were appointed to examine the details of the proposed
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scheme, and especially to consider its viability in relation to
the cost factor.
Finally, on October 20, 1972 the Accident Compensation Act was
passed and thus an entirely new system was introduced whereby the
action in tort is completely abolished and under which anyone
injured in any type of accident, in New Zealand, irrespective of
the issue of fault, will be entitled to compensation.
Originally, the Act provided for two compensation schemes. One
was to provide compensation for all earners, no matter what type
of accident they were involved in. The other was to cover those
who suffered personal injury in automobile accidents. This left
non-earners not injured in an automobile accident without
compensation. To rectify this situation, an amending Act was
passed in 1973. The Accident Compensation Amendment Act (No.2)
1973 provided for a third scheme, known as the Supplementary
Scheme, to provide cover for all persons suffering personal
injury by accident who would not have had cover under the
Earners' Scheme or the Motor Vehicle Accident Scheme.
The Earners' Scheme was to be funded by a levy imposed on
employers and self-employed persons, as a percentage of wages,
relating to the degree of risk of the particular activity. The
Motor Vehicle Accident Scheme was to be funded initially by
levies imposed on motor vehicle owners, and the Supplementary
Scheme was to be financed from national funds. These three
schemes were to be independently administered and financially
self-contained. The advantage of having three separate schemes
was that the principle of cost internalisation could be applied.
Increases in the cost of an activity, such as motoring, would be
borne by an increase in the levies imposed on that activity. A
further amendment defined which injuries and diseases would be
encompassed by the term "personal injury by accident" and which
would not.
The Accident Compensation Commission, comprising a chairman and
two other members, was established by the first commencement
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order made on October 30,
the schemes. The aim
1972 as a body corporate to administer
was to reduce administration costs by
utilising a special government agency to run a single national
scheme. The charge of operating a cumbersome government
bureaucracy was later levelled at the New Zealand scheme.
However, private insurance companies were in fact consulted at
the time and asked to estimate their administration costs for a
no-fault scheme, but their estimate was much higher than could be
achieved under a government body (36). However, private
insurance companies were still allowed to play a supporting role,
as provision was made for them to be appointed as agents to the
Commission, along with certain other bodies. The Act also
delegated the collection of levies and the handling and payment
of claims to these bodies. Thus the new scheme would be able to
benefit from the experience and manpower of the insurance
companies and their widespread distribution of offices, and
insurance companies would be placed in contact with a large
number of potential clients for other types of insurance.
Levies on employers and self-employed persons were to be paid to
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, and levies on motor vehicle
owners were to be collected by the Post Office. It was arranged
that the State Insurance Office would act as the Commission's
agent, within certain prescribed limits, by processing
certain claims. The more complicated claims (such as permanent
disability assessments) were to be handled by the Commission.
The Commission was granted authority under the Act to make
recommendations each financial year to the Minister of Labour
concerning adjus~ments to levy rates and other matters.
The amended Act came into effect on April 1, 1974 and thus
statutory compensations was provided for anyone suffering
personal injury by accident in New Zealand, regardless of the
question of fault. The common law action for personal injury and
death consequently ceased to be available, except in the very
limited circumstances recognised by S5 of the 1972 Act (37). If
a person was covered by the Act, he or she could no longer bring
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a tort action for damages. If they were not covered under the
Act, they could proceed with a tort action, or seek social
security compensation (Workers' Compensation had been abolished).
In 1979 a Committee was set up under the chairmanship of Mr. D.F.
Quigley, M.P., to review the operation of the Act during the past
five years. The Quigley Report, submitted in October 1980,
recommended certain changes with regard to the benefits provided,
and to the administration of the Act. Consequently, a number of
Amendment Bills were introduced. The first of these replaced the
Commission with the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC),
although the Act declared the Corporation to be the same body as
the Commission. The Corporation is made up of a chairman and











administration of its functions.
In 1981, the Corporation undertook to review the Act with a view
to a general overhaul of the Act. The resulting Bill
incorporated some important changes, and involved a streamlining
of the 1972 Act (up to 60 sections of the former Act were
eliminated). This bill became law on December 17, 1982 and took
effect from April 1 , 1983.
7.11 THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE 1982 ACT
A PRACTICAL VIEW OF A ' PURE ' NO-FAULT COMPENSATION .SCHEME
7.11.1 PERSONAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT
Compensation under the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act
centres around the concept of "personal injury by accident"
(82[1]). The Act can be described as a code for 'personal injury
by accident' in that:
in
where any person suffers personal injury by accident
New Zealand or dies as a result of personal injury so
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suffered, or where any person suffers outside New Zealand
personal injury by accident in respect of which he has cover
under this Act or dies as a result of personal injury so
suffered, no proceedings for damages arising directly or
indirectly out of the injury or death shall be brought in
any Court in New Zealand independently of this Act, whether
by that person or any other person, and whether under any
rule of law or any enactment" (S27[1]).
It is a function of the ACC to determine whether or not a person
can be classified as having suffered 'personal injury by
accident'. Section 27(3) provides that the Corporation has
exclusive jurisdiction in this matter, and that its decisions are
conclusive. The only exceptions to this rule are (i) where there
is a claim arising from an overseas accident, (ii) where a claim
arises out of a breach of a contract of insurance, and (iii)
where there is a claim in respect of an accident or death
occurring before April 1, 1983.
The 1982 Act does not give an exhaustive definition of the term
'personal injury by accident', but S2(1)(a) of the Act gives
specific inclusions, and S2(1)(b) gives specific exclusions.





The physical and mental consequences of any such injury or
of the accident.
Medical, surgical, dental, or first aid misadventure.
Incapacity resulting from an occupational disease or
industrial deafness to the extent covered by S28 and S29.
Actual bodily harm (including mental or nervous shock)
resulting to the victim from certain criminal offences.
Unless included in the above,
excluded:




caused by a cardiovascular or cerebrovascular
(heart attack or stroke), unless as a result of
strain or stress that is abnormal, excessive or
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(ii)
unusual for the person suffering it and which arises out
of and in the course of his or her employment.
Damage to mind or body caused exclusively by disease,
infection or the ageing process.
The term 'personal injury by accident' is taken to convey the
idea of an unexpected and undesigned injury. The injury must be
a sudden one as far as the victim is concerned, i.e., not a
disease.
It should be noted that even a deliberately-caused injury to a
claimant by another person is trea ted as an accident (38).
However, claimants who intentionally injure themselves are not
covered (S90) although the ACC has the discretion to award their
dependents some compensation. Section 90(2) provides a statutory
presumption against wilfully self-inflicted injury or suicide, in
the absence of proof to the contrary. The ACC also has the power
under S92 to refuse compensation and rehabilitation assistance in
whole or in part where the claimant suffered his injury and
incapacity in the course of criminal conduct. This new section
specifies that the provision should only apply where the offence
for which the claimant has been convic ted involves sentencing to
imprisonment, and that it would be " r e p u g n a n t to justice" for
cover to be granted.
7.11.2 COVER
'Cover' is defined in S2(1) as the entitlement which any person
or his dependents would have to rehabilitation assistance and
compensation under the Act if he suffers personal injury by
accident or dies as a result of the injury so suffered.
Cover for earners is financed through levies payable by employers
on the earnings of their employees, and through levies on self-
employed people. Cover for motor vehicle accidents is financed
by levies on motor vehicles. However, the payment of levy does
not ensure compensation (Sl13), as Accident Compensation is not
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an insurance scheme. By the same token. cover cannot be denied
on the grounds that levy has not been paid.
Cover for motor vehicle accidents is extended to people injured
by accident by. through. or in connection with. the use of a
motor vehicle. Al l people injured in such circumstances have
cover. whether they are earners or non-earners.
7.11.3 SOURCES AND APPLICATION OF FINANCE
The previously existing statutory funds: the Earner's Fund, the
Motor Vehicle Fund and the Supplementary Fund, and their related
schemes which applied under the 1972 Act have been abolished by
the 1982 Act. However, the Corporation Administration still uses
separate accounts for the purpose of levy-setting. (Thus cost
internalisation is preserved). From April 1, 1983 all claims
involving motor vehicles were to be charged to the motor vehicle
account. As far as the funding of the system is concerned:
"The ACC, until the 1982 Act. operated a fully-funded
system, as opposed to a pay-as-you-go system. This
implied that the levies received in anyone year should,
on investment, be sufficient to meet the run-off claims
filed in the same year, including compensation and costs
of rehabilitation arising from those claims and payable in
future years. In these circumstances, it was necessary
for the ACC to build up reserve balances to meet the
situation.
However, under the 1982 Act the Corporation may operate
either a fully-funded or a pay-as-you-go system, or a
system combining both approaches. The Corporation has.
with effect from 1 April 1984, set levy rates at a level
sufficient to maintain reserves for five years'
outstanding liabilities for accidents to earners and self-
employed and for four years' outstanding liabilities for
motor vehicle accidents" (39).
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7.11.4 THE MAKING OF A CLAIM
The process of lodging a claim under the Accident Compensation
Act greatly simplif ies the common law process. All the claimant
has to do is satisfy the ACC that he has in fact suffered
personal injury by accident. This is done by the injured party
claiming benefits by means of a simple claim form (Cl) and a
supporting First Medical Certificate (C14) which he lodges at his
local ACC Office:
"On the bas is of that form, a first medical certificate
and an employers certificate of earnings, a decision is
made on the claim, normally. within a few days. The
average interval between receipt of a claim and the first
cheque being posted to the claimant is now about ten days.
Continuation of compensation payments is dependent upon
the production of further medical certificates" (40).
Section 98 provides that there is a time limit of one year on the
making of a claim under the Act. However, failure to bring a
claim during that period will not be a bar if such failure has
not prejudiced the Corporation, or if the failure was occasioned
by mistake of fact, or by mistake of any matter of law other than
the provisions of this section, or by any other reasonable cause
(S98[2]).
7.11.5 EARNINGS-RELATED COMPENSATION
To claim earnings-related compensation, a person suffering
personal injury by accident must establish that at the time of
the accident he or she was an earner - whether self-employed or
an employee - and that he or she is prevented from earning his or
her pre-accident level of earnings due to the injury.
(Exceptions are made in certain cases. For example, S63 provides
for compensation for loss of potential earning capacity in
certain cases e.g., students, and 869 provides for extension of
entitlement to earnings-related compensation, where a person has
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ceased to be an earner. In both cases the discretion to make an
award lies with the Corporation).
First-week compensation is only provided for employees injured in
the course of their employment. Such compensation is payable by
employers at 80 per cent of total los t time (including overtime)
(557[2]). Earnings-related compensation after the first week
(for temporary l?sS of earning capac ity) is paid at the rate of
80 per cent of lost earnings capacity. This amount is calculated
by taking the sum of a person's pre-accident ('relevant')
earnings, less the sum of h is earnings during his period of
incapacity (559[2]). The maximum amount of earnings-related
compensation is now $700 a week (Prescribed Amounts Order SR
1984/140). Thus, if a person suffers total loss of earning
capacity because of his or her injury, his or her average weekly
earnings (termed 'relevant' earnings) will represent his 'o r her
actual loss of earning capacity, and earnings-related
compensation will be payable at 80 per cent of that loss. One of
the reasons full cover is not provided is in order to give the ·
injured person an incentive to return to work, while at the same
time cushioning him against financial loss. In fact, the Act in
general aims to offer a generous level of compensation - not full
indemnity.
7.11.5.1 Notional Earni ngs Assessments
It has been mentioned that the payment of earnings-related
compensation relates to a person's loss of earning capacity, and
not necessarily to a person's inability to earn. Thus, once an
injured person is once again able to be employed, he is expected
to seek employment. The Corporation will assist the prospective
employee insofar as rehabilitation and retraining is concerned.
However, if the employee has not found selected or alternative
employment after 13 weeks have elapsed, the Corporation may
decide to make an assessment of 'notional earnings'. Section
59(2) of the Act permits the Corporation to deduct an amount,
known as 'notional earnings' from his relevant earnings.
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"Provided that if the Corporation considers, having regard
to the medical and other evidence available to it, that the
earner is -
(a) Not endeavouring to work or earn in paid employment to
the extent of his capacity; or
(b) Not working or earning in pa id employment to the extent
to which he would be able to do so if the only factor
affecting his ability to work or earn in paid
Thus,
employment were his incapacity for work due to the
injury, -
may fix the amount to be so deducted at such figure as it
considers appropriate" (S59[2]).
the people penalised are those who choose not to be
employed at a level commensurate wi t h their capabilities, and
those whose capacity to earn is affected by factors other than
their injury. In practice 'notional earnings' are calculated by
determining the remuneration an injured person would reasonably be
capable of receiving if he were working to full capacity, taking
into account any limitations his injury might place on him. Once
this sum has been calculated, it will be deducted from a person's
relevant earnings, and a lower level of compensation will be paid
out. Notional earnings are reviewe d in order to account for
changes in an injured person's circumstances, such as an
improvement or deterioration in his me dical condition.
7.11.6 COMPENSATION FOR PERMANENT INCAPACITY
A special code, set out in S60 applies to the assessment of
permanent incapacity. It applies where an injured person is
medically regarded as unable to completely recover from his
accident incapacity, after his condition has stabilised
(medically), and where full rehabilitation and retraining steps
have been taken. The Corporation will base the amount of
compensation to be provided for such person by comparing:
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•.• the amount the claimant would have been earning at the
date of the assessment, in his pre-accident employment, but
for the accident, with the amount he is now capable of
earning. That figure is then related back to relevant
earnings to determine any permanent loss of earning
capacity" (41).
The permanent weekly compensation will thus be 80 per cent of
the figure so determined.
The Act has been criticised on the grounds that compensation for
earnings is regulated by a person's pre-accident earnings, and
the loss of career prospects is disregarded. This may work well
in terms of short-term benefits, but would perhaps be prejudicial
to those incapacitated for a long period of time. It has been
suggested that:
a loss is properly assessed by comparing what the
victim has been able to earn aga inst what he can establish
on the balance of probabilities he would have been earning.
This allows for rises in earnings and improvement in
occupational status he would have had but for the accident.
It is, admittedly, difficult to build this into a pension
scheme, but it is nonetheless relevant - the more so in
respect
(42 ) •
of a person disabled for a long period of time"
The 1982 Act does make provision under 862 for employees under
the age of 20, apprentices or improvers under awards or
industrial agreements, and employees under contracts of service
requiring training for qualifications in their occupation to
receive certain increases in earni ngs-related compensation if, in
terms of their employment, they would have been entitled at
subsequent stages of that employment to increments in earnings.
However, if the employee's relevant earnings exceed the maximum
prescribed weekly amount for such cases ($395), the prescribed
amount becomes his relevant earnings. It must be acknowledged
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that this is only a minimal reform in respect of a recognition of
a motor victim's erstwhile future prospects, but it is a step in
the right direction. On the other hand, the recommendation of
the Woodhouse Commission to the effect that earnings-related
payments be reviewed to keep pace wit h changes in the cost of
living has been incorporated into the 1982 Act, under 856(6).
The amount of permanent compensation received will not be reduced
if a person undergoes a future increase in earning capacity, but
it may be increased if a person's condition and capacity to earn
deteriorates further as a result of the accident.
7.11.7 BENEFITS AVAILABLE UNDER THE ACT
A brief outline follows of the various types of benefits
available under the 1982 Act to persons suffering personal injury
by accident.
1. Earnings-related compensation.
2 • Medical Treatment: The ACC will be liable for medical
treatment where a person suffers personal injury by accident
in respect of which he has cover, and treatment is needed
(875). The cost of each treatment will be met by the ACC if
(i) the injured person is not entitled to Social Security
benefits, (ii) the amount paid for such treatment is
considered reasonable by New Zealand standards by the
Corporation. The same applies to dental treatment.





Reasonable cost of medical or d e n t a l treatment (5875,76).
Reasonable cost of transport to a doctor or hospital for
initial treatment, or to home (S72).
Reasonable cost of meals, accommodation and transport to
receive medical and rehabilitative treatment in certain
cases (873).
Reasonable cost of transport by ambulance (874).
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3. Damage to Artificial Limbs or Aids or Clothing:
Compensation for damage to, or loss of, any clothing,
spectacles, contact lens or artificial limb or aid used or
worn at the time of the accident (including dentures) (577).
However, no compensation for such damage or loss will be
made unless the person also suffers personal injury by
accident for which medical or hospital treatment is required
(S77[3][a]).











(ii) Compensation to a member of the household for quantifiable
loss of service of a domestic or household nature through
injury or death by accident (S80[2][a]).
(iii) Compensation to anybody who can show actual and reasonable
expenses or losses incurred in helping an accident victim
(S80[2][b]).
(iv) Payment for the reasonable cost of necessary constant
personal attention following injury (580[3]).
Section 80(1) gives a list of specific exclusions in relation to
compensation for each pecuniary loss, t h e most important of which





Benefits relat ing to dependents:
Reasonable funeral expenses (581).
Lump sum payments for a dependent spouse (including
de facto) and children (including children to whom the
deceased stood in place of a parent), if death is a result
of an accident (582).
A spouse (including de facto) and other dependants may
also qualify for earnings-related compensation if death
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(iv)
occurs as a result of an accident (865).
Payment may also be made to dependants for loss of support
due to a reduction of superannuation, pension, and the
like, as a result of death by acc ident (880[4]).
6. Lump Sums: Non-economic loss is compensated by lump sums in
the case of -
(i) Permanent physical disability (878); and
(ii) Pain and suffering, disfigurement, and loss of amenities and
enjoyment of life (879).
The present maximum amount of compensation available for
perm~nent disability is $17,000. The First Schedule of the 1982
Act sets out the percentages of this maximum figure available for
loss of various parts of the body and certain other disabilities.
An assessment is usually provided by means of specialist medical
attention. Section 78(6) provides a statutory threshold of 5 per
cent disability that must be met before any lump sum compensation
for permanent disability can be made. Section 79 sets a $10,000
maximum for lump-sum compensation for pain and suffering,
disfigurement and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life.
Payment is to be made as soon as practicable after the ACC
considers the medical condition of the accident victim to be
sufficiently stabilised, but certainly within two years from the
date of the accident.
7 •
7 . 12
Rehabilitation and retraining assistance (837[3]).
REHABILITATION
Rehabilitation has always been a high priority issue to the ACC,
and this is reflected in sections 36 and 37 of the Act. 8ection
36(1) reads as follows:
"The Corporation shall place great stress upon
rehabilitation and shall take all practicable steps to
promote a well coordinated and vigorous programme for the
medical and vocational rehabilitation of persons who have
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cover and who became incapacitated as a result of




These rehabilitation programmes promoted by the ACC are required,
according to S36(2), to have the following objectives:
(a) The restoration of the injured persons as speedily as
possible to the fullest physical , mental and social fitness
of which they are capable, having regard to their
incapacity; and
(b) their restoration to the fullest vocational and economic
usefulness of which they are capable; and
(c) their reinstatement or placement in employment.
Section 36(3) gives the ACC the discretion, notwithstanding
subsection (1), to provide for rehabilitation outside New Zealand
for an earner suffering personal injury by accident outside New
and adequate rehabilitation of injured accident victims,
Zealand. Thus the fullest measures are provided for the prompt
so that
they may regain their place in society.
One aspect of rehabilitation in New Zealand is the Alternative
Work Scheme promoted by the ACC. This scheme mainly assists
partially incapacitated employees to return to work. Employers
are requested by the ACC to designate work which can be carried
out by partially incapacitated persons.
Section
to its
37 sets out the function of t he Corporation in relation
promotion of rehabilitation. These include the
sponsoring, supporting and fostering of groups concerned with
rehabilitation and the consideration of the extent to which
rehabilitation may be promoted by fiscal and other measures.
In pursuing these statutory objectives the Corporation has
appointed rehabilitation officers to all ACC offices throughout
New Zealand. The function of these officers is to help injured
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persons assess their rehabilitation needs and see to it that
these needs are met. Rehabilitation officers work, in accordance
with (S37[1][a]), in cooperation with hospitals, rehabilitation
agencies, government departments and employer and employee
organisations, in o rder to promote and help organise the
provision by them of all services necessary for the discharge of
the Corporation's fu nctions vis-a-vis rehabilitation. The
rehabilitation officer, in consultation with an accident victim,
will endeavour to design a rehabilitation programme especially
tailored to suit the needs of the injured individual. This
programme will be based on an in-depth assessment of the injured
person's present and future needs, with an emphasis on speedy
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation programmes will then be reviewed
in accordance with the injured person's progress.
Section 37 also provides that the Corporation may become a direct
provider of resources in clearly defined circumstances. These
resources may include housing alterations (S37[3][c]), the
provision of a wheelchair or other aid for daily living
(S37[3][f]) and/or the adaptation or purchase of a motor vehicle
(S37[3][g]).
The effectiveness of a rehabilitation programme or measure will
of course depend largely on the cooperation of the injured
compensation to
victim. Section 87 imposes a duty on the person claiming
submit to medical examination and medical or
surgical treatment for the purpose of rehabilitation, and
provides that an unreasonable refusal t o comply with this duty
may result in such person being denied further assistance.
7.13 CONCLUSION
What has been examined here is the practical functioning of a
unique system which has taken the radical step of completely
abolishing the fault requirement not just in relation to motor
vehicle accidents, but to all accidents. New Zealand
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is the only country which has made anything like such
a wide-ranging reform of its accident compensation system,
and as such it stands as the sole representative of the most
radical form of alternative compensation strategies which
are commonly discussed" (43).
Despite criticisms as to the impracticality of such a system by
the defenders of the fault system, not only does the New Zealand
Accident Compensation Scheme work, but as the last eleven years
have demonstrated, it also works well.
In relation to the cost of the scheme:
in effect all the moneys previously flowing into
workmen's compensation and compulsory third party motor
vehicle insurance have been diverted into a single fund
which is topped up to some extent by parliament. Thus the
overall cost of the new system is much the same as the
previous one, despite the generosity of the benefits and the
vastly enhanced entitlement to compensation" (44).
This lack of increase in cost has been attributed to the saving
in administration costs brought about by the abolition of the
entire 'investigation into fault' process, and by the utilisation
of a state-run scheme. The method of funding the scheme has also
been applauded as cost-efficient. Benefits provided under the
scheme are wide-ranging, and demonstrate a real effort to achieve
what ought to be the goal of any compensation scheme: provision
for the physical, economic, social and rehabilitative needs of
the injured person in the fullest sense.
In fact it has been remarked that "The range of benefits provided
by the scheme are similar to those promised, though not often
paid, by the delict system" (45).
"Of course, nobody receives fantastic lump sum payments any
more but the system of periodic payments guarantees generous
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compensation for life, which in a world beset by inflation
is arguably better than a capital sum that might prove
inadequate for one's future needs, even if wisely invested.
Nor should one forget that very few claimants under the old
system ever received the huge sums promised by the law of
delict" (46).
The efficiency of the scheme is demonstrated by the fact that the
average time gap between the documentation of a claim and the
first payment thereof is ten days (47). This efficiency has been
aided greatly by the fact that since 1981 there has been a
planned policy of decentralisation, with the ACC's officers being
given a greater measure of delegation and responsibility. This
policy of decentralisation .i s aimed at bringing the ACC closer to
its victims, and has undoubtedly been successful.
Since its inception the ACC has committed itself to the
priorities of (i) a~cident prevention (ii) rehabilitation and
(iii) realistic compensation. These priorities serve as an
indication of how far removed this innovative system is from
focusing attention on the establishment of fault. Recognising
that accident prevention is of primary importance, the
Corporation has adopted the "whole-man" approach in its promotion
of safety activities.
"Just as there are many causative factors involved in every
accident, so accident prevention must be viewed as multi-
dimensional in its scope. More and more it is becoming
clear that good human relations are intertwined with safety
and good safety practices. Human relations in the sense of
safety embrace the whole person: covering such factors as
environment, attitudes, behaviour, identity, self-esteem,
performance, supervision, motivation, medical and mental
health, even the understanding of ethnic backgrounds; there




"Viewed overall, the new system seems to be a great success.
It has cured most, if not all, of the defects of the old
system: it pays compensation quickly, reliably and
economically to those who really need it, for as long as
that need lasts. And it does so at much the same cost as
the previous inefficient system" (49).
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN
1. For information relating to the US no-fault experience. I
am especially i n d e b t e d to Compensating Auto Accident Vic-
tims A Follow-up Report on No-fault Auto Insurance
Experiences US Department of Transportation, May 1985.
2. The -Co l u mb i a plan involved the fol lowing points: "1. Motor
Vehicle Owners should be liable for all personal injury and
death caused by the operation of the vehicle, regardless of
fault. To secure such liability every owner should carry
third-party insurance covering himself and every person
driving the vehicle with his consent. 2. The suggested
compensation should provide the following: (a) Medical
expenses for the whole period of disability; (b) a weekly
allowance based on the wages or other income, or t he
replacement cost of services such as housework; and in the
case of unemployed persons such as students, a minimum
amount; (c) the amount would be two-thirds of the average
weekly earnings. In the case of partial disability, two-
thirds of the difference between the average earnings before
and after the accident. ~here should also be a schedule of
dismemberment allowances; (d) no compensation for the first
week of disability". 1972 Tasmania Report, pp.15-16. J.
Green recorded that the "unreliability of witnesses and the
delay and expense involved in bringing an issue to trial,
seem to be the chief reasons for the Columbia group
concluding that the moral value of establishing liability
according to fault is lost in the practical application of
the rule". J. Green 'Automob ile Accident Insurance
Legislation in the Province of Saskatchewan' Vol.31 (1949)
Journal of Comparative Law, p.40 .
3. In considering how the burden of motoring, (i.e., the costs
of compensation) could best be allocated, Keeton and
O'Connell came up with five basic points: "We propose first,
that the burden of a minimum level of protection against
measurable economic loss -let us call it basic protection -
be treated as a cost of motoring. The cost of providing
this minimum level of compensation for traffic victims would
be distributed generally among persons who benefit from
motoring, without regard to fault in particular arguments.
Second, we propose to distribute this cost through a form of
compulsory motor vehicle insurance closely comparable to the
medical payments coverage of present automobile policies.
Third, we propose that the burden of non-economic hardship
(principally pain and suffering) resulting from injuries
that cause damages below a limit equal to the basic
protection limit be borne by each victim without any
compensation other than that he chooses to arrange for
himself by voluntarily purchasing a special type of added
insurance coverage for this purpose. Fourth, we propose
that the fault principle and present rules of tort law
developed under its guidance be preserved as the basis of
allocating the burden, both economic and non-economic, in
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cases of more serious injury, that is, the economic burden
that lies beyond basic protect ion, and the pain and
suffering resu lting from injuries that cause economic loss
beyond basic protection. Fifth, we propose, for both the
new form of compulsory insurance and the insurance motorists
may carry to protect against tort liability for the more
severe injuries, that an attempt be made to formulate a
system of involvement rating that will be administratively
practical and will cast upon those most frequently involved
in accidents - a class roughly consisting of those who are
the most dangerous drivers - a somewhat heavier burden than
that cast on other motorists". Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey
O'Connell, 'Basic Protection - A Proposal for Improving
Automobile Claims Systems' op cit ., pp.356-357.
4. 1973 Nova Scotia Report p.170.
5. Public Law No. 90-313, 82 Stat. 126 (May 22, 1968).
6. Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Crash Losses
and their Compensation in the United States 100 (1971)
quoted in 1985 DOT Report p.14.
7. Robert L. Bombaugh, 'The Department of Transportation's Auto
Insurance Study and Auto Accident Compensation Reform Vol.71
Columbia Law Review 207 at 240.
8. 1985 DOT Report p.2.
9. Brief mention should be made here of other reforms which
have had .t h e effect of making the American traditional fault
system ~ore "compensationist". A major reform was the
change from the doctrine of contributory negligence to that
of comparative negligence effected in 42 States. The
doctrine of contributory negligence prohibits a victim who
negligently contributed to the accident in which he was
injured in any way, however small, from receiving any
compensation whatsoever. Under the comparative negligence
rule, such a victim may st ill receive some measure of
compensation, provided he is found to be less at fault than
(or possibly as equally at fault as) the other party.
Another recent change is that 30 States have abolished the
"contact" rule, by which a person injured in a "hit-and-
run accident had to prove that there was a collision with
another vehicle. Now victims are able to claim that such a
vehicle forced them off the road. Also, traditional
insurance States often offer a limited form of insurance
that pays behefits without rega~d to the issue of fault.
This is known as "medical payments" (MP) insurance. It
provides for the payment of medical expenses to all injured
occupants of a policy holder's car, up to the limits of the
policy (usually fairly low). These and other reforms have
greatly extended the ambit of compensation of victims under
the "fault" system.
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10. It should be noted that the purchasing of motor vehicle
insurance has not been made compulsory in all American
States. However, "Financial responsibility" laws exist in
all States, and these enforce a certain statutory minimum of
liability insurance or its equivalent for all motorists.
Thirty-three states have actually made the purchase of BI
insurance cover compulsory.
11. Most States provide for the exclusion of certain victims
from PIP benefits. These include those who intentionally
cause injury, thieves, would-be suicides, those driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, owners of uninsured
vehicles, etc.
12. Nevada was also a no-lawsuit no-fault State until January 1,
1980. The main reason for the repeal of this law was the
Nevada plan's lack of "balance". "The Nevada law provided
$10,000 in no-fault benefits for each victim and prohibited
lawsuits in tort unless the victim's medical benefits
exceeded $750. The frequency of BI liability claims in
Nevada was considerably higher t h a n the BI liability claim
frequency in other no-lawsuit States with similar
thresholds. The frequency and size of PIP claims in Nevada
also exceeded the average for such claims in other no-
lawsuit States. As a result of these factors indicating
lack of balance, there were sharp increases in automobile
insurance rates in the State and Nevada's law became
increasingly unpopular with the State's legislators". 1985
DOT Report, p.24. Pennsylvania also had an out-of-balance
no-lawsuit no-fault law repealed and replaced with an add-on
no-fault law, effective as of October 1, 1984.
13. 1985 DOT Report, p.3.
14. No American jurisdiction to date provides for no-fault bene-
fits for non-economic loss (pain and suffering) incurred by
victims. Thus a victim would have to incur non-economic
loss of a certain degree of severity to be compensated for
it at all. Kansas is considering amending its no-fault
statute in 1985 to include compensation for pain and
suffering.
15. The level of dollars of loss medical expense thresholds
varies from $400 in Connecticut to $4,000 in Minnesota.
16. No. 83-1938 (D.C.D.C. 1984).
17. 1985 DOT Report p.16.
18. Ibid., p.68.
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8. SOUTH AFRICA - THE 'FAULT' SYSTEM
8.1. INTRODUCTION
In 1942, South Africa became the last country in the Western
World to adopt compulsory motor vehicle i n s u r a n c e . Consequently,
it had the benefit of surveying and evaluating the extensive
overseas experience in this field before formulating the
principles which would govern this country's motor insurance
system. The sytem chosen, third party fault liability insurance,
has maintained a conservative course over the years, although
reforms within the system have taken place. At the same time,
however, South Africa has also encountered the universal problems
inherent in the use of the motor vehicle as a mode of
transportation. Once again, it has had the benefit of observing
the various solutions to these problems which overseas systems
have implemented. South African legislators are thus faced with
the choice of maintaining the present fault-based system, and
bolstering it with continual reforms, or of breaking completely
new ground for South Africa by following a trend towards no-fault
automobile insurance already evident overseas.
Before examining the possibilities of a change of that nature, it
may be profitable to examine the background to fault liability
motor vehicle insurance in South Africa in greater





During the 1930s there was a growing concern felt in South Africa
in relation to the rising number of motor vehicle accidents and
the widespread inability of negligent drivers to pay the amount
of damages awarded against them. In an attempt to solve this
problem, a Bill was submitted to Parliament in 1939. Due to the
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outbreak of war this Bill was shelved until 1942 when the Motor
Vehicle Insurance Act 29 of 1942 was passed. As mentioned
earlier, the Bill originally provided no indemnity to the
wrongdoer, it being proposed that the insurer should b e entitled
to recover the damages it had paid from such wrongdoer in every
case. However, it was decided prior to the inception of the Act
to provide the wrongdoer with financia l immunity from liability,
except in a few specified instances where the insurer would be
granted a right of recourse. Despite this innovation, the common
law liability of the negligent driver was not affected, but was
merely shifted onto his insurer. Consequently the insurer's
liability was not absolute - he would only be liable if the
insured would have been liable under the common law, i.e., if it
could be established that the damages claimed were caused by his
negligence or 'fault'.
The Act was brought into operation from 1 May 1946, by
Proclamation 28 of 1946 (in the same year Saskatchewan enacted
the first no-fault motor vehicle insurance plan). Thus a
statutory obligation was imposed on all ordinary motorists to
obtain insurance against the risk of injury to third parties, on
pain of criminal penalties. Under the 1942 Act, insurance
companies offering third party insurance operated for their own
gain, with the State's function being merely to ensure that all
motor vehicle owners complied with the law, and occasionally, at
the request of insurance companies, to determine tariffs for the
insurance of motor vehicles.
The provisions of the 1942 Act allowed a motorist to escape
liability completely if contributory fault on the part of the
plaintiff could be proved, or if it could be established that an
act of the plaintiff was the proximate cause of the collision, or
that the plaintiff had had the last opportunity of avoiding the
collision. The hardship that resulted from this rule was
alleviated by the introduction of the Apportionment of Damages
Act 34 of 1956, which provided that such contributory negligence




previously excluded under the act could now claim for
compensation - the degree of compensation allowed being
to the degree of fault of the claimant. In other words,
was found that the claimant was himself 25 per cent to blame
if it
for
the accident, he would receive three-quarters of the amount of
compensation that would have been allotted in that particular
case, had he not been negligent.
In 1965 the Motor Vehicle Assurance Fund (MVA Fund) was created
in order to act as a reinsurer of the risks of authorised
insurers, and as an indemnitor for those injured in hit-and-run
cases, and those i n j u r e d in a collision with an uninsured
vehicle.
Meanwhile, the 1942 Act was repeatedly amended until in 1972 it
was replaced by the present Act, the Compulsory Motor Vehicle
Insurance Act 56 of 1972. (The same year the Accident
Compensation Act was passed in New Zealand). This Act repealed
and re-enacted the 1942 Act and its amendments.
purpose of this Act is reflected in its title:
The general
"To provide for the compulsory insurance of certain motor
vehicles in order to ensure the payment of compensation for
certain loss or damage unlawfully caused by the drivi ng of
such motor vehicles; for the payment of compensation where
the loss or damage is caused by t h e driving of an uninsured
or unidentified motor vehicle; and for incidental matters".
The Act can be seen as something of a social measure in respect
of its provisions for the compensation of injured persons and the
dependants of those killed in motor accidents. However, 821(1)
of the new Act echoes the requirements of 811(1) of its
predecessor, in that the damages claimed must be "due to the
negligence or other unlawful act of the person who drove the
motor vehicle". Consequently only the victims of a fault-caused
accident may recover any damages and no-one may recover for
damages suffered as a result of his own negligence. The onus is
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on the injured party to prove the negligence of the other driver,
and only when he is successful in establishing such proof will he
be eligible for compensation under the Act. In addition,
Sections 22 and 23 of the present Act provide for the limitation
and exclusion of the insurer's liability in certain cases,
although these restrictions are not related to fault
requirement. These provisio ns make the obtainment of
compensation more onerous for road users, so that only a small
proportion of these stand to benefit under the Act.
In recent years, t h e question has been raised whether motor
vehicle accident insurance should retain the fault requirement as
an essential element for the provision of compensation.
Adherence to the fault criterion has increasingly come to be seen
as the cause of many of the deficiencies of the present system.
8.3 THE CALL FOR STATUTORY REFORM
As early as 1955 a memorandum was submitted by Mr. A.C. Suzman
QC., a member of the Johannesburg bar, to a Commission which had
been appointed by the then Governor-General






"Motoring accidents have become so frequent a hazard of
modern daily life that it is submitted that the time has
arrived for a radical departure f r o m our existing law under
which a person who is injured, or the dependants of a person
who is killed, must establish negligence in order to receive
compensation" (1).
The memorandum continued by outlining proposals for a system of
collective responsibility irrespective of fault, based upon an
extension of the principles of the Workmen's Compensation Act of
1941 [Act 30 of 1941].
In 1962 the Du Plessis Commission of Inquiry into Motor Vehicle
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Insurance reached the conclusion that the purpose of such




for the protection of the poorer
cannot make provision for their
and
own
difficulties, and we consider it as necessary legislation
because there are many people who cannot provide for
themselves when they are involved in an accident or when
they are injured" (Para 52).
The Commission considered the proposal that compensation should
be awarded irrespective of ' n e g l i g e n c e , but rejected it on the
increased,
ground that the price of premiums would have to be drastically
putting them beyond the means of many motor vehicle














com panie s , have sometimes weighed with the Commission
disproportionately to their importance. Many of the
'Co mmi s s i o n ' s cures are worse than their woes" (2).
The writer went on to submit that a more careful investigation
into the benefits of a 'no-fault' scheme might have convinced the
Commission that such a scheme had great merit. The Commission's
finding was further criticised in the Financial Mail:
the scheme can be shown to be inefficient and
wasteful, and to operate in such a way as not to fulfil the
needs of our society or the aims of the legislature.
There seem to be two reasons for this unhappy state of
affairs. Firstly, there is a lamentable degree of ignorance
of the rights and duties of the public, which has led to
widespread suspicion of the insurance companies and the
unnecessary use of lawyers and expensive legal and quasi-
legal processes.
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Secondly. there is the delict ual base of the law. A
thorough-going revision of the law and removal of the
economic inefficiency inherent in Third Party insurance can
only be achieved by introducing a scheme in terms of which
compensation is paid irrespective of fault.
As compensation is the clear intention of the law. all
extraneous arguments should be dropped. Society must admit
its collective responsibility to compensate motor accident
victims. Such a plan would be called compensation insurance
as against the present liability insurance •••
The proposal has been much debated in South Africa and has
twice been put before Commissions of Enquiry into the
workings of the Third Party Scheme. However. c hiefly as a
result of resistance by insurance companies. it has been
neglected. But whereas the argum~nts in favour of such a
scheme are strong. little that is cogent can be said against
it" (3).
In 1968 Professor Harry Street (4) delivered an address at the
University of the Witwatersrand. Johannesburg. in which he
expressed his concern at the state of both the British and the
South African laws governing the compensation of victims of
traffic accidents. He pointed out that although social norms
dictate that the person who caused the harm should accept
responsibility and compensate the victim, in reality it is the
insurance company and not the careless motorist who pays for the
damages. In addition the insurer's administrative costs are
greatly increased because of the need to investigate and assess
the issue of fault. and concluded that:
••• the present system based on fault has so many inherent
defects that nothing less than its replacement by something
completely new will bring about a fair and economical system
for compensating traffic victims" (5).
As noted earlier. the 1970s saw a renewed interest in no-fault
insurance in the Western world, with various no-fault plans being
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adopted in America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, etc., and
with the appointment of the Pearson Commission in Great Britain.
Here in South Africa, the Financial Mail regarded a completely
new approach to motor vehicle insurance as vital.
alternatives it suggested was:
One of the
..... to recognise that MVA is an essential aspect of social
welfare and to make cover automatic, on a graded
compensation basis" (6)
However, the 1976 Wessels Commission of Inquiry adopted the
position that the idea of no-fault insurance was at variance with
the established principles of Roman-Dutch law on which the Act is
based. They suggested that should the necessity arise in future
of deliberating on the replacement of the present Act with no-
fault insurance, such an inquiry should be assigned to a judicial
commission (7). In 1979 the Secretary of Justice, Mr. J.P.J.
Coetzer, indicated in his report that there were strong arguments
in favour of a move towards no-fault motor vehicle insurance. In
May 1980, the then Minister of Transport, Mr. Chris Heunis,
recommended to the State President that a commission be appointed
insurance should be introduced.
to investigate, inter alia, whether a system of no-fault
Such a commission was appointed
)n 8 May 1981, under the chairmanship of The Hon. Mr. Justice
: .M. Grosskopf. The fact that such .a judicial commission was
ppointed to investigate the desirability of insurance reform may
= viewed as an indication of a willingness on the part of the
i t ho r t t Le s to at least consider a fundamental change in
rection for South Africa's motor vehicle insurance legislation.
8.4 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH THE PRESENT FAULT SYSTEM
IN SOUTH AFRICA
Over the years a number of criticisms have been levelled against
the use of the fault criterion in relation to motor vehicle
insurance (9). The validity of these arguments has already been
dealt with in relation to overseas systems. Here it is proposed
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to examine the extent of these problems in the light of the South
African motor vehicle insurance system. The results of a
questionnaire, circulated mainly to attorneys practising in the
country's major centres, will be used to illustrate this topic.
8.4.1 UNCOMPENSATED VICTIMS
One of the major criticisms levelled against the use of the fault
criterion as a prerequisite for compensation is that its
Even an entirely innocent victim may be excluded
application
compensation.
results in many people being excluded from
from compensation because of his inability to prove fault on the
part of the other motorist. The survey taken indicates that more
than two-thirds of the attorneys questioned had encountered cases
where innocent victims had been denied compensation. Others
remarked that they could well envisage such cases. The
circumstances listed in illustration are too numerous and varied
to be listed here in toto, but some of the most frequent
situations which resulted in compensation being denied were: (i)
where there were no witnesses to the accident; (ii) where
mechanical failure, (e.g., brake failure) occurred; (iii) where
there was no fault on the part of the other driver, e.g., the
motor vehicle which caused the accident suffered a burst tyre
(10), (iv) where the plaintiff suffered from amnesia as a result
of the accident; ( v ) where evasive action was taken to avoid a
collision, and thus no 'contact' between the vehicles could be
proved in a hit-and-run case; (vi) where the claimant was a
dependant of the negligent driver and was travelling with him in
the insured vehicle.
Thus it would appear that in addition to those persons who cannot
claim because they themselves solely were at fault, (or because
they fell into that category of persons excluded from
compensation in terms of Section 23 of the Act), a substantial
number of people who were not at fault are also excluded from
compensation due to the requirement that fault be proved.
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8.4.2 OVER- AND UNDER - COMPENSATION
There is very little information available regarding the over-
and under-compensation of victims in South Africa. Professor
Botha cautiously sta tes that:
"Some accident claims in South Africa are settled without
the direct intervention of the courts. It can be argued that
as a result of the delay in disposing of claims victims
could conceivably accept an unfavourable settlement" (13).
Insurance companies in South Africa have the advantage, as do all
defendants, of using the "payment into court" procedure. Unlike
other defendants, however, they have the benefit of the
provisions of Section 21 (lB) of the Act, which has the effect of
turning even the pre-litigation offer of settlement into the
'cost' equivalent of a payment into court. This may discourage a
plaintiff - particularly a poorer plaintiff, from proceeding with
the case. An attorney surveyed observed that "Third Party
litigat ion is like poker, with the claimant at tremendous risk
when the insurance company makes a payment into court". In
addition, even if a claimant succeeds in a court action and is
awarded party and party costs, he is still left to pay his
a ttorney-client costs out of the lump sum he receives.
In relation to the issue of under-compensation, Section 22 of the
present Act limits the liability of insurers towards various
classes of passengers travelling in the insured vehicle.
Although the question of fault does not play a direct role in
relation to these limitations, it would appear that the
imposition of limitations in these cases has something to do with
'morality' in so f a r as these passengers are to a greater or
lesser extent 'punished' for the negligence of the driver of the
vehicle they occupy. A large number of the people questioned felt
strongly that unlimited cover should be extended to all
passengers (86,3 per cent). A mere 7,2 per cent felt this to be
an unnecessary measure. As far as the payment itself i s
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concerned, the call was for a more realistic quantum of
compensation, especially for general damages. The view was
expressed that in South Africa compensation is inadequate in most
cases.
8.4.3 DELAY
A frequent criticism of the fault system is that the
investigation into the question of fault required by third party
liability insurance h a s the effect that many victims have to wait
an inordinate amount of time before they are recompensed for
their loss. The situation in South Africa would appear to confirm
this pattern. The MVA Fund's Annual Report 1983/84 (14)
indicates that the greatest amount of payments are made between
2-3 years after the accident (15). In addition, R26 665 501 was
paid out during the 1983/84 insurance year in respect of claims
made between 1965 and 1980.
When those surveyed were asked what, in their experience, the
average time gap was between the injury and the compensation of
the victim, the results were as follows: 7,6 per cent cited 4-12
months as average, 52,3 per cent considered 13-24 months normal,
32,S per cent experienced 27-36 months as average, and 6,8 per
cent cited an average time gap of ove r 3 years. It was generally
felt that the act ought to be streamlined, and that there should
be a simplification of the procedure of lodging claims. The need
for a mechanism to obviate the delay i n payment of compensation,
especially in serious damage claims, was expressed. Three
quarters (75,7 per cent) o f those questioned were in favour of
advance payment plans for a victim's out-of-pocket expenses in
those cases where the insured driver is clearly liable.
Interestingly, 45,2 per cent were of the opinion that the gap
between losses incurred and compensation received was due to the
fault requirement (40 per cent disagreed), although 60,6 per
cent felt that a change to a system of no-fault insurance would
have a significant beneficial effect on payment time periods
(18,9 per cent disagreed and 20,S per cent were uncertain).
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8.4.3.1 DELAY IN RELATION TO EVIDENCE
Under the third party liability insurance system a plaintiff must
be able to prove fault on the part of the driver who injured him.
The evidential difficulties inherent in the fault system have
already been examined (16), and the above-mentioned delay between
the time of the accident and the court hearing has a further
negative effect on the evidence requirement. Certain South
African judges have acknowledged the deleterious effect of delay
on evidence given i n motor accident cases. Kotze J A in
Union and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd v Humphrey
stated that:
(17),
"Experience has shown that the onus to be discharged by a
plaintiff in a case of this nature is often an exacting one
on account of the difficulty in recreating or of assessing
the conditions which prevailed at the time of the event in
question" (18).
Watermeyer J in Pasquallie N 0 v Shield Insurance Co Ltd (19),
referring to the fact that the hearing had come to court three
years and three months after the accident took place, expressed
the opinion that after this time-lapse "memories are blurred and
no longer accurate" (20).
8.4.3.2 DELAY IN RELATION TO COURT CONGESTION
There are no figures available as to the percentage of the court
roll being taken up by motor vehicle accident cases in South
Africa, although motor accident cases would appear to account for
a considerable amount of litigation, both at the Magistrate's and
Supreme Court levels. According to J.M. Burchell:
"One merely has to look at the ratio of reported motor-
accident cases to other delictual cases to see that motor-
accident cases form the bulk of the reported material on
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delict" (21).
It has been suggested in this regard that a special MVA court
should be set up, with its own set of rules which would:
"Accommodate the ideas of an early conference, availability
of police dossiers in order to establish fault, interim
payments and the relaxation of the present formalistic
requirements concerning the exchange of unwieldly and often
unnecessary pleadings. Actions not settled at the proposed
early conference will not have to wait for twelve or even
twenty-four months after closure of pleadings before trial
dates are allocated" (22).
While this reform may be effective in speeding up the trial
procedure, the necessary delay of an investigation into the issue
of 'fault' still remains.
It should also be noted that the Wessels Commission considered
the desirability of establishing a special court for MVA claims,
but decided that such a move was not justified:
the Report records that of approximately 22 000 MVA
claims disposed of annually only about 2% (440) had to be
settled by a court, the remainder being settled mutually.
(It is not clear whether the 440 includes matters settled
after the trial had begun). This number compares strangely
with the number of MVA matters on the court rolls for
hearing, totalling, according to the Report (6.23.1.1) about
1 230 during the year. The implication appears to be that
many matters are settled at the door of the court because
the insurers have delayed their investigations or the
plaintiffs have proceeded with hopeless claims or withheld
medical or other information in expectation of a nuisance
value" settlement, or both parties have not exercised proper
efforts towards settlement. Another, perhaps more likely,
explanation is that claimants only realise, at the door of
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the court. the high costs of the litigation involved and are
more disposed to settle than they were originally"(23).
8.4.4 ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM: THE COST
According to the MVA Fund's Annual Report for 1983/84 (24). the
average premium income per motor vehicle, as defined in the Act,
for the period 1 May 1965-30 April 1984 amounted to R17.47 and
was expended as follows (25):
Compensation R10,39
Medical costs 0,60
Claimants' legal costs 1,14
Average premium income



























From the above, it can be established that the victim's
compensation and medical costs (R10,99) amount to approximately
63 per cent of the total premium expenditure, the other 37 per
cent being expended in other areas. From the figures given it
would seem that administrative and legal costs (and agents' and
assessors' fees) take up a substantial portion of the premium. A





determination. Provision is made for outstanding claims, and
because motor vehicle insurance in South Africa lies in the hands
of a group of private insurance companies, a certain amount of
premium income is expended on investments and profit.
8.4.5 LUMP SUMS AND REHABILITATION
The present motor vehicle insurance system tends to utilise the
lump sum system of payment as a matter of course. This once-and-
for-all type of payment may be used to cover such diverse heads
of damages as:
(a) Medical and hospital expenses, present and future, including
the cost of consulting a medical specialist;
Pain, suffering and shock;
Future pain and suffering;
Permanent disability, loss of health and loss of amenities
of life;
(e) Loss of expectation of life;
(f) Loss of earnings to date through absence from business,
profession or employment (even where the employer has paid
him his wages during such absence);
(g) Loss of earning capacity and of future earnings;
(h) Loss of benefits (e.g., board and lodging) incidental to
employment;
(i) Disfigurement (26).
The difficulties inherent in assessing future medical expenses
and future loss of earnings was recognised by the Wessels
Commission of Inquiry (27), which recommended that such
compensation be paid by way of periodic payments for the duration
of a claimant's life. These recommendations resulted in the
incorporation of S21 (lC) into the 1972 Act (28), which deals
with the payment of costs of future medical expenses and future
loss of income and support.
Section 21(lC)(b) now provides that:
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the authorised insurer concerned shall be entitled,
after furnishing the third party in question with an
undertaking to that effect or a competent court has directed
him to furnish such undertaking, to pay the amount payable
by him in respect of the said loss, by instalments as agreed
upon or directed by the courts".
Thus, provision is made for the payment of loss by instalments
under our law. However, in Marine and Trade Insurance Company
Limited v Katz N 0 (29), Trollip J A in delivering the
unanimous judgment of the Appellate Division, held that this
provision was instituted mainly for the benefit of insurers. He
also held that the sole right of electing to compensate by
periodic payments lies with the insurers, and neither the third
party involved nor the trial court is able to direct the insurers
to adopt this form of compensation. Thus this provision does
little, if anything, to provide more adequate compensation for a
motor accident victim, as it will only be used in those
circumstances where
such payments.
it suits the insurance company to utilise
Of the attorneys questioned. 51,4 per cent advocated a change to
monthly payments of compensation, while 41,3 per cent favoured
the retention of lump sum payments. Some people felt that there
was a place for both options, using lump sums for general damages
and monthly payments for ongoing treatments. A number of people
expressed the view that a monthly system of compensation should
only be utilised if no-fault insurance was introduced, as in the
present system it would be impractical.
Turning briefly to the question of the rehabilitation of victims,
the enormous amount of emphasis placed on the rehabilitation of
motor accident victims by the no-fault plans presently operating
in the USA and New Zealand has already been noted. However, here
in South Africa little attention has been paid to this area of
treatment. Mr. Harold Palmer, Director of the Cripple Care
Association. has pointed out this country's great need for a
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national rehabilitation policy, it being the only country in the
Western world without such a policy. He has also called for the
establishment of proper rehabilitation centres here (30).
8.4.6 TEMPTATION TO DISHONESTY
Only 34,8 per cent of those questioned felt that the present
system exerts a strong temptation to dishonesty, while 45,2 per
cent disagreed (20 per cent were uncertain).
8.5 THE VIEWS OF THE INSURER
To give
Insurance
effect to the principle of





authorised insurers, who are obliged to insure every applicant
for insurance. This consortium is made up o ( private insurance
companies, with the MVA Fund acting as a reinsurer of risks. At
the moment, the position of these private companies is secure, as
the State President entered into an agreement with the
consortium, authorising them to insure all motor vehicles in
terms of the Act for the period 1 May 1976-30 April 1986.
These private insurance companies have an interest in maintaining
the present administrative system of third party insurance, under
which they enjoy both exclusive rights in relation · to the
handling of motor vehicle insurance premiums and the protection
of the MVA Fund, which acts as a 100 per cent reinsurer of risks.
If a change to a no-fault insurance system were instituted, these
companies would lose a certain amount of business - especially if
it was decided to introduce a scheme run by a state corporation,
as in New Zealand. However, although Section 24(1)(C) of the
1942 Act gave the State President the discretion to establish a
corporation to insure motor vehicles,either in competition with
registered companies or to the exclusion of all other companies:








absolute liability in respect of compulsory
insurance had, at least for the time being,
Such a corporation could have provided
machinery for the establishment of a system
and it appeared from this omission that the question of
motor vehicle
liability" (31).
It should be noted that although the establishment of such a
corporation might be a useful reform, it is not vital to the
introduction of a system of no-fault insurance, as has been
demonstrated by the United States no-fault experience.
8.6 THE VIEWS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The question remains: what is the attitude of the South African
legal profession towards the institution of a no-fault motor
vehicle insurance system?
The Financial Mail states its views vis-a-vis this group rather
baldly:
"The only groups which would suffer from introduction of a
compensation scheme are those which earn a living as a
result of the complexities and uncertainties of the present
liability scheme, chiefly certain attorneys and other "Third
Party special ists". But the scheme was not introduced for
their benefit and their incomes are presently earned at the
expense of the efficiency of the scheme, premiums paid by
the motoring public and smaller awards received by Third
Parties. Their loss is a sma ll price for an economically
more efficient, and socially more desirable scheme" (32).
However, it is unfair to assume that the legal profession is
necessarily opposed to the introduction of no-fault insurance,
simply on the grounds that they wou ld lose some of their "bread-
and-butter" cases if such a reform were to take place. While it
cannot be denied that this does constitute a powerful incentive
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to uphold the status quo one cannot blithely assume a lack of
social conscience on the part of an entire profession (especially
in the light of ev idence to the contrary in respect of other
areas of legal reform).
The response to the questionnaire, which dealt inter alia with
the possible introduction of no-fault motor vehicle insurance,
may be taken as an indication of attorneys' attitudes to this
type of reform, and of their satisfaction with the third party
fault system as it stands.
When asked to consider the 1972 Motor Vehicle Insurance Act and
its stipulations, 40 per cent stated that change was urgently
needed, while 39,3 per cent felt that change was needed at some
stage. These figures would seem to indicate that more than
three-quarters (79,3 per cent) of t h o s e questioned were not
entirely happy with the Act as it stands (only 20, 7 per cent
stated that change was not necessary). Of those who considered
change necessary, 53,2 per cent specifically recommended a change
to no-fault insurance, 51,4 per cent advocated procedural
changes, and 35,1 per cent endorsed changes to the provisions of
cover under the Act (the overlap in percentages is due to the
fact that some people detailed more t han one type of reform).
Among the points e numera ted in favour o f a change to a no-fault
system were suggestions that it would provide a speedier and more
satisfactory basis of compensation, and that it would reduce
legal costs and make a greater amount of finances available for
compensation payments. Some attorneys emphasised the pressing
need to introduce a no-fault scheme in order to obviate the well-
known drawbacks inherent in the outmoded "laissez-faire" notion
of fault. Even those attorneys not fully committed to a no-fault
system felt that the question of no-fault insurance ought to be
investigated more thoroughly.
The proposal of a partial abolition of the fault system using the
concept of a "threshold" to eliminate delictual liability in less
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serious accidents found favour with 42 per cent, although 44,7
per cent were against such a system (13,3 per cent were
uncertain). However, this apparent rejection is tempered by the
fact that several of those rejecting the use of a threshold, did
so on the basis that there ought to be a total abolition of the
fault concept, and that there was no reason whatsoever to
institute the "half-way house" solution embodied by a threshold.
Another view expressed was that a claimant should have the option
of claiming a certain minimum under a no-fault system, or of
electing to gamble on the present system, but that once they had
chosen their means of compensation they should not be allowed to
"switch midway". The majority of respondents felt that no-fault
compensation should be restricted to claims under R5 000.
When questioned as to whether they co nsidered that a change to
no-fault insurance would have any effect on driver behaviour in
relation to road safety and deterrence, more than two-thirds
(69,1 per cent) of the replies indicated that such a change would
have no effect whatsoever on driver behaviour. The main reason
given for this view was that drivers do not actually pay
compensation out of their own pockets under the present system
it is the insurance company which pays. A change to 'no-fault'
would therefore not alter the present situation.
Views expressed in relation to the proposal of a change to a
first-party system, (where one's claims are paid out by ones own
insurance company), were fairly balanced: 32,8 per cent felt such
a change was necessary, while 34,4 per cent felt it was
unnecessary. However, if first-party coverage were introduced,
43,7 per cent felt that such cover should then also be extended
to cover property damage. More than one-half of those questioned
(60,6 per cent) agreed that a change to no-fault insurance would
have a significant beneficial effect on payment time periods, and
62,6 per cent felt that no-fault motor vehicle insurance would be
a socially more desirable scheme, although in some cases doubt
was expressed whether such a scheme would be legally more
desirable.
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When asked whether, following the worldwide trend towards no-
fault insurance, they would agree with the contention that it
would only be a matter of time before such legislation was
introduced in South Africa, 41 per cent replied in the
affirmative, a further 41 per cent were uncertain, and only 18
per cent disagreed.
It must be acknowledged, however, that many attorneys were
strongly in favour of the retention of the fault concept; 83,9
per cent felt that accidents result from the failure of drivers
to use due care, while 49,3 per cent felt that it was just and
fair to assign both moral and legal responsibility in each
accident (36 per cent disagreed). Response to the statement that
'The concept of cause has little operational significance in the
meaningfully
failures of












thirds (62,3 per cent) did not feel this to be accurate.
15,2 per cent upheld the statement.
Only
Certain lawyers felt that the fault system was too basic to our
legal system ever to be abolished, while others felt that any
change from a capitalist free-enterprise system recognising
delictual liability to a socialist approach to the problem of
compensation was unacceptable.
When asked if they would rather see a national scheme run by a
state agency or by a private agency) only 27,S per cent opted for
a state agency, while 64,1 per cent were in favour of a scheme
run by private insurance agencies. Some expressed the opinion
that the system should remain as it is at present, although there
was apparently some confusion as to whether the present scheme
was run by private agencies or a state agency. However, it was
generally felt that the wider one extended no-fault compensation,
the greater the need was for a single state agency. A Workmen's-
Compensation type scheme was advocated by some, but an
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overwhelming number of people were against such a scheme. In
fa~t, one of the main reasons why many respondents objected to
no-fault at all was the fear that MVA claims would be relegated
to the same bureaucratic category as Workmen's Compensation
claims. The fact that the Workmen's Compensation scheme is run
by civil servants who "have no discretion" and who work on
certain set formulas as to quantum, was generally criticised.
Many respondents were of the opinion t hat state intervention is
fatal to a fair system of compensation, and that an arbitrary
impersonal approach to claimants would inevitably follow.
Suggestions were accordingly made for the creation of a single
body to deal with compensation, which would be manned by experts
and not civil servants. A special 'motor court' was also
proposed, in addition to the suggestion that all claims should be
paid by the MVA Fund.
Some respondents even levelled criticisms at fellow members of
the legal profession and at insurance companies. It was
suggested that attorneys are often responsible for unnecessary
delays to the claimant's detriment, and that extensive costs are
frequently run up by attorneys act ing on behalf of insurance
companies before any serious attempt is made to settle. As far
as insurance compa nies were concerned , it was alleged that it was
often the case that insurers try to 'catch' the victims either by
the citing of contradictory reports or by strict application of
the relevant time limits (56,5 per ce nt of those questioned felt
it necessary to extend the 2-year prescriptive period). The lack
of incentive to settle claims speedily was also condemned.
The questionnaire results clearly indicate that it is impossible
to make a blanket assessment regarding the views of South African
attorneys. Views supporting no-faul t reform were expressed, as
well as those supporting the retention of the fault liability
system. However, it is also clear that there exists a depth of
dissatisfaction with the present Act, even in relation to
provisions unrelated to the question of fault. A telling point
in th is regard is that only 34,5 per cent of those questioned
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were of the opinion that the present system is successful in its
function of compensating personal injuries suffered in automobile
accidents, while 47,4 per cent were of the view that it is
unsuccessful.
All in all, the results of the survey taken, lead to the
inevitable conclusion that the Motor -Ve h i c l e Insurance Act as it
stands does not enjoy the united support of the South African
legal profession as a whole.
8.7 AN EXAMINATION OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF COMPULSORY MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
8.7.1 INTRODUCTION
A Commission of Inquiry was appointed in May 1981, under the
chairmanship of Mr. Justice Grosskopf, to investigate certain
aspects of compulsory motor vehicle i n s u r a n c e , in terms of the
Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 1972, as amended. The
terms of reference of this Commission authorised it to inquire
into, report on and make recommendations in connection with,
inter alia:
"The desirability or otherwise of introducing no fau lt
liabi lity insurance and making it compulsory" (33).
After deliberating this, and other issues for some five years,
the Grosskopf Commission reported its findings in 1985.
8.7.2 THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE COMMISSION
In the chapter relating to the general approach of the Commission
(34), an attempt is made to evaluate certain criticisms levelled
against the third party fault liability insurance system.
The legal process is acknowledged as being not only time-
consuming and expensive, but also uncertain (35). However, these
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shortcomings are felt to be "often exaggerated" (36). Law
reforms are said to have simplified procedures, improved rules of
evidence, and created new procedures to simplify and expedite
proceedings (37). The introduction of legal aid is said to have
made the courts more accessible to the public. In relation to a
claim arising from a delict, it is explained:
"A claimant can succeed if he proves that the defendant
acted negligently. Negligence is the failure to act as a
reasonable person would have acted in the circumstances.
The test sounds vague, but in most areas of life there is a
generally accepted view in the community about what is
expected from a reasonable person. This acceptance is often
consolidated or created by decisions in court and by laws,
but even without them most people in most circumstances
would agree about what a reasonable person should do" (38).
It is submitted that the test does not merely sound vague, but is
intrinsically flawed. The vagaries of the 'reasonable man' test
have already been discussed in depth (39), and it can only be
reiterated that enormous difficulties are encountered in
attempting to establish what the hypothetical 'reasonable man'
would do when he is a split-second away from a collision. The
fact that liability is established on a case-by-case basis with
new precedents continually being introduced, makes deciding how a
'reasonable man' would behave increasingly difficult for a
judicial officer, to say nothing of the man in the street.
In relation to the cost-efficiency of the present system, the
question has been posed whether the money obtained from the
community is distributed in an equitable and efficient manner.
The Commission answers this query by saying:
"We feel that the answer to this question depends largely on
one's point of view. If one regards third party insurance
as a social service then the answer must be negative" (40).
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The Commission makes the distinction that third party motor
vehicle insurance is unacceptable as a social service because by
its very nature its scope of compensation is limited to the
compensation of a small percentage of people who suffer damage as
a result of death or physical injury, i.e., to those people
killed or injured in road accidents. In addition, compensation
is restricted to those claimants who can prove negligence on the
part of the other motorist. Thus it is argued that we cannot
look upon third party insurance as a social service, because it
only operates in re lation to a small number of people. The
Commission further i llustrates it point by referring to figures
taken from the Centra l Statistical Services, which indicate that
whereas approximately 88 000 people were killed and injured in
motor accidents in 1980, only 13 000 third party claims were paid
or settled during the 1980/81 insurance year. Although these
figures are approximate, they would tend to indicate that only
14,6 per cent of those suffering loss as a result of a motor
accident eventually obtained compensation. The Commission
acknowledged that the compensation paid in these cases had no
connection with the need of the claimant - it is only related to
the degree of fault apportioned to his actions. Payment will
only be received once his claim has been recognised, settled, or
decided by a court, no matter how great his need may be in the
meantime. Finally, the Commission argued that third party
insurance is described as unacceptable as a social service, due
to its high administration costs, which are related to the
determination of fault procedure.
"To sum up: if one were planning a social welfare system
for victims of accidents there would be no logical basis for
distinguishing between the victims of traffic accidents and
those of other accidents (or, for that matter, the victims
of illness) and one would have to determine the benefits
according to the victim's needs. This is, in essence, the
approach of our present system of disability pensions. Our
system of third party insurance i s therefore difficult to
defend if it is judged by the criteria used for welfare
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service" (41).
On the other hand, the Commission argues that if third party
insurance were judged simply as a form of insurance,
approach would be different.
one's
"Then the system would have to be judged according to the
benefit it offers the victim injured through the fault of
the motorist and the motorist himself" (42).
If one chooses to judge the system according to the criteria
given by the Commission one would discover that the latter
receives unlimited cover against damage caused by him at a low-
price premium, and the victim can recover his common law damages
without fear of the wrongdoer's inability to pay. However, if
third party insurance were judged simply as a form of insurance,
it would probably be evaluated according to the benefits it
affords the insured. Third party insurance offers no protection
to the insured against bodily injury to himself or his family,
and it compensates far fewer victims than would be the case under
an alternative form of insurance, such as strict liability
insurance, or no-fault insurance. The question that remains is
whether third party liability insurance best fulfils the needs of
accident victims and of motorists, (i.e., premium-payers), in the
light of modern motor vehicle transportation, and its toll on
life and limb.
The Commission then moves on to discuss certain criticisms
levelled against the third party insurance system. The first
criticism discussed is that third party insurance only helps a
small percentage of all persons sustaining physical injuries. It
has been suggested that the third party system be replaced by a
general system of compensation for all who suffer injuries,
regardless of cause, on the basis of absolute liability. (In
other words, the implementation of the type of scheme presently
operating in New Zealand). The Commission rejects this
suggestion on the grounds that:
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"Our terms of reference are not wide enough to include
the abolition o f third party system and the institution of a
general accident scheme" (43).
The Commission cont i nues by stating that:
"If such a scheme should be investigated one would have to
give caref~l consideration to the financing and
administration of such a scheme and also to the level at
which benefits can be offered. Such an inquiry may indicate
that the financial benefits which innocent victims of
traffic accidents can reap at the moment would practically
disappear if they were to be divided among all disabled
people (or even all people whose disablement results from
accidents). Be that as it may, we were not asked to
institute such an inquiry and we did not do so" (43).
This statement tends to give credence to the view expressed
earlier that the only reason third party insurance can ostensibly
provide 'full' compensation - or even a high level of
compensation for non-economic loss - is that a large number of
people are left totally uncompensated. However, considering the
extensive finances available to the MVA Fund, it is submitted
that the financing of such a system should not be the main reason
given for avoiding reform. It should be borne in mind that the
large savings in administration and legal costs that would be
achieved by instituting such a reform would create extra funds
for the compensation of victims. The administrative costs of
compani~s which undertake motor vehicle insurance was estimated
at R131 380 975 for the year 1984 (44), and the total legal costs
for the same year amounted to R52 130 430 (45).
The Commission then considered the a lternative proposal of a
compensation scheme exclusively for the victims of traffic
accidents. The arguments for such a scheme include the assertion
that such victims fall into a special category. This was the
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view adopted by the Pearson Commission,
Grosskopf Commission:
as quoted by the
"995 The Criticisms which may be levelled at the present
system of tort compensation for road injuries - that too few
victims are compensatedj that the entitlement to
compensation depends too much on chancej and that the system
is unduly slow, and expensive to administer - may also be
levelled, to a varying degree, at tort compensation for
other types of injury. But there are in our view a number
of considerations which justify singling out this system for
reform.
"996 First, motor vehicle injuries occur on a scale not
matched by any other category of accidental injury within
our terms of reference, except work injuries (which are
already covered by a no-fault scheme). Secondly - and here ·
they are to be distinguished from work injuries - they are
not confined to any particular group of victims. Thirdly,
they are particularly likely to be serious, so that they
highlight the difficulties of compensating for prolonged
incapacity. Fourthly, road transport, itself is an
essential part of everyday life of fundamental importance to
the economy as a whole and to the mobility of individuals"
(46).
The Grosskopf Commission rejects this argument in its entirety.
It upholds its former statement that those injured in motor
accidents do not form a major portion of those injured in all
types of accidents, by stating that the only reason that the
Pearson Commission accorded so much weight to traffic injuries
was that injuries sustained in the home were not included in that
Commission's terms of reference. (One can argue that the
Grosskopf Commission's terms of reference were similarly
circumscribed' (47». It is further stated that:
..• we find it artificial, when one is dealing with social
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services, to attach overriding importance to the commonness
of the injuries. To a man who suffers a fracture of the
skull when a robber hits him over the head it would be
difficult to understand that compensation is withheld from
him because relatively few people sustain injuries in that
manner, but that he would have been compensated if he had
fallen within the larger category of persons injured in
traffic accidents, even if his injuries were the result of
his own culpable actions" (48).
Here we see a new version of the 'bathtub' argument, referred to
earlier (49). It seems that for some reason the Commission
regards no-fault insurance as a form of social service, rather
than a system of insurance. This is rather unusual, considering
that under the type of no-fault insurance envisaged by the
Pearson Commission, cover is still granted on the purchase of an
insurance policy from an insurance company, although compensation
is awarded on a first-party rather than a third-party basis.
The Commission also rejects the view of the Pearson report that
motor accident injuries constitute a unique problem because
injuries so suffered are likely to be serious, on the grounds
that if the intention is to help the seriously injured, it should
not matter how they sustained their injuries. The Commission
further contends that:
"Because motor traffic is a necessary and integrated part of
everyday life it does not follow that all persons injured by
it must receive compensation. Indeed, the argument to the
contrary appears stronger - motor vehicle traffic creates
one of the normal risks of modern life so that there is no
justification to single out victims of traffic accidents for
compensati9n" (50).
This type of argument must be described as 'laissez-faire' in the
extreme. Originally such an argument was backed up by 'moral'
principles, but there appears to be no such justification here,
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probably because the institution of insurance has since come into
existence. The fact that a motor accident is "one of the normal
risks of modern life" does not preclude the insurance against
such a risk on a first-party basis, as is the case with 'normal
risks' such as theft of property. The casual attitude towards
motor accidents and their victims exhibited by the Commission
seems rather incongruous in the light of such statements as:
"More human lives have been lost in traffic accidents in
South Africa during the past three years than the 24 532
South Africans who perished during World Wars 1 and 2" (51).
It has also been estimated that:
"purely in economic terms, without any allowances for
soci~l costs in terms of bereavement and pain, the cost of
road traffic accidents to the nation was at least R2,5
billion (2 500 000 000) in the year 1984" (52).
The Commission further rejects the implementation of the general
deterrence theory, that those engaging in and benefiting by an
activity (such as motoring) should pay all damages caused by it.
"Motor traffic is ••. such an integral part of our community
that a financial burden placed on the owners of motor
vehicles, is in essence carried by the whole community and,
in fact, the whole community benefits by motor vehicle
traffic. Besides which, the authorities have placed many
burdens on the owners an? users of motor vehicles already in
the form of direct and indirect taxation. The income
derived from this will certainly be more than enough to
compensate all damage caused by motor vehicles if the State
should wish to use it for that purpose" (53).
The question arises: if the Commission believes that costs
cannot be internalised, why does it endorse the purchasing of
third party insurance by motor vehicle owners, rather than
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recommend the use of general taxation? What is to be noted here
is that there are apparently 'more than enough' funds available
to compensate all damage done by motor vehicles, i.e., compensate
all motor accident victims. The financing of a system of no-
fault insurance can ther ef ore not be held to be a bar to its
introduction.
"To sum up, it is true that the third party system provides
aid to only a small percentage of people who suffer damage
as a result of personal injuries. However, the third party
system was never intended to be a system under which all
people who suffer damage would be compensated, and it is not
within our terms of reference to consider whether it should
be replaced by a general system. When it comes to the
narrower question of whether al l persons should receive
compensation for damage suffered as a result of ~njury or
death resulting from motor vehicle traffic, we find it
difficult to see why such people should be put at an
advantage vis-a-vis people injured in other ways" (54).
The Commission thus strongly rejects the idea that any class of
victim should be excluded from compensation, as they are all
equally worthy of compensation. It therefore proceeds to shun
any type of reform which does not encompass the idea of universal
compensation, in the interests of equality. One wonders why
workmen have been unfairly singled out for no-fault compensation
for the last 25 years (55). Unlike the Woodhouse Commission in
New Zealand which took full advantage of the item in its terms
of reference which related to 'associated relevant matters,' the
Grosskopf Commission evidently did not feel the necessity to
venture beyond its immediate terms of reference, even though a
similar provision is included in Item l(b) of the terms of
reference of the Grosskopf Commission, whereby it is authorised
to inquire into, report on and make recommendations in connection
with "any other matter relevant to this inquiry".
In relation to the criticism of the application of negligence as
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a criterion for liability in relation to road traffic accidents,
the Commission's response was to point out that there has been no
pressure from the public to abolish such application. Its
impression was "that the general public's sense of justice
accepts negligence as a requirement for culpability" (56).
However, such 'impressions' are, in t h e absence of evidence to
the contrary, vague and unsubstantiated. It is difficult to
prove, without research into this top ic, just what the general
public thinks about the negligence requirement in relation to
motor accidents, and consequently such a response hardly
constitutes a credible defence of the present fault system.
The criticisms of the evidence requirement and the difficulties
of proof (due to the absence of witnesses, the time-lapse between
accident and trial, etc.) under t h e present system are
acknowledged
felt by the
to contain a measure of truth, but





believed that in most cases it is reasonably clear what the cause
of the accident was, and whether anyone was negligent. This may
be the case, but these factors will not necessarily facilitate a
speedy settlement. A legal investigation into the apportionment
of fault will still have to be carried out, which may not always
be a clear-cut matter, especially where there is conflicting
evidence on the part of the participants.
F inally, the criticism of the third party system's dependence on
the legal process is evaluated. This criticism has two aspects:
(i) that the third party system is slow and expensive because it
involves the courts, and (ii) t hat the courts are overburdened
because of the large number of third party cases it must hear.
The Commission's response to this criticism is that if the third
party system is a good one, it should not be discarded simply
because it burdens the courts - one should rather adapt the
judiciary so that it can carry the burden. Reference is made to
Annexure K of the Report, which acco rding to the Commission,
makes it clear that in fact "third party ~ases occupy only a
comparatively small part of the time o f the Supreme Court" (58).
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Annexure K contains a summary of statistics by the various
divisions of the Supreme Court regarding the hearing of third
party cases during the period 1 July 1981 to 30 June 1982. The
figures given demonstrate that 820 such cases were heard in the
Supreme Court during this period, with 454 court days being taken
up with the hearing of these cases. Unfortunately, these figures
are meaningless in themselves. An accurate assessment can only
be made if these figures are expressed as a percentage of the
total number of cases heard. It is suggested that the solution
to the slow and expensive legal process lies either in making
that process faster and less expensive , or to have the third
party system administered by some other body. However, the
Commission feels that the latter suggestion would only work if
the system of compensation for road traffic accidents were
greatly simplified. In any event, only a small proportion of
claims reach the courts - the majority are settled by insurers or
the MVA Fund. An analysis ' of a sa~ple of 13 225 claims
instituted up to and i n c l ud i n g 30 April 1981 referred to by the
Commission (58) indicated that only 72 of these eventually
reached the Court. Apparently 97,3 per cent of the 13 225
claimants received their compensation within 24 months after
filing their claims. These figures may be impressive for a third
party system, but they hardly compare with the average of 10 days
achieved in New Zealand under a no-fault scheme.
8.7.3. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATI ONS IN
RELATION TO THE INTRODUCTION OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE (60)
The Commission begins by explaining that under a no-fault
insurance system the moral culpability of the 'mo t o r i s t or the
victim will not be considered at all, even where there is
intentional harm, or negligence. However, it is acknowledged
that most systems of no-fault insurance do contain certain
exceptions tothis general rule. It goes on to state that it is
against a system of no-fault insurance for death or injury caused
through traffic accidents, as it sees no reason why traffic-
accident victims should be especially favoured. On the other
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hand, it adds that:
"These theoretical arguments would not hold water if the
administration of a system of no fault liability were to be
so much cheaper than the present system that the total costs
of such a system would not be more than the present system"
( 61) .
The Commission continues:
"In calculating the costs of a system of no-fault liability,
however, we were confronted by insurmountable problems. We
have already pointed out that 88 791 persons were injured
and killed in motor car accidents during 1980, but that only
approximately 13 000 third party claims amounting to
R60 605 228 were paid during the 1980/81 insurance year. If
one assumes that the damage suffered by each of the 13 000
claimants was approximately the same as that suffered by
each of the 88 791 victims, the total compensation would
rise by approximately 680 per cent. Unfortunately, this
assumption has no scientific foundation. The 13 000
successful claimants did not recover all their damages.
Some of them received a smaller amount because they
contributed to the accident thro ugh their own fault. Others
settled for a smaller amount because they were uncertain
whether they could prove negligence on the part of the owner
or driver of the insured vehicle, or for other reasons.
Claimants from both these classes would have been able to
claim the full amount of their damages under a system of no-
fault liability. Under such a system the amount of R60 605
228 would have been significantly higher and the impact
would have been even greater, of course, had it been
multiplied by 6,8" (62).
In addition to the increased compensation costs, the Commission
argues that under a no-fault system a claimant would still have
to prove that he had suffered damage in a motor accident, and an
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amount of compensation would still have to be determined. There
would still be investigations and litigation, although to a
lesser degree. Further litigation, it is argued, could arise
from the exceptions. The Commission is sceptical that costs
could be reduced in other ways, and the New Zealand system is
taken as an example of this:
"A victim's right to compensation can be limited, for
example by entitling him only to his actual monetary loss
(and not compensation for pain and suffering, loss of the
amenities of life, e t c , ) . If this limitation should be
introduced one would have to consider whether these items of
damage could still be recovered from a guilty owner or
driver of the motor vehicle (either with or without
compulsory insurance). If it could still be recovered,
litigation would not be reduced very much by the system
because practically all claimants who suffer monetary loss
as a result of injuries also experience pain and suffering
and forfeit enjoyment. If such damages could not be
recovered, some people would regard this as unreasonable
tampering with the present legal position. However, we do
not need to take a stand in this regard because even with
this limitation, compensation in accordance with a system of
no fault liability would amount to a multiple of what is
being paid at present" (63).
There could also be a duplication of procedures




According to the Commission, costs could further be reduced by
the use of a fixed tariff of compensation, and by allowing claims
to be dealt with adminstratively. However, if such a system were
accepted, the Commission feels that it would be "very unfair" to
remove a victim's common law claim against the "unlawful
perpetrator". The administrative handling of claims paid
according to a tari ff, although cheaper than the individualising
of claims through negotiation or decisions of court would also
involve costs.
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The Commission concludes by saying that:
"There are, of course, other possible variations but in
almost all those we could think of, an equitable system of
no fault liability would eventually be mtich more expensive





recommend that a system of no
should not be introduced and
fault liability
made compulsory"
The reasons ultimate ly given by the Commission for the rejection
of the introduction of a no-fault system of motor vehicle
insurance centre around the issue of cost. Keeping premiums low
is obviously of primary importance to the Commission. However,
while the amount of compensation awarded under a no-fault system
would inevitably exceed the amount awarded under the present
system (due to the increased number of claimants), the extent of
this excess can only be guessed at and could, depending on the
nature of the system to be instituted, be significantly lower
than the amount suggested by the Commission.
Although the Commission is supposedly concerned only with the
economics of a no-fault system, it reverts to 'moral '
considerations in assessing the question of costs. The imposition
of a limit to awards under various heads of damages is rejected
as 'unfair' and 'unreasonable tampering', and thus the Commission
avoids dealing with the very real cost-saving impact such
limitations will have on the system. Furthermore, the erroneous
impression is given that overseas systems, such as that of New
Zealand, limit compensation to actual monetary loss and make no
provision for the compensation of non-economic loss. However,
the New Zealand scheme does provide for compensation in respect
of pain and suffering , disfigurement, and loss of amenities and
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enjoyment of life in certain cases. The Commission fails to pay
sufficient attention to the very real savings which will flow
from the reduction in litigation which a no-fault system will
facilitate. It is implied that the introduction of a no-fault
scheme would not substantially reduce the number of court cases.
However, studies have shown that this number is drastically
curtailed even under threshold no-fault systems, due to the fact
that the court action is banned below the threshold, as are
claims for non-economic loss, and that the majority of claims
occur in respect of minor damages.
Finally, the Commission's concern with the costs of such a system
is hardly
Report that
in keeping with the statement made earlier in
there are 'more than enough' funds available
the
to
compensate all motor vehicle-related damages. Internal
contradictions such as this tend to undermine the credibility of
the Commission's arguments in this regard.
8.7.4 CONCLUSION
The decision of the Commission in relation to the introduction of
no-fault insurance indicates that it is dedicated to the
perpetuation of the fault system, and that it
opposed to the introduction of a 'social welfare'
is inherently
type of scheme.
although it can be argued that no-fault insurance hasHowever,
certain 'social wel fare' elements, it can be more real istically
regarded as an alternative form of insurance offering first party
rather than third party benefits. The Commission's dedication to
the status quo is further demonstrated by the fact that the
Commission also ruled against the introduction of compulsory
balance of third party insurance, against the introduction of a
levy on fuel (although a minority report supported such a levy),
against the scrapping of the physical contact rule in hit-and-run
accidents
the Act.
and against changing the prescription requirements of
The South African Commissions of Inquiry into motor vehicle
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insurance seem to continually evade the question of the
introduction of no-fault insurance. The Wessels Commission
decided it was not qualified to look into the question of such a
scheme, and the Grosskopf Commission decided that the only
acceptable no-fault scheme was a national scheme covering all
accident victims - which it was apparently not qualified to look
into. Perhaps this attitude will herald the appointment in the
future of a Commission with wider terms of reference. In any
event, the fact that the report of the Grosskopf Commission is
not the last word on reform is demonstrated by the announcement
that a fuel levy will be introduced here next year (65).
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9. PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NO-FAULT
SCHEME FOR SOUTH AFRICA
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The foregoing chapters have sought to emphasise the general
defects of the fault liability system as applied to motor vehicle
insurance, and in particular how various overseas plans have
attempted to alleviate these problems by the introduction of a
variety of no-fault motor vehicle insurance plans.
However, mere criticism of South Africa's present fault-based
motor vehicle insurance scheme accomplishes little, and a viable
alternative to the present system must at the same time be
presented.
The plan which follows may admittedly appear idealistic, but
there is no reason why one should not aim for the best possible
solution to what is a social problem of some magnitude. It is
hoped that the following proposals will provide some guidelines
for the implementation of an effective and efficient no-fault
plan for South Africa. Actuarial analysis will be necessary to
flesh out the basic skeleton of the compensation system, and the
writer has confined herself to setting out only the governing
principles of the scheme.
The principles embodied in the plan are the result of the study
and evaluation of a number of the statutory no-fault schemes
currently in operation, but the largest debt is owed to the New
Zealand Accident Compensation Act.
' 9 . 2 A NO-FAULT SCHEME FOR SOUTH AFRICA
9.2.1 RECIPIENTS UNDER THE SCHEME
It is envisaged that all motor accident victims be entitled to
compensation under this scheme irrespective of the question of
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fault, on the basis of their injuries. Compensation should no
l o n g e r be dependent upon the determination of
whether a person has suffered bodily i n j u r y as





Ho we v e r , a small group of victims should be penalised by having
their compensation restricted, or possibly even abolished. Such
,e x c l u s i o n s should be limited to those causing intentional harm
(either to themselves or to another person), those using the
vehicle in the commission of or in the furtherance of a crime,
those participating in a motor race, and those driving while
unlicensed, intoxicated, or under the influence of drugs. It
should be noted that these exceptions all involve activities
which may be guarded against, and that they consequently
constitute an effect ive deterrent against such behaviour.
9.2 .2 COMPENSATION TO BE PROVIDED UNDER THE SCHEME
This may be divided into economic and non-economic loss.
COMPENSATION FOR ECONOMIC LOSS
MEDICAL SCHEMES
The cost of all reasonable medical, surgical, nursing and
ambulance services incurred in the treatment of a motor accident
injury should be fully compensated under the scheme. A victim
should possibly be compelled to pay a small sum, perhaps the
first R25 or so, of his medical expenses, in order to discourage
the administrative expense of frivolous 'nuisance' claims .
Compensation for damage to artificial limbs or aids, spectacles,
contact lenses or dentures used or worn at the time of the
accident should also be provided (as under S77 of the New Zealand
Ac t) .
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WAGE LOSS AND REPLACEMENT SERVICES
Wage loss should be compensated by periodic payments, so as to
cause the minimum amount of dislocatio n to accident victims. A
monthly indemni t y should be paid in order to alleviate the
hardship caused by loss of income. However, no indemnity should
be paid for the first two weeks following the accident, in order
to discouratge frivolous claims. (Such loss is also usually
compensated by an employer).
A victim should be entitled to receive 80 per cent of the wages
he or she has lost due to the injuries received in an automobile
accident. The aim is to provide adequate, but not full coverage
in order to encourage the injured party to return to work as soon
as is physically practicable. Compensation should be limited to
a maximum amount per month. Ideally, this figure should provide
fair compensation for loss of earnings for the majority of the
population, and should be adjusted according to inflation at
yearly intervals. If a person with a more substantial income
desires greater compensation for wage loss, he should be able to
purchase optional coverage for this purpose from an insurance
company. Such coverage should be undertaken on a purely
voluntary basis. To avoid double compensation, payment made
pursuant to no-fault coverage should be reduced by the amount
received from collateral statutory sources.
Earnings-related compensation should be paid for wage loss. It
is submitted that the formula embodied in the New Zealand Act
(S59[2])is the best. A person should be compensated for his or
her loss of earning capacity, calculated by subtracting the
earnings a person receives during the period of accident
incapacity from his or her pre-accident earnings. Compensation
to the level of 80 per cent of such loss of earning capacity
should then . be provided. In fixing the earnings of a self-
employed person, reference should be made to his or her
assessable income in the last financial year as declared and
accepted by the Department of Inland Revenue.
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The scheme is not to be a social security measure. Persons whose
inability to resume employment is related to factors other than
t he accident injury should not be able to claim under the scheme.
Once the injured person is ready for selected or alternative
work. having received the full benefit of the rehabilitation and
re-training resources provided under the scheme. he should be
allowed a reasonable time period (e.g .• 10 weeks) to seek
employment. If he has not found work, his earnings-related
compensation should be reduced. Earnings-related compensation
should be reviewed from time to time, according to any
improvement or deterioration in the condition of the injured
person. Such compensation should continue, if necessary, until
the death or retirement of the victim.
Compensation should also cover the expense of paying for those
services which prior to the accident were performed free by the
victim. but
performing
which he or she is subsequently prevented from
as a result of the injury. Compensation paid should
not exceed a set maximum sum per day, and should only be awarded
for a limited period of time (e.g., 6 months).
F UNERAL EXPENSES
All reasonable funeral expenses (up to a stated maximum amount)
s hould be paid by the scheme.
DEPENDENCY BENEFITS
A spouse and other dependants should be provided with earnings-
related compensation in the event of the death of the victim.
Division of such compensation between dependants should be
related to the degree of dependency. Payments to children should
cease on their attaining majority, or, in the case of students,
on their becoming independent. Payments made to a spouse should
cease on remarriage or retirement. On remarriage a spouse
177
should receive a lump sum equal to two years earnings-related
benefits. The purpose of awarding such a sum is to encourage
people to marry rather than cohabit in order to receive payments.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
Compensation for damage to property should not be provided under
the Act. A vehicle owner should be responsible for damage to his
own car, but should not be compelled to insure. Optional
coverage along the lines of present "comprehensive" Motor Vehicle
Insurance should be made available.
9.2.2.2 COMPENSATION FOR NON-ECONOMIC LOSS
PER MANENT DISABILITY
Compensation for non-economic loss (payable by lump sum
awa rds) should only be made where the person does not completely
recover from his accident injuries. Such disability should only
be assessed once the injured person's medical condition has
stabilised, and all practicable steps have been taken towards the
vic tim's rehabilitation and re-training. A schedule should be
dralwn up specifying set amounts of compensation for permanent
los s or impairment of bodily function. ( A maximum total amount
of compensation should be set). An assessment of the victim's
disability should be made on the basis of spec ialist medical
opinion. There should be a thr eshold of 5 per cent disability
before any payment may be made for permanent disability.
LOSS OF AMENITIES AND PAIN AND SUFFERING
A l u mp sum not exceeding a set maximum amount (such as R20 000)
should be awarded only in those cases where the victim has
suffered a certain specified serious injury or disfigurement.
Payment should be made as soon as the victim's medical condition
has stabilised sufficiently for a medical assessment of such
loss. Alternatively, pain and suffering awards should be
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excluded from the scheme, and instead a person should be allowed
to purchase optional coverage suited to his or her individual
requirements from private insurance companies. Such cover should
again be purchased on a purely voluntary basis.
9.2.3 THE METHOD OF COLLECTING COMPENSATION FUNDS
The scheme should be financed by a levy on petrol. This would
have the effect of internalising costs, as such costs would be
distributed among all drivers according to the amount of driving
they do. Contributions to the scheme could also be collected
easily and cheaply (by oil companies) if this method were
instituted. Drivers of vehicles not driven by petrol (i.e.,
vehicles driven by diesel fuel or electricity) should pay a
premium commensurate with the fuel levy. Such premiums should be
collected by the Post Office.
The scheme should operate on a pay as you go rather than a
fully-funded basis, as this will allow the scheme to operate more
efficiently and economically (1). However, it is acknowledged
that the full implementation of such a scheme may take a few
years.
9.2.4 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SCHEME
The scheme should be administered by a central body, run on a
non-profit basis. Such a scheme would have the advantage of
avoiding the costs inherent in private enterprise, such as profit
and advertising. The use of such a system would also make it
easier to achieve economies of scale. There would also be no
need to set up a whole new system, as the present MVA Fund could
be modified in order to administer the new system. The Fund
should be "insulated, to some degree, to insure that there is no
partisan, government interference of any kind" (2).
In order to be compensated, a claimant should be required to
lodge a claim form (which should be freely available from the
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accidentmotor
may complete it without professional assistance.
should set out the necessary particulars of the
Post Office) with the MVA Fund. This form should be as simply-
worded and straightforward as possible) in order that a claimant
The claim form
and the resultant injur y suffered by the claimant. Supporting
medical certificates and receipts should be attached to the form,
and where.earnings-related compensation is claimed) an earnings
certificate setting out the monthly wage received by the claimant
should als6 be included. A claimant should also be required to
report the accident to the police before he claims and quote the
police reference on the form (in order to deter people from
making fraudulent claims). In order to avoid delays) a prompt
payment clause should form a part of the scheme. Where
compensation has not been paid within 30 days of the receipt of
the proof of injuries and of the amount of expenses incurred) a
certain level of interest should be charged (1).
9.2.5 REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS
The rehabilitation of victims should be a primary aim of the
scheme. The promotion of rehabilitation procedures is
advantageous both in relation to injured individuals and to the
economic savings realised by enabling motor victims to become
self-supporting again.
The scheme should fully finance the cost of services and supplies
required for the rehabilitation of the victim) such as: wheel
chairs) prosthetic devices) refitting automobiles for operation
by paraplegics) guide dogs) the construction of wheelchair ramps
in houses) lessons in braille and job re-training.
The scheme should (through the central body) promote a




As in New Zealand) the central administrative body should




ordinated and vigorous programme for the medical and vocational
rehabilitation of injured persons" (3).
The rehabilitation programmes promoted should have the objectives
set out in 536(2) of the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act,
namely:
their
persons as speedily as
mental and social fitness
having regard to
(a) The restoration of the injured
possible to the fullest physical,
of which they are capable,
incapacity;
(b) Their restoration to the fullest vocational and economic
usefulness of which they are capable, where applicable; and
(c) Their reinstatement or placement in employment where
applicable.
9.2.6 ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND DRIVER EDUCATION
High priority should be given under the scheme to accident
prevention measures. The need to direct attention towards
accident prevention is especially pressing in South Africa, a
country noted for having one of the highest motor vehicle
accident rates in the world (4).
Full consideration should be given by the scheme to promoting
better design and maintenance of roads so as to facilitate as far
as possible the elimination of roadside hazards, as it has been
demonstrated that " r o a d improvements can save more than 20 per
cent of accident costs" (5).
Attention should also be directed towards the problem of alcohol
abuse and driving. One estimate puts the value figure of
alcohol-abuse related motor accidents in South Africa during 1983




The necessity for a clamp-down on drunken drivers has
realised in Britain, where there is currently talk of
drivers with any alcohol in their blood up to £2000 (7).
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a similar response should be considered here.
A full programme of driver education should be conducted through
the mass media and a driver education course should be a
prerequisite for the issuance of a licence. Driver education
should be seen as fulfilling an important function in relation to
the saving of lives and the reduction of injuries on our roads.
This is especially so in the light of evidence in Canada and the
Un i t e d States that young people who are trained in comprehensive
courses of instruction in theory and in practice have
significantly fewer accidents and traffic violations (8).
9 . 3 ANTICIPATED ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In recommending
Africa) it may
a system of no-fault compensation for South
be relevant to examine some of the criticisms
levelled at such a scheme. Many arguments against the no-fault
system have already been examined in Chapter 4. However) it may
be of value to look at certain criticisms made especially in
relation to the introduction of no-fault in South Africa.
9.3.1 THE CRITICISM OF "SOCIALISM"
One of the charges most often levelled at proposals for the
introduction of no-fault motor vehicle insurance is that they
represent a move away from the free enterprise capitalistic
system presently operating in South Africa towards a "socialist"
approach to the problem of compensation. Such charges are not
only highly emotive in light of the present South African
political landscape) but also do an injury to the actual
dictionary definition of the term: "socialist". In addition
)
claims that South Africa is "capitalistic" obviously do not take
into account what might be described as the "socialistic" nature
of the South African economy in so far as the extensive
nationalisation of industry (SAA) ISCOR) SAR) to name a few) is
concerned) nor do they take into account the fact that there is
no such thing as a purely "capitalistic" system in operation
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anywhere in the world. Even the so-called bastion of capitalism,
the United States, can be accused of "socialism" by opponents of
no-fault insurance, because of its numerous no-fault plans. In
any event, many forms of "first party no fault" insurance, such
as fire and theft insurance, are in fact operative in South
Africa already, and these do not appear to have plunged our
society into "socialism".
When the implementa tion of a no-fault scheme similar to that
which presently ope rates in New Zealand is suggested, much is
ma d e of the fact that South Africa is not a social welfare state.
Ho we v e r , New Zealand had a relatively low level of general social
security payments before the Accident Compensation Act was
introduced in 1972 (9). On the other hand:
"New Zealand has a far more developed social security system
than we do, which lowers the cost of their scheme, since the
cost of hospital treatment, for example, is borne by the
state. The egalitarian nature of New Zealand society is
another important difference, but it should not be over-
emphasised. The uneven distribution of wealth in South
Africa would not necessarily result in high earners
subsidising low earners under a comprehensive scheme, since
compensation for lost earning capacity would be paid on an
earnings-related rather than a flat-rate basis,
case in New Zealand " (10).
,
as is the
9.3.2 CRITICISM OF THE TYPE OF COMPENSATION TO BE PROVIDED UNDER
THE PROPOSED SCHEME.
COMPENSATION FOR NON-ECONOMIC LOSS
PERMANENT DISABILITY.
The scheme's utilisation of a fixed schedule of damages for
specified permanent disabilities may be criticised on the grounds
that the same injury will affect different victims in different
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ways. For example, a violinist with a broken or crippled hand
suffers infinitely more than a bank manager with the same injury.
This is readily conceded. However, the scheme is intended to
offer an adequate level of benefits to all people, and
accordingly persons with special skills, such as the violinist,
should have the responsibility of taking out personal insurance
to guard themselves against such loss. This would arguably be
the most sensible solution for all concerned, as the violinist
may just as easily injure his hand under other circumstances.
LOSS OF AMENITIES AND PAIN AND SUFFERING
The stipulation under this head of damages of a set maximum
amount of compensation at a lower level than amounts which may be
obtained under the present system may also give rise to
criticism, especially since such general damages tend to form the
bulk of compensation awarded under the present system. The case
of Marine and Trade Insurance Company vs Katz No (11) is referred
to in the Memorandum on behalf of the Association of Law
Societies of South Africa:
"In that case, Mrs Ingrid Simmons, who was then about 32
years old, was injured in a motor accident, as a result of
which she was almost completely quadraplegic and would have
to spend the rest of her life as a bedridden patient in a
nursing home for chronically ill patients; during that time
she would require constant treatment, attention, medication
and careful nursing. The Appellate Division confirmed an
award of R90,OOO-OO for general damages ••. It would have to
be a society without humanity which would deprive Mrs.
Simmons of at least the comforts which her R90,OOO-OO would
bring her. The sense of equity of a society which would do
so in order to compensate the person who injured her would
be dubious" (12).
This criticism has been concisely dealt with in an address
delivered by Mr. J L Fahy, the Managing Director of the New
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Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation:
"Sometimes the comparison is made between a quadriplegic
who, at common law can recover an enormous lump sum and a
quadriplegic in New Zealand whose main entitlements are
rehabilitation assistance an d permanent periodic
compensation related to loss of earning capacity.
There are however three factors:
First, at common law it is useless for a seriously injured
person to think of a large lump-sum award unless his injury
can be proved to have been caused by someone else's fault,
so a significant number of seriously injured people are
excluded altogether •
Second, periodic compensation and rehabilitation are
designed to meet the injured person's continuing needs,
both present and future, while some of the very large lump
sums awarded at common law seem to be more appropriate to
the foundation of a dynasty.
Third, the common law lump-sum award is a
it cannot be revised upwards if the
circumstances change for the worse" (13).
"once-off" award;
injured person's
In addition, critics of the relatively small amount of damages
awarded under no-fault schemes often overlook the fact that
although a smaller amount of compensation for non-economic loss
is available under such a scheme, a victim may ultimately receive
more overall compensation under the no-fault system, as he will
be compensated on an inflation-proofed periodic basis for future
wage loss, and such compensation may last until he is 65, or




the charge is made that:
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of the no-fault system is
optional
for non-
such a system would necessarily penalise the Claimant
who can at present establish fault and recover full
compensation, in order to provide compensation for the
person who cannot, and who will in many instances himself
have been the cause of his own damage. In other words, the
paraplegic will subside (sic) the drunken driver who ran him
down. The equity of such a system is difficult to grasp"
(14).
It is significant that the Association resorts to the emotive
concept of a drunken driver being compensated at the expense of
his unfortunate paraplegic victim, which is so frequently cited
by critics of the no-fault system. However, this particular
concept would appear to have no foundation in any no-fault scheme
presently in operation, as the drunken driver falls into that
category of persons excluded from compensation under such schemes.
In any event, it would be equally simple to make an emotional
appeal on the basis of inequities resulting from the application
of the fault criterion.
Inherent in the argument of dubious equity is the tendency to
label all drivers as either "innocent" and therefore deserving of
compensation, or "guilty" and therefore undeserving of
compensation. However, this loses sight of the fact that a motor
accident is in the vast majority of cases the result of
"negligence", and not the result of a deliberate action on the
part of the driver or drivers concerned.
9.3.3 THE ISSUE OF PERSONAL INSURANCE
The suggestion that motorists be allowed to take out
extra coverage for wage loss, and optional coverage
economic loss has met with the criticism that:
"We have difficulty in understanding the logic of an
argument that the present insurance scheme should be
replaced by a scheme which, if voluntary would oblige every
186
prudent motorist to take out additional insurance not only
for himself but for all members of his family; if such
additional insurance were to be compulsory this would
amount simply to two different insurance schemes) the total
cost of which to the motorist would be vastly increased) and
which would provide the person who is at present entitled to
compensation under the MVA Act with no greater cover than he
presently enjoys" (15).
As far as wage loss is concerned) it must be pointed out that the
proposed scheme aims to provide adequate but not total
compensation for wage losses, with the maximum amount available
large enough to adequately compensate the majority of the
population. It is deemed more equitable to adequately compensate
substantially all victims, rather than to totally compensate a
handful of victims. Although the above passage would seem to
imply that a victim is entitled to total cover under the present
Act, it should be noted that the Memorandum acknowledges that
"approximately 25 per cent of all injured persons have received
compensation prior to the amendment of April, 1980" (16) and
goes on to make calculations as to the cost of a no-fault
on the assumption that
system
the present premium structure has been tailored to
provide full common law compensat ion for 25 per cent of all
persons injured i n road accidents " (17).
If one takes this f igure to be the norm, then it would appear
that at present no cover at all is provided for 75 per cent of
motor accident victims.
In the light of the escalating number of road deaths and injuries
in a country noted for having one of the highest motor accident
rates in the world, it is submitted that prudent people under the
present system will be forced to take out optional insurance
cover to
accident,
cover all their damages in the event




under the present system.
As far as cover for non-economic loss is concerned, it is
submitted that it may be wiser to incorporate compensation for
these damages into the scheme, as it is doubtful whether
claimants will be sufficiently concerned about this type of loss
to take out such insurance (18). This issue could possibly be
put to the public by way of a referendum) the results of which
may surprise critics of the no-fault system:
"Surveys in the USA indicate that the general public prefers
insurance which offers the certainty of payment of actual
loss suffered as opposed to the uncertainty of recovery of
actual loss suffered plus pain and suffering, dependent on
whether or not fault can be proved" (19).
9.3.4 CRITICISM OF THE METHOD OF COLLECTING COMPENSATION FUNDS
The imposition of the levy on fuel in place of compulsory
insurance of vehicles has been rejected by the Grosskopf
Commission (20). Although the Commission acknowledged the
advantages such a system would have (such as increased cost-
efficiency), it felt that a system financed by a levy on fuel
would have to overcome certain basic problems:
" ( a ) Fuel which is used for internal combustion engines is
also used for other purposes which have no connection
with traffic on public roads. This is especially so in
the case of diesel which is used on a large scale for
the running of stationary engines, tractors, etc. If
fuel were to be sometimes taxed and sometimes not there
would be too many opportunities for evasion and
mistakes in administration.
(b) If a fund were to be established through a levy on fuel
there would be no third party insurer to handle claims
as under the present system. A new system for handling
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claims will thus have to be established.
Added to these two basic problems there is another less
important one, namely -
(c) many vehicles which are at present covered by the Act,
such as trailers and vehicles driven by electricity do
not use liquid fuel and would thus not make a direct
contribution to the fund". (21)
In order to surmount these problems the MVA fund submitted a
proposal containing the following suggestions:
"(a) That a fund be created and financed by -
(i) a levy on petrol, and
(ii) the payment of a premium for vehicles not
driven by petrol.
(b) That the administration of the proposed scheme be
handled as follows:
(i) The levy to be recovered by oil companies;
(ii) the premium for vehicles not driven by
petrol to be paid at a Post Office;
(iii) claims to be administered by a State
Corporation created for this purpose" (22).
The Commission then attempted to compare this proposed system
with the present system in relation to costs, service rendered to
the public. and the general effectiveness of the scheme.
In the course of examining the question of costs, the Commission
discovered that the oil companies were in principle prepared to
collect the levy free of charge or at a small charge provided it
could be included in levies already collected by them. The
Department of Posts and Telecommunications had not, at that
stage, agreed to collect premiums or indicated how much it would
charge for this service, but the Commission accepted that the
total costs of collection would probably be lower than at
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present, as 80 per cent of vehicles are driven by petrol at the
moment. However, · it was felt that the number of diesel-driven
vehicles might well rise drastically in the future, resulting in
the necessity of insuring more and more vehicles individually.
The Commission felt that the cost of administering the claims was
difficult to predict, and was not persuaded that there would be
any substantial saving achieved by the proposed system. It was
also not convinced that the proposed scheme would be an
improvement in relation to service rendered to the public, or in
relation to general effectiveness. The Commission expressed the
opinion that the proposed State corporation would not be cheaper
or more effective in the long run than the present system. In
this connection it argued that:
it must be borne in mind that the members of the
Consortium already have an existing widely spread network of
branch offices in 43 centres throughout the country to
satisfy the needs 6f the public and that a State corporation
would suffer a loss in effectiveness without a similar
infrastructure" (23).
It was generally felt that there was a lack of information
regarding the imposition of a fuel levy, and therefore no
concrete evidence that it would prove to be a better system.
Consequently the majority of the commission recommended that a
change from the present system of compulsory insurance of
vehicles to a ~evy on fuel should not be made.
However, a minority report (24) presented by J. Keyser supported
a change to a levy on fuel, and gave extensive reasons for its
introduction. These arguments given in support of a fuel levy
effectively counter many of the reservations held by the majority
of the Commission and merit closer examination.
Mr. Keyser commences his report by stating:
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"I feel that, in their approach to the problem, some of the
other members of the Commission placed too high a premium on
the importance and effectiveness of the free market system,
which, as far as third party insurance is concerned, is at
present represented by the service insurers and their agents
render on an agency bas~s, as against the interests of the
owners of about 4 million motor vehicles who are compelled
to take out third party insurance annually in terms of the
amended Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 1972 (Act 56
of 1972)" (25).
Keyser then commences to review the system of third party
insurance in relation to the question of State interference in a
free market system. He relates how under the provisions of the
1942 Motor Vehicle Insurance Act insurance companies were allowed
to carry on third party insurance for their own gain or loss,
with the State's function being merely to see to it that all
motor vehicle owners satisfied the requirements laid down in the
Act, and to determine tariffs for the insurance of motor vehicles
from time to time at the request of insurance companies.
The prescribed insurance tariffs increased gradually from R3,00
in 1946/47 to R17,00 in 1961/62. In 1964 the insurance companies
requested the Minister of Transport to increase the applicable
tariffs by 20 per cent. When this request was refused some
companies practically refused to issue third party insurance, and
a chaotic situation developed. Thus the State intervened and
created the Motor Vehicle Assurance Fund (MVA Fund) which acted
as a 100 per cent reinsurer of all the risks of insurance
companies. Keyser points out that it was only this governmental
intervention that has kept the tariff of premiums as low as it
is:
"The refusal of the Minister of Transport to agree to a 20%
increase in the premium tariffs at that time and the
resultant further intervention of the State in the free
market system had the result that motorists were saved at
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least R150 mil lion in premiums up to and including the
1983/84 insurance year. The amount of R1S0 million does not
include any premium increases resulting from inflation,
which insurers would certainly have insisted upon if they
had still been carrying on the relevant insurance for their
o wn g a in" ( 2 6 ) •
Keyser proceeds to demonstrate how between 1 May 1965 and 30
April 1983, 62,5 per cent of funds were used in compensating
claimants and paying their medical expenses, 37,5 per cent of
funds being used to pay the legal costs of insurers, the legal
costs of claimants, the assessors' fees, sundry expenses,
commission paid . to insurers and their agents for collection of
premiums and handling of claims, and the operating costs of the
MVA fund (27). Keyser thus submits that 37,5 per cent of the
funds are not used for the purpose for which they were collected
and that consequently more cost-effective systems must be
investigated.
Keyser also comments that:
"It is not good financial practice for the State to impose a
financial obligation on its citizens and then to leave it to
the private sector to spend the funds collected without the
sector's running any danger of suffering a loss as the




In relation to the problem of vehicles not driven
Keyser's solution is to abolish insurance for the
340 208 vehicles which are not self-driven.
amount to approximately 44
vehicles not driven by petrol.
per cent of the 20
He argues that:
per cent of
"The driver of a haulage unit or towing vehicle must
necessarily drive that vehicle negligently to cause an
accident with the towed vehicle. Even where a trailer for,
example, is left on a road or highway in a negligent manner
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and an accident results from this the driver of the haulage
unit who left the trailer there was being negligent and he
will be liable for the damage caused through his
negligence •••
If the owners of towing vehicles were released from the
obligation of taking out third party insurance there would
be only about 431 000 vehicles not driven by petrol that
would have to be insured annually, and this would certainly
not be so formidable a task for the Department of Posts and
Telecommunications or any other body " (29).
In relation to
states:
the problem of diesel-driven vehicles, Keyser
"Because of the imbalance between petrol and diesel in the
manufacturing process it must be accepted that the
Government would discourage rather than encourage the
manufacture of diesel-driven vehicles and the number of
vehicles of this type will, in my opinion, not increase so
much that their insurance will create any problems" (29).
Finally, the supposed advantage of the Consortium's network of
branch offices is challenged:
"Concerning the handling of claims, the insurers at present
have offices in some 43 centres in the country where claims
can be handed in. In most cases, however, the claims are
actually dealt with at the head offices of the Insurers on a
centralised basis and negotiations between a claimant and an
insurer can necessarily only take place in that centre where
the claims are being handled. In the case of the MVA fund,
all claims are at present filed at the MVA Fund office in
Pretoria and to help claimants the date on which the claim
was posted is regarded as the date of service of such claim
on the MVA Fund. Officials of the MVA Fund also visit the
larger centres in the country regularly to conduct
negotiations for settlement with claimants and their legal
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representatives. There is no reason why the present
procedure could not be continued under the proposed system"
(30).
Keyser ends his minority report by recommending that
"(a) a levy be imposed on petrol
(b) an insurance premium be imposed on all vehicles not
driven by petrol
(c) all vehicles not self-propelled be exempted from
compulsory motor vehicle insurance, and
(d) the collection of funds and the handling of claims be
assigned to the Motor Vehicle Assurance Fund" (31).
Although these arguments and recommendations are made with regard
to the imposition of a petrol levy within a third party system,
they are equally apposite to the imposition of such a system
within a first-party no-fault framework. In any event, it would
appear that a levy on fuel will be imposed in South Africa as
from April 1986, thus providing an opportunity to observe the
functioning of this alternative form of third party insurance at
first hand.
9.3.5 THE ISSUE OF COST
It is often, alleged that the cost of instituting a no-fault
system will be very high, making it a completely impractical type
of reform. There seems to be an overwhelming concern with
keeping the price of premiums (or levies) low. However, costs
"should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle in view of the
fact that the cost to the community of retaining the fault system
is astronomically high" (32). Even if a no-fault system would
cost more, the benefits to society as a whole would far outweigh
the extra expense. As an attorney replying to the questionnaire
pointed out, the present premium amounts to about one-half of
the cost of filling a petrol tank. He further suggested that
premiums should be increased to RIOO-R150. Those who argue that
such a move would prej udice poorer people presuppose that people
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who can afford to purchase a motor vehicle - an expensive item
cannot afford to pay for motor vehicle i n s u r a n c e , which is a
relatively small item. In any event, the high-benefit medical and
rehabilitation coverage offered by the proposed no-fault scheme
could mean the difference between full rehabilitation or a life
of disability for a poor person.
A change to a system of no-fault insurance does, however, not
necessarily mean an increase in costs. In examining the New
Zealand scheme, on which the proposed plan is to a large extent
based, one discovers that:
"the overall cost of the new system is much the same as the
previous one, despite the generosity of benefits and the
This
vastly enhanced entitlement to compensation" (33).
factor is due not only to the considerable saving in
administrative costs brought about by the utilisation of an
efficient state-backed insurance scheme but also to the use of
the "pay-as-you-go" method of financing the scheme.
"Private insurers operate on the principle of full funding:
in anyone year the revenues raised must on investment be
sufficient to meet the current and all future costs of
accidents occurr ing in that year. Thus considerable capital
reserves must be built up to meet the run-off costs of
present claims and they must, of course, cater for future
inflation. A government backed scheme, on the other hand,
can operate on a " pay-as-you-g o" basis, which that themeans
revenues raised in anyone year need only be sufficient to
meet the current costs of benefits provided in that year,
includ ing, of course, benefits currently payable in respect
of past accidents. Consequently, there is no need to
establish huge reserves, or to predict the future, if
inflation, for example, drives up the cost of the system,
the government (un like private insurers) can increase levies
or reduce the benefits payable under the system. This
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In the foregoing chapters the various forms of motor vehicle
insurance available today have been reviewed and the philosophy
behind the present fault system has been briefly examined. A
study has been made of the arguments both for and against the
present fault system and the implementation of no-fault motor
vehicle insurance in United States and New Zealand has been
examined. Finally, attention has been directed towards the motor
vehicle insurance system in South Africa and the possibility of
the reform of this system.
In closing, a brief reiteration of some of the reasons for the
necessity of reform may be helpful.
As noted earlier, there has, in recent years, been a shift in the
purpose of motor vehicle insurance from the indemnification of
drivers to the protection of victims. Compulsory motor vehicle
insurance plans are enacted for the benefit of those injured in
motor vehicle accidents, in order to ensure that there is a
solvent defendant in every case. At the same time, Western
society has demonstrated an increasing concern for the victim,
whether or not he is negligent) and the idea that society has a
moral duty to protect the public from the ravages of automobile
transportation has gained widespread acceptance.
There has been a recognition even among supporters of the fault
system, that the deterrent value of basing liability on fault has
been more or less eradicated by the provision of compulsory
insurance for all motor vehicle owners, and thus one of the main
tenets of using the fault system has crumbled. No-fault plans
have been enacted in various overseas systems without any
increase in irresponsible driving, thus confirming the suspicion
that driver behaviour is not influenced by the amount of cover
provided.
With the great increase in the number of vehicles on the
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road,
accidents have become more frequent and on today's roads a split-
second's loss of at tention may result in a serious accident.
Even good drivers make mistakes and in many cases it is simply a
matter of chance whether or not an accident will occur.
The fault system has been seen to make an arbitrary selection as
to who shall be compensated under the system. Factors such as
the absence of witnesses, the mechanical failure of the insured
vehicle and an inability to establish fault on anyone's part, as
well as factors such as the negligence of the victim have been
allowed to determine the exclusion of a large percentage of motor
accident victims from compensation. As a result, thousands of
injured victims and dependants of those victims who have been
killed on the road are left without compensation, and often
without any means of support.
In addition, the delays and administrative expense inherent in
the present fault-adversary system as well as the over-
compensation of minor injuries and the under-compensation of
serious injuries resulting from this approach, mean that even
where the victim can prove fault, the process of compensation is
still not entirely satisfactory.
In short, the fault system in its application to motor vehicle
accident compensation is inefficient and dilatory, and is
therefore not a suitable system in relation to this particular
field. What is needed is a system that will offer adequate
compensation
economical,




prompt payments in order to alleviate, as far as possible, the
economic and social hardships resu lting from a motor accident,
and the largest part of the insurance premium or levy collected
should be allocated to the compensation of victims.
It is contended here after careful consideration that a no-fault
system would fulfil these requirements. The advantages of such a
system have been highlighted earlier, and an investigation into
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overseas no-fault systems presently in operation has demonstrated
that in practice these systems enjoy a great deal of success.
Prompt compensation of all victims on the basis of the injuries
they have sustained as a result of the motor accident, regardless
of the question of fault, would result in a more equitable
system. The resulting reduction in administrative costs and
legal fees would also provide more funds for the compensation of
victims.
In South Africa calls for reform have led to the appointment of a
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the question of a change to
a system of no-fault motor vehicle insurance. Academics have
voiced their concern as to the deficiencies of the fault system
and although the legal profession would appear to be divided over
the issue of no-fault reform, there is no doubt that many have
encountered injustices in the present system.
The time is ripe for South Africa to take a bold and visionary
step into the forefront of Western insurance thinking. Although
the introduction of a no-fault scheme for motor accident injuries
would involve breaking new ground for South Africa, there is no
excuse for clinging to the present system simply to avoid a leap
into the unknown. This is especially the case in the light of
the proven success of 'no fault' in overseas systems. As Lord
Denning has said in another context:






do anything which has not been done before, we
get anywhere. The law will stand still while
both" (1).
NOTE TO CHAPTER 10
1. Packer v Packer (1954) P15 (A) at 22.




In May 1983 a questionnaire on motor vehicle insurance was sent
out to all attorneys in the cities of Durban, Pietermaritzburg,
Bloemfontein, Cape Town, East London, Johannesburg and Pretoria.
It was also sent to the Law Departments of all the South African
Universities, and to all the insurance companies in the
consortium at the time. In all, 150 completed questionnaires
were received from 144 attorneys, 4 academics and 2 insurance
companies. The results of this questionnaire therefore express,
to a large extent, the opinions of attorneys. While it is
acknowledged that the response was small it may still be useful
to record the findings of this survey.
SECTION A
QUESTION ONE
Consider the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act,
stipulations.












If the answer to the above is (a) or (b), what changes do you
envisage?
Change to a no-fault system -
Procedural changes
Changes in the provisions














In addition, 0,8 per cent felt an independent body should be
utilised, 3,1 per cent felt neither a state agency nor a private
agency should be utilised, 0,8 per cent felt that both should be
employed, and 3,8 per cent responded that the situation should
'remain as is'.
QUESTION FOUR
Should insurance companies pay on a monthly basis, as doctor's
bills, hospital bills, lost wages etc., occur, or wait until the
injured person and the insurance company agree on a lump sum
after a trial?
(a) monthly sum best
(b) lump sum best
51,4 per cent
41,3 per cent
In addition, 5,1 pe r cent felt both opti ons should apply, 0,7 per
cent were uncertain, and 1,4 per cent felt that neither option
should be used.
QUESTION FIVE
(i). Are you in favour of a partial abolition of the fault system
using the concept of a "threshold' to eliminate delictual






(c) No 44,7 per cent
(ii) If yes, at what level would you place such a threshold?
Under R5000
R5000 - RlO 000
RIO 000+






and 14,1 per cent felt there should
What effect, if any, do you think a change to no-fault insurance









What, in your experience, is the average/normal time gap between
the injury and the compensation of the victim?
4-12 months 7 . 6 per cent
12-24 months 52,3 per cent
24-36 months 32 ,5 per cent
36-48 months 6,1 per cent
Over 48 months 0,7 per cent
QUESTION EIGHT
(i) Have you encountered cases where innocent victims have been








(ii) If yes, give an example of the circumstances. Numerous
varied e xamples were given, the most common of which were:
there were no witnesses to the accident, (ii) where
mechanical failure (e.g. brake failure) occurred, (iii)
where there was no fault on the part of the driver (e.g.,
where the motor vehicle which caused the accident suffered a
burst tyre, or where the driver of the vehicle which caused
the accident suffered a heart attack), (iv) where the
plaintiff suffered from amnesia as a result of the accident,
(v) where evasive action was taken to avoid a collision, and
thus no 'contact' between the vehicles could be proved in a
hit-and-run case, (vi) where the claimant was a dependant of












Advance payment plans for victim's out-of-pocket expenses if the





















































The concept of cause has little operational significance in the
study of accidents, and traffic accidents can be most
meaningfully viewed as failures of the system rather than








The present system is a success as regards its function of
compensating
accidents
for personal injuries suffered in automobile
Agree 34,3 per cent
Uncertain 18,2 per cent
Disagree 47,4 per cent
QUESTION FIVE
The gap between loss and compensation is primarily due to the









The present system exerts a strong temptation to dishonesty, in
that pressure is felt to improve one's case or defence, even by








If first party coverage was introduced, then such insurance








If change to a system of 'no-fault' insurance would have a









The introduction of a no-fault motor vehicle insurance system









Following a worldwide trend towards no-fault insurance, it will
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